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Summary
The role of owner occupied housing and manufacturing industry have been both high 
profile and controversial topics, particularly over the last decade. The present study 
attempts to identify and evaluate the effect of government taxation policy, inflation, 
risk and capital markets on individuals long run allocation of resources between these 
sectors. The majority of economic literature, particularly in the U .K ., focuses on 
these sectors in isolation and is often (especially in housing studies) interested in the 
short to medium run implications.
The first part of the study (Chapter 1) identifies various key investment rules to 
which our model can appeal. In order to expose the factors outlined above the 
investment hurdle has been formulated within the confines of the user cost of capital 
theory. Economic and institutional conditions prevalent in the period 1965 to 1979 
were imposed on the basic portfolio model which is a two sector multi-equation 
general equilibrium model whose output determines asset allocation, real user cost of 
capital and real cash flows (Chapter 2). Plausible data estimates were calculated, or 
where econometrically derived estimates were necessary, these were obtained from 
relevant empirical studies (Chapter 3).
The model is subjected to sensitivity analysis and then we apply growth, general and 
relative price inflation and finally mortgage rationing (Chapter 4). These simulations 
culminate to produce conditions which are similar to those actually experienced 
during the period of interest. Principal results of interest of the model are portfolio 
asset allocations, user costs of capital, the mortgage loan to valuation ratio and real 
cash flows. Output may also be obtained for required rates of return, risk premia 
and the effects of the mortgage capital market. The study finds that, in the long 
run, portfolio shifts occur away from manufacturing assets towards owner occupied 
housing in the presence of general and relative house price inflation. Mortgage 
rationing on the other hand offsets much, though not all, of this bias. We then 
adjust the model by fixing the risk free rate of interest. We also reduce both the 
relative real house price inflation and manufacturing equity variance which were a 
particular feature of this period in order to provide us with a long run model with 
which we may regard as a base for comparison in the following Chapter.
The model is utilised to trace the effects of variant tax policies under identical 
inflation and capital market conditions (Chapter 5) in order to suggest methods of 
compensating or eliminating the above bias. This is of particular interest, as the 
identification and evaluation of the long run indirect as well as direct effects of 
government policy (taxation and capital market influence), under alternative
economic environments, is a prerequisite for informed policy prescription. Two 
policies are directed at owner occupied housing and two at manufacturing. All 
policies are designed to encourage portfolio switching towards manufacturing. We 
present and assess each policies effectiveness under various economic conditions.
Finally, we discuss our results in the context of the U.K. literature and suggest areas 
of further research to which our model may be applied (Chapter 6).
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1. INTRODUCTION.
1.1. Introduction.
The objective of this research is to develop a model framework which will facilitate 
the analysis of inflation, taxation, risk and capital markets on individuals portfolio 
investment. A long run general equilibrium simulation model utilising user cost of 
capital theory is identified as the most pertinent modelling vehicle for this task. We 
present the owner occupied housing and manufacturing sectors as key to the 
performance of the UK economy and model these over the period 1965 to 1979 in 
Chapter 2. A discussion of appropriate parameters and model solution technique is 
presented in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 we simulate various parameter changes in 
order to explore pertinent areas of the model and simulate the growth, inflation and 
capital market conditions of that period. Our final objective of this Chapter is to 
slightly alter both the model structure and a limited number of parameters in order 
that we may obtain a long run model suitable for comparing various policy shocks 
which are presented in Chapter 5. The process of cumulatively imposing growth, 
general inflation, relative inflation and mortgage rationing enables a comparative 
static analysis of the effects of these changes under alternative policy frameworks. 
Chapter 6 provides a summary of conclusions followed by an outline for further 
research.
The objective of this Chapter is to outline the foundations of asset allocation studies 
and discuss some of the long-run implications of these models. Following a 
discussion of the micro-economic principals of the investment decision, the three 
main investment theories of the firm are presented along with a review of the 
empirical evidence. Given the long-run nature of most sector or asset allocation 
models and the complexity of the investment decision process, it is argued that 
utilisation of the user cost of capital theory will most beneficially enable the explicit 
isolation of the effects on asset allocation of taxation, risk capital markets and 
inflation. A review of investment allocation models which encompass the above 
issues is presented and a conclusion derived suggesting the most fruitful vehicle for 
researching issues within a U.K. context. Following this we present a discussion 
which focuses on why owner occupied housing and manufacturing are key sectors.
In particular the interaction of owner occupation and the political environment is 
discussed along with the role of building societies and the potential effects on the 
rest of the economy of housing wealth. It is argued that manufacturing investment 
is significant in introducing technical improvements which are crucial to economic 
growth and international competitiveness. A discussion of the U .K .'s  productivity 
slowdown in the 1970's is provided which places investment misallocation in the
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context of alternative hypotheses explaining this phenomenon. In order to provide 
the foundations of the model presented in Chapter 2 each sectors respective fiscal 
regimes are presented followed by a discussion of contemporary policy issues which 
may be tested by our model.
1.2. Economic Growth, Investment and Resource Allocation.
The purpose of this Section is to set in context the importance of investment for 
resource allocation and economic growth. During this process we review a number 
of theories of investment and determine which is the most appropriate when 
constructing our model.
1.2.1. Investment Theory.
In order to demonstrate the importance of investment for economic growth we can 
look at the basic framework of a simple neoclassical growth model and then suggest 
some realistic complexities which reinforce the importance of investment.
In the long run, an economy's level of output is mainly a function of the size of the 
labour force, the capital stock and the state of the technology. Standard neoclassical 
long run steady-state growth models demonstrate that the growth rate is a function of 
the growth in both the labour force and, in technical knowledge, not the rate of 
investment (Phelps, 1961, pp. 643; Levacic and Rebman, 1982, pp. 276). Generally, 
these models demonstrate that an increase in the rate of investment raises the short 
run rate of growth. In time, the economy reverts back to the "natural'' rate of 
growth, but at a higher income per head and capital-output ratio.
A standard aggregate production function would take the form:
where the subscript w represents the whole economy rather than any subsector. Lw is 
the stock of available labour, Kw. represents the total capital stock and T is the state 
of technical knowledge.
Abstracting from technical progress, the average product of labour is an increasing 
function of the capital to labour ratio:
Y w = f  (L„K „,T), (1. 1)
Yw / Lw =  f  (K„ / L J . (1.2)
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A key contribution to growth theory was made by Solow (1956) who maintained that 
factor prices are variable in the long run and respond to excess demand. This 
introduced the possibility of factor substitution by agents in response to changes in 
relative factor prices. These assumptions formed the comer stone of the neoclassical 
model of economic growth.
A notable feature of this model is that there is no explicit investment function, 
investment being a change in the capital stock:
I =  dK^ / dt, (1.3)
where I represents investment and t is a unit of time. Perfect competition is 
assumed and, consequently, profit maximising firms equate the marginal product of 
sm input to its price.
This research utilises the assumption that, in the long run, factor prices are flexible, 
and consequently given demand conditions factor substitution occurs.
Usually, growth analysis is concerned with the relationship between the factors of 
production labour and capital. At one disaggregate level, Y w consists of a set of 
industries such as manufacturing, services or housing. The composition of these 
industries may affect the overall performance of the economy. Neoclassical theory 
would argue that the composition of was irrelevant as each industry's marginal 
products would be optimal but when we introduce taxation and inflation, this result 
cannot be taken for granted. For example, it could be argued that both disembodied 
and embodied technical changes naturally occur in one industry to a greater extent 
than on another. Thus, increased levels of investment in this sector would directly 
impinge on the growth rate of the economy. The level of capacity in certain sectors 
may have a bearing on inflation and the balance of payments.
It is clear then that economic performance is directly influenced by the level and 
direction of investment flows which represent resource allocation by investors in the 
economy who are assumed to be standard profit-maximising agents. These simple 
assumptions of factor substitution in the long run, and profit maximisation, enable 
governments to affect resource allocation through fiscal measures, that is, taxes and 
subsidies. Thus, government action, whether intentional or unintentional, will affect, 
through personal sector portfolio allocation, the economy's output and productivity 
levels. In a similar way rising inflation or volatile risk premiums may favour 
investment in particular sectors which again suggests that in a more complex 
environment, economic growth will depend on the direction and magnitude of
- 3 -
investment flows.
1.2.2. The Concept of Investment.
Given the importance of investment it is desirable to examine some of the key 
concepts which underlie the process. Investment is the accumulation over time of 
real capital goods by economic agents where capital yields a flow of services to its 
owner. There are four main forms of real investment: Firstly, business investment 
in fixed capital, that is plant or machinery which maintain their physical form 
throughout their working lives. Secondly, inventories or stocks of working capital 
which play an important function in the economy by enabling industry to respond 
effectively to changes in demand (A brief discussion of inventories is presented in 
Greenaway and Shaw 1983, Kelly and Owen 1985 and Wallis et al. 1987, Chapter 
5). Thirdly, investment in housing construction and finally, public sector 
investment.
Keynes (1936, pp. 63) states that once consumption is set by the personal sector, 
saving and investment, which, by definition are equal, is the residual between 
income and consumption. In the short run, it is not surprising that investment is the 
most volatile component in the traditional national income identity and is a major 
factor in determining the level of economic activity.
The agents motive to invest is essentially an attempt to maximise wealth subject to a 
suitable intertemporal trade-off between present and future consumption. Investment 
must be capable of increasing future output. This can be achieved by either 
increasing the size of the fixed capital base or through technological advances.
A neglected aspect of investment (Feldstein and Foot, 1971; Bemdt, 1991, pp. 229- 
232) is the distinction between gross (I), net (In) and replacement (Ir) investment. 
Gross investment represents the total outlay on capital goods, whilst net investment 
measures that part of the outlay which increases the size of the capital stock. The 
difference, depreciation, or Ir is that amount of the capital which has completed its 
economic life either as a result of physical deterioration or technical obsolescence.
If capital depreciates at a rate 5 then:
dK, / dt =  I, - <5K, =  Int = I, - Vi, (1.4)
and
K, =  K„, +  I»t, (1.5)
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where K, represents the stock of manufacturing capital. Throughout this Chapter K^ , 
and K may be substituted and we use K for simplicity. Depreciation alone requires 
investment in capital if  the size of the capital stock is to even remain constant and is 
therefore a significant component of total investment outlay for many productive 
sectors, for example manufacturing. Only when I, >  Pv new investment adding 
to the capital stock and consequently wealth.
Having allocated present income for investment, the investor must then assess both 
the likely return from each potential project and the associated risk incurred. In this 
respect, the formation of expectations are crucial to investment (Arrow, 1964; Ando 
et a/,1974; Nickell, 1974) and consequently, the standard neoclassical theory has 
been criticised for its myopic assumptions. More recently, rational expectations 
theory (see Muth 1960; Sheffrin 1983, Chapter 1; Cuthbertson and Taylor, 1987, 
Chapter 3), where long-run expectations are based on an assessment of all available 
information using the true predictive model of the economy, have been applied to 
models of the whole economy (Wallis et al. 1987, pp. 3). Dow and Dow (1985) 
argue that even rational expectations theory cannot account for "Animal Spirits" 
associated with the investment process. An important aspect of risk minimisation is 
through product or portfolio diversification (a general framework of portfolio 
characteristics is discussed in Blake (1986a)). Having assessed these parameters, 
investments are chosen so as to optimise the risk return trade off.
We shall assume that, ultimately, individuals own all net wealth in the economy and 
therefore, it is the set of risk and return combinations facing them which 
fundamentally determine resource allocation (eg. HH, where HH denotes Hendershott 
and Hu (1983); Kau and Keenan, 1983; Gahvari, 1984; King and Fullerton, 1984; 
Fullerton and Henderson, 1987; Davis, 1988; Barr and Cuthbertson, 1989). Clearly, 
there is a direct link between individuals and their decision to invest in an asset such 
as housing. This is complicated when assessing manufacturing investment given the 
existence of the corporate entity which itself has to choose between strategies and 
investments. Whilst individuals and firms are naturally interdependent, there is an 
important difference in function illustrated by Goodhart (1975, pp. 89). Corporates 
perform an organising function, the creation of teams, whilst the personal sector 
supplies labour and, ultimately, owns all the assets used in the corporate sector.
The important point of this study is that corporates can only invest to the extent that 
individuals will fund them, which, in turn, depends on the relative attraction of 
corporate debt and equity.
The nature of investment in real fixed assets will directly link today's investment 
with the composition of future capital stock. Thus, Arrow (1964) points out that 
whilst profit is a function of the capital stock, this function will change through time 
as technology and relative prices change. Robinson (1961) and Nickell (1974) 
argue that investment models assuming a "putty-putty" capital stock (one where 
there is perfect substitution of capital ex ante and ex post) are flawed. Their 
argument is based on the premise that after the decision to choose a project has 
occurred, the capital is "bolted down" and hence, investment is irreversible, the 
capital is in clay form and I >  O. Evidence of premature scrapping (Wadhwani 
and Wall, 1986) in times of recession does weaken this argument to some extent. 
Their point is important as a criticism of pure neoclassical investment models and 
their full employment of capital predictions. This argument only magnifies the need 
for government to understand how it may be affecting investment decisions while 
they are at a putty stage. Given that our model seeks to shed light on the long run 
allocation implications of taxation, inflation and risk then it is putty-putty in nature.
In the long run, investors may substitute assets freely investing in order to maximise 
returns. We have assumed that individuals own all net wealth and therefore we are, 
by definition, interested in the decisions they make given a choice o f post tax real 
asset yields and associated risks.
1.2.3. Theories of Investment.
We can now discuss investment theory in order to establish investment rules which 
represent the behaviour of investors which we may utilise in our model. Initially we 
discuss the single project rules of Net Present Value (NPV) and Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR) in their basic forms (Section 1.2.4.1.). Following this we discuss the 
crucial roles of the cost of capital (finance) and equity valuation. Using the single 
project rules framework we analyse the effect of inflation, taxation and risk on the 
investment decision. For completeness we discuss the less technically oriented 
payback method in Section 1.2.4.2. which leads us into our discussion of investment 
theories of the firm.
1.2.4. Single Project Rules.
At an individual project level, there are two similar methods for evaluating an 
investment: the net present value method (NPV), the internal rate of return (IRR) 
and a more general rule of thumb, the pay back method. Utilising such methods, 
the individual or firm chooses investments with the object of profit or shareholder 
wealth maximisation.
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1.2.4.1. Net Present Value and Internal Rate o f Return.
The concept of NPV and IRR are related and can be discussed together, with 
identical investment conditions, they produce exactly the same results (Levy and 
Samet, 1986, pp. 58). It should also be noted that the user cost o f capital (see 
Section 1.2.5.1. focuses on these principals, in particular the NPV concept. More 
detailed descriptions can be found in most standard finance text books (Rutterford, 
1983; Levy and Samat, 1986; Adams, 1989).
Equation (1.6) is a simple formula which allows us to calculate the present value, 
PV, of some value known in the future, FV, at a time period t when the actor is 
aware of the relevant discount rate, C, thus:
PV =  FV, / (1+C )'. (1.6)
Conversely, multiplying both sides by (1+C)* we can calculate a future value given 
the present value of the sum at time period 1.
Equation (1.6) can be split into a more obviously operationally relevant formula 
which introduces net cash receipts, CR (profit deducting operating expenses) for each 
time period until the investment is expected to end its usefulness in period s and by 
deducting the initial investment outlay, 10, we obtain a general formula to calculate 
the NPV as:
s CR,
NPV =  E ------------- - IQ . (1.7)
t=i (1+C )'
Equation (1.7) is utilised by investing in a project as long as the NPV > 0 .  If the 
NPV =  O, the investor is indifferent to the project.
The IRR method of project selection is very similar to the NPV principal. The 
object is to find the discount rate which equates the PV of the stream of net receipts 
to the value of the initial investment outlay. We can call this discount rate C,. 
More complex factors may be introduced such as comparing projects with the same 
IRR but with different cash flow profiles (Gronchi, 1986; Wright, 1986). However, 
such complexities are unnecessary for the present analysis. The investor must find a 
value for C, such that equation (1.8) is satisfied:
E  i* = o.
,=7 (l+c,.)'
(1.8)
Remembering that C is the cost of capital facing the investor (the opportunity cost) 
and therefore represents the minimum required return from a project. The investor 
will invest in a project as long as the condition C, >  C and is indifferent where C,
=  C.
The IRR method is sometimes known as the "discounted cash flow" or the "marginal 
efficiency of capital". The latter term was used by Keynes (1936, pp. 135) where 
he states, "I define the marginal efficiency of capital as being equal to the rate of 
discount which would make the present value of a series of annuities given by the 
returns expected from the capital-asset during its life just equal to its supply price".
It is from this analysis that Keynes describes a downward sloping marginal efficiency 
of capital schedule equating the rate of interest and the stock of fixed capital. The 
slope results from the downward pressure on the projects profit stream, as rising 
output tends to push price down for a given demand while capitals supply price rises 
as the demand for capital increases. In this respect Keynes did not attempt to 
provide an alternative to the marginalist theory of distribution in the long run 
(Sebastiani, 1984, pp. 186). It is this process is that which lies behind the law of 
diminishing returns. The desired capital stock will be chosen utilising the above 
NPV or IRR methods subject to the law of diminishing returns which ensures a 
limited value for the desired capital stock, K*.
1.2.4.1.1. Cost of Capital.
We demonstrated the key role of the cost of capital in Section 1.2.4.1. Given this, 
it is important to understand what alternatives may contribute to the cost of capital 
in the real world.
The cost of capital is the cost of financing an investment project (opportunity cost) 
and is different from the user cost of capital (although it is part of it) and the price 
paid for a capital good or asset. Clearly from equations (1.6) to (1.8), the cost of 
capital (C, or C,); will affect the attractiveness of an investment. Corporates can 
finance investment by utilising retained earnings (RE), debt (B) or equity (E). In 
reality the actual C will be a weighted average of these financing routes.
A good starting point to discuss the relationship between these financing vehicles is 
to begin with a paper written by Modigliani and Miller (1958). The aim of this
paper is to demonstrate that under certain conditions, the financing and investment 
decisions are separate. That is, the cost of capital is independent of the ratio of RE, 
B and E. In order to achieve this result, no corporate or personal taxes are 
assumed, capital markets are perfect and financial transactions and bankruptcies are 
executed cost free. All funds can be borrowed at a single rate and published 
information is equally available to all.
Naturally, such assumptions are far from realistic and therefore, financial structure 
will depend on the extent to which these assumptions evaporate. King (1974; 1977, 
Chapter 4) argues that taxation (for example, the interest deductability o f corporate 
debt) does affect the investment finance decision and in both papers concludes that 
for purely tax reasons, corporates would not issue equity. Auerbach (1983, pp. 909) 
derives a similar conclusion for the U.S. Casual observation suggests that this is not 
a corporates typical financial structure. Capital markets reflect the view that as the 
proportion of debt rises the probability of bankruptcy increases and therefore, 
increased debt would either cost the corporate disproportionately more or not be 
forthcoming at all.
It would consequently be advantageous if our model could facilitate financing from 
various sources with separate costs and tax structures.
1.2.4.1.2. Equity Valuation.
The valuation placed on the ownership of certain assets, particularly equity, can also 
effect the incentive to invest. Given this our model will incorporate a parameter 
which enables equity valuations to shift.
The need for equity financing introduces further complexities for corporate financial 
structure. Efficient market theory (briefly outlined in Rutterford (1983, Chapter 9) 
and Phlipps (1988, Chapter 8)) suggests that share prices fully reflect the underlying 
worth of the company. Under these conditions, corporates would be unwilling to 
finance by issuing equity if  the stock markets valuation was lower than their 
perceived worth of the company. Efficient markets are a prerequisite for the 
Modigliani and Millar (1958) conclusion.
Many economists have questioned this theory given the extreme volatility and 
sustained deviations of market valuations from underlying valuations. Efficient 
market theorists argue that these observations are a result of new information or 
changes in the discount rate. Grossman and Shiller (1981) and Nickell and 
Wadhwani (1987) reject the efficient market hypothesis. The former authors reject
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the changing discount rate theory while the latter authors support the "fads model" 
explanation. "Fads models" suggest that stock markets become driven by sentiment 
or fashions. Hendershott (1981) focuses on the undervaluation of the U.S. stock 
market in the 1970's, particularly the effects inflation may have through taxation, 
increased risk premiums, the effects of government deflationary policy and 
alternative assets becoming more attractive. There is currently little consensus as to 
what theory, if  any, should replace the efficient market hypothesis.
This problem is not isolated to the corporate sector, Case and Shiller (1989) use 
time series data between 1970 and 1986 for selected regions in the U.S. and rejected 
the hypothesis that the housing market is efficient. Phillips (1988) finds that while 
investors in housing are sensitive to changes in the user cost of housing the 
immediate response can be small and the speed of adjustment is asymmetric as 
investment rises relatively quickly if costs fall but individuals tend to cut expenditure 
in other areas if housing costs rise.
Evaluating the true worth of a corporate is not straight forward. Fazzari et al. 
(1988a) and Edwards (1987) argue that capital markets present the problem of 
asymmetric information which makes it costly for providers of external finance to 
evaluate the quality of firm 's investment opportunities. Edwards (1987) furthers this 
argument by indicating that this information problem itself may have secondary 
effects on financing. Owners of firms (outsiders) may use capital markets as a form 
of controlling the actions of managers (insiders), to the extent that when this happens 
it can be thought of as an "agency cost". Furthermore, a signalling cost can also be 
identified in which managers pay out greater than financially optimal dividends in 
order to attract funds. Fazzari et al. (1988b) show that asymmetric information and 
taxation impinge to a large extent on corporates (particularly rapidly growing ones 
who are quantity constrained in the capital markets and are therefore dependent on 
retained earnings. If  this is the case, then the average tax rate on returns from 
existing projects will affect the investment decision.
Clearly, given the arguments presented above, any investment theory which explicitly 
incorporates the cost of capital should allow for different methods and costs of 
finance.
A common method of incorporating multiple financing sources is to include each 
with a relevant weight attached. This method is incorporated into our model and is 
also utilised in the work of King (1974, pp. 29), Auerbach (1983, pp.
926-929), Kelly and Owen (1985, pp, 8-12) and Levy and Samet (1986, Chapter 
18).
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1.2.4.1.3. Taxation and Investment.
The role of taxation on resource allocation is key to the rationale for the model 
presented, particularly in view of the effect on economic growth argued in Section
1.2.1. Apart from the critical function of raising revenue, fiscal measures are 
clearly regarded by government as "control variables" or "instruments” and 
therefore, form an integral part in overall economic policy (eg. see Gordon, 1981, 
pp. 435-436). As such, we have witnessed a plethora of changes in tax rules not 
only during the period of interest, but throughout the century. It is not the purpose 
of this work to discuss the theory of taxation in any great depth (the reader is 
referred to Prest and Barr (1985), James and Nobes (1988) or Hardie (1989) for a 
brief history), but to discuss the main areas where tax policy influences investment 
and resource allocation. More specific aspects of the tax regime and its interaction 
with the user cost of capital is discussed in Chapter 2.
The government can tax using either indirect or direct taxes and it can tax the 
consumption of a good which, depending on income and substitution effects, may 
reduce the demand for that good and thus influence resources devoted to that 
industry. If it is the intention of the government to influence resource allocation 
between sectors, then a more efficient method would be to directly tax or subsidise 
the sectors in question. This could be done by altering the sectors cost of capital 
(see Devereux (1987) for a summary of the U.K), effectively increasing the rate at 
which firms must discount their cash flow or to directly tax cash flow. This 
influence is weakened if efficient "tax capitalisation" occurs in the asset market, that 
is, the price of the asset rises or falls in order to equate post tax return to its 
original level before the fiscal change.
We can use the example of taxing a firm 's cash flow by r  (the corporate tax rate) 
and for simplicity, relate this to the investment rule in equation (1.8), although the 
same principal of incorporating tax into the three investment theories o f the firm 
applies. By introducing corporation tax, we can calculate a post tax net present 
value (denoted by the superscript p t )  of a project. Equation (1.8) then becomes:
, (l-r)CR,
NPVpr =  E ---------------- l o ,  (1.9)
t=i (1+ C )1
We can see that firm 's investment decisions in a sector which is subject to 
corporation tax will find fewer viable projects compared to firms in a sector with no 
corporation tax. Simply, for all t, if the condition r  >  O holds, then NPV/T <
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NPV.
Annual depreciation allowances have the opposite effect in that they allow firms to 
subtract the cost of depreciation of capital from its annual tax charge. A tax rate of 
r  makes a 100% allowance worth r  pence in the pound while a 25% first year 
allowance is worth 0.25 x r  in the pound. Future years allowances can be 
calculated and a present value created. This does not directly affect the firm 's cash 
flow but influences the post tax cash flow and therefore, corporate tax becomes 
t(CRt-M lj), where M l, is the accelerated depreciation allowance. Since M l, is 
subtracted to calculate the corporation tax burden, it has to be added back to give a 
post tax cash flow of (l-r)(C R ,-M l,)+M l,. Equation (1.9) becomes :
(1-t)CRj tM 1;
N P V "  =  E [ ------------- + -----------------(l-g)I„ ]  (1.10)
, - i  (1+C *)‘ (1+Cf)<
Where C* is the post tax cost of finance, Cf is the "risk free" cost of finance which 
is applied to depreciation allowance because it is certain unlike profits flow.
The term g represents an investment grant which effectively reduces the price of the 
capital good to the investor. As the value of g rises, the NPV to an investor also 
rises. Thus, a sector which attracts such grants, ceteris paribus, will find it more 
profitable to expand capacity than one which does not.
The argument that taxation has no effect on the investment decision has been 
forwarded by Stiglitz (1973) who criticises Jorgensen and others who apply tax 
parameters to marginal costs of capital for resource allocation purposes on the basis 
that they have no effect on the investment decision. A similar argument was put 
forward by the Colwyn Committee Report of 1927 (Prest and Barr, 1985, pp. 47) 
with respect to income taxes. Prest and Barr (1985) argue that this criticism is 
misconceived on the grounds that marginal firms are not zero profit firms but make 
normal profits and thus, would pay tax on these.
Another theoretical problem when assessing the effect of tax changes on resource 
allocation is the "Ceteris Paribus" complexity (Prest and Barr, 1985, pp. 32). This 
is the difficulty of identifying what other variables in a model are assumed to be 
held constant when the effects of a tax change are being traced. For example, if 
government expenditure is assumed to increase pari passu with the imposition of a 
new tax, it is difficult to differentiate between the changes arising from the tax and 
the increased government expenditure. This can be achieved by assuming that any 
tax change is "fully compensated" by the opposite change in another tax which is
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known to have no effect on individuals' income or the government budget, but only 
changes the relative prices facing the individual. This methodology is applied to 
resource allocation between non-residential and residential sectors by Gahvari (1984). 
This problem is discussed in relation to our model in Chapter 2.
1.2.4.1.4. Inflation and Taxation.
On its own inflation, through relative prices can affect a sectors investment or 
financing ability, even the government (a study of the gains and losses on the real 
value of monetary assets between 1979 and 1987 can be found in Kennedy (1989)). 
The interaction of inflation and a tax regime can distort the signals which investors' 
face and as such alternative investments are best looked at in real post tax terms. 
Our model is designed to expose the effects of inflation and taxation at a general 
and asset specific level. All model results will be in real terms.
Inflation and taxation interacts with investment decisions in several ways: The net 
present value calculation described above is sensitive to changes in inflation because 
of the compounding effect on cash flow. The holder of the asset may be moved 
into progressively higher marginal tax brackets, although this process, fiscal drag 
(See Prest and Barr (1985, pp. 334) or James and Nobes (1988, pp. 139)), would 
not directly affect resource allocation except to the extent that competing assets had 
different income elasticities.
For industrial assets, inflation, coupled with historic cost accounting does effect real 
returns. Corporate profits become overstated because stock gains are taxed on a 
nominal basis and because depreciation is based on historic figures. King and 
Wookey (1987) argue that this argument may be too simple and that for a given tax 
structure, effects on the economy may be symmetrical in that the effects on 
investment may be positive below a certain rate of inflation and negative above it. 
For this reason, they emphasise the need for careful modelling of such areas in 
order to fully understand the implications of tax structures. This argument can be 
extended in that such effects will occur at different rates of inflation for different 
sectors of industry, the particular rate being a function of relative stock to capital 
and debt to equity ratios. A disaggregated approach is also useful given that 
inflation is generally not neutral, thus price signals and expectations become 
important. During the 1970's corporate returns looked spectacular, but intuition and 
inflation adjusted measures confirm otherwise. Under inflationary conditions, 
excessive dividend payout and wage claims may be the norm.
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The accountancy profession did attempt to introduce some form of inflation 
accounting with the Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAPs) 16 and 
Exposure Draft 35 (see Holmes and Sugden, 1986, Chapter 22). A further structure 
which differs from current cost accounting is the current purchasing power method 
(Kay and Meyer, 1984). Owing to disagreement among the accountancy profession 
and reservations of industry, these methods have never achieved mass popularity 
and, consequently, the historic cost basis has remained the norm.
Inflation can bring its apparent advantages to investment. To the extent that an asset 
is debt financed, the owner will benefit from the erosion of the real value of this 
debt through time. Furthermore, if  nominal interest rates can be deducted against 
taxable income, then high nominal interest rates increase the value of this deduction. 
Even where the tax regime achieved neutrality across assets, if  people perceived any 
of these as better inflation hedges than others, that asset would benefit as inflation 
rose.
Despite the logic for economic agents to make decisions from a real base, nominal 
figures clearly operate in complex ways. A good example of this outwith investment 
theory is the argument presented by Deaton (1977) that "mass illusion" can occur 
because consumers are unable to distinguish between relative and absolute price 
charges and, as a result, in an inflationary environment, real consumption falls. For 
the above reasons, Anderson (1981) suggest analysing investment expenditure in a 
nominal framework. Bean (1981), on the other hand, points out that this argument 
implies that all price movements are unanticipated and suggests that a better way 
forward would be to maintain the conventional real approach, but include prices as 
an additional variable. The approach suggested by Bean (1981) is used in our 
model.
I.2.4.I.5. Risk and Taxation.
Like inflation, the combination of risk and taxation can theoretically have important 
implications for the allocation of investment. This is likely to be especially true 
with assets at divergent ends of the risk spectrum. Given this our model explicitly 
incorporates risk premiums and enables the effect of taxation on these to be 
analysed.
Assuming that investors are risk averse, then the quid pro quo for incurring 
additional risk must be a higher expected return (a more detailed discussion is 
presented in Prest and Barr, 1985, pp. 43-47). Under this assumption the existence 
o f a fixed rate tax results in the post tax risk premium received by the investor
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being less than at the pre tax level. Moreover, the taxing of risk premium is 
asymmetric in that the government does not share in any losses, thus taxation 
reduces the mean expected return of progressively riskier projects. This proposition 
is diluted to some extent if the tax on all returns reduces income and therefore 
increases the desire to undertake risky investments in order to compensate for this 
(Prest and Barr, 1985, pp. 45). Evidently, housing is considered a relatively "safe" 
investment, for example, Bootle (1985, pp. 38) compares it with that of an index 
linked gilt, thus even if it were taxed, the returns would not suffer in the manner 
described above.
Risk and inflation are not independent. High levels of inflation (more precisely 
varying rates) tend to be associated with greater uncertainty and the likelihood of 
austere anti-inflation policies. Risky investments will tend to suffer in such an 
environment. In the U.S. Malkiel (1979) has argued that investment in fixed capital 
was not only sluggish during the 1970's, but that much of the investment which did 
take place was skewed towards equipment and relatively short term projects. He 
concludes that inflation disproportionately increased the risk premium on long-term 
investments.
1.2.4.2. The Payback Method.
A less theoretically rigorous, but commonly used, investment decision rule is the 
payback method (discussed in Rutterford (1983, pp. 142-148) and Levy and Samat 
(1986, pp. 197-198)). The payback is a non-discounted rule of thumb which tells the 
investor how many years are required in order to recover the initial investment 
outlay. Despite this simplicity, it remains a popular investment appraisal tool, 
especially in equity capital markets all over the world. Given the increasing 
importance of these markets, this rule cannot not be ignored.
The payback is denominated in time, generally years, and is given either by the 
initial investment outlay divided by the annual cash receipt or, more commonly, in 
capital markets as the PE ratio - share price divided by the earnings per share 
(EPS). EPS is defined as profit after tax, interest on corporate borrowing and 
preference share dividends, divided by the number of shares issued.
Given that the PE is a ratio, it can be used to compare the valuation placed on one 
project/company compared to another. The higher the PE, the greater the growth of 
future returns (dividends and capital growth) expected of a company. Obtaining an 
aggregate PE for an entire market is often used to assess investment values on an 
international basis. It should be noted, however, that because of differences in
- 15 -
international accounting standards, cross country comparisons require more careful 
interpretation. This arises chiefly from the differences which affect reported earnings 
(Schieneman, 1988).
Longmore (1989) finds that this rule of thumb is often used even in large 
sophisticated multinationals. Given the trend to reward executives in line with short 
run accounting earnings he argues that low PE acquisitions can be favoured even if 
longer life investments produce a higher NPV.
Further major disadvantages to the payback method are that it does not easily relate 
to a firm 's cost of capital (discount rate) and can not explicitly account for the 
various factors determining the viability of a project/company.
1.2.5. Investment Theories of the Firm.
There are three main aggregate theories of investment based on firm behaviour. 
These are the "User Cost of Capital Theory", initially described by Jorgenson (1963) 
and Hall and Jorgenson (1967), "Tobin's Q Theory", expounded in Tobin (1969) 
and the "Accelerator Theory", first introduced by Clark (1917) and subsequently, 
favoured by Keynesians. These theories have in common the notion that, for a 
given level of demand, the firm maximises shareholder wealth (equivalently profit 
maximisation, Gravelle and Rees (1981, pp. 412-414)) by employing a desired level 
of capital stock, K*. Where the theories diverge is in the main factors driving the 
firm 's decision process and subsequently, the possible policy implications. There 
does exist some controversy as to whether firms may choose alternative objectives 
outlined in Hay and Morris (1979, pp. 255-276) such as size or growth 
maximisation while Reekie (1979, pp. 136-143) argues that managers are sufficiently 
disciplined to act fully in shareholders' interests.
1.2.5.1. User Cost o f Capital.
The concept of the user cost of capital is well defined, it represents how much (in 
terms of monetary units or as a rate of return) would have to be paid in the form of 
rent in order to command use of certain resources over a specified time period.
The user cost theory of investment is traditionally known as the neoclassical theory 
o f investment. Economic literature does not seem to have been able to consistently 
differentiate the terms "user cost of capital" and "cost of capital". Throughout this 
research, cost of capital is equivalent to the cost of finance, that is, the cost to the 
firm incurred by its methods of finance. The user cost of capital is as described
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below. Key aspects are the relevance given to relative factor prices in investment 
demand and the theories grounding in micro-economic theory. Exponents of this 
school do not reject the importance of effective demand and consequently, some 
aspects of the accelerator theory are similar when looking at investment demand.
Although chiefly attributed to Dale Jorgenson after his 1963 paper, the concept of 
paying for capital services (the user cost of capital) can be traced as far back as 
Bohm-Bawerk (1888) (Bohm-Bawerk, E. (1888) The Positive Theory o f  Capital, 
translated by Smart, W. (1891), GE Stechert and Co: New York. Cited in Downs
(1986) page 298 and commented on in Blaug (1985) pp. 278). In the first half of 
this century, Keynes (1936, pp. 53) described a slightly broader, though similar, 
concept: "Let us call this quantity....which measures the sacrifice of value involved 
in the production of A, the user cost of A".
Despite capital being a fixed stock, it is accumulated in order to provide a flow of 
productive services through time to its owner. For the purposes of simplification, 
we shall assume, for the time being, that this effective owner is the manufacturing 
sector. The user cost of capital is the cost per period of time paid by a firm in 
order to obtain these services. Consequently, this cost can be used as the relevant 
discount rate when the firm applies an NPV or IRR analysis. The user cost is, 
therefore, sometimes referred to as the "rental cost of capital".
Standard assumptions of the theory are that all markets are competitive, efficient and 
that perfect certainty exists. The firm 's objective being to maximise its PV subject to 
a production function which presents continuous substitution possibilities where all 
factor inputs are regarded as homogeneous. These assumptions allow traditional 
marginalist principals to be deployed when determining the capital stock. That is, 
the firm invests up to a point where the marginal user cost equals its marginal 
revenue product (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2.).
The firm 's relationship between the change in the capital stock and gross investment 
is that described by equation (1.4). Output is generally achieved via a Cobb- 
Douglas production function which is consistent with assuming a unitary elasticity of 
substitution (see Bemdt, 1991, pp. 252). Jorgenson (1963) assumes that an iterative 
process occurs in which first output and then labour are determined and the marginal 
productivity condition for labour is a function of the existing capital stock.
Assuming that the capital stock cannot adjust instantaneously, the second marginal 
product condition is required to determine K*r:
K*, =  a k(Yt / UC,). (1.11)
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That is, K*/ is proportioned to the value of output deflated by the price of capital 
services, UCr  If  relative factor prices play no part in determining K, then equation 
(1.11) becomes effectively equal to equation (1.17) where ak=a*.
Having obtained a value for K** > this is embedded in a general investment function: 
I, =  w (K *r-K „;) +  (1.12)
The optimal lag structure, represented by w could, then, be imposed (Jorgenson, 
1963) or derived using a general to specific methodology (Anderson, 1981).
1.2.5.1.1. User Cost Components.
We have not yet discussed the contents of the user cost equation. Such equations 
can be simply specified containing only a price deflator a cost of capital (finance) 
and a rate of depreciation. More complex derivations may include expected capital 
gains, taxation or adjustment costs.
In order to expose the principal of the user cost, we can derive a simple example of 
a capital good acquired at time t and supplying capital services at time s. The user 
cost is the discount rate which equates the marginal cost of a new capital good (P7f) 
to the discounted value of all future services from that good:
p„ ==  1, e"r(s_t) UCfae"5(s_t) ds, (1.13)
which characterises the marginal capital investment as a zero NPV alternative. 
Differentiating this relationship with respect to the time of acquisition:
UC* =  P / r  +  5) - P/? (1.14)
where P7 is the period change in the price of the capital good and r represents the 
required rate of return (cost of financing).
Given equation (1.14), we can easily identify those components of the user cost 
which can affect K*n the price of the capital goods, the cost of finance, the rate at
which capital decays and any expected capital gains. Equation (1.14), as we stated, 
is a relatively simple user cost, many studies also analyse the effects of taxation on
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the user cost (Jorgenson, 1963; Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; Auerbach, 1979, 1983; 
Hendershott, 1981, 1987; Hendershott and Hu 1983; Downs, 1983 Kelly and Owen, 
1985; Jorgenson et al. 1987; Fullerton and Henderson, 1987). It is also possible to 
analyse the effects of temporary changes in tax rules (Auerbach and Hines, 1988; 
Kollintzas and Rowley, 1985) or take account of adjustment costs (Auerbach, 1983).
Between the main aggregate investment theories our model centres around the user 
cost of capital theory. The major advantage of the theory is that by calculating the 
price of capital services it can be used for resource usage and asset allocation 
comparisons. The theory is also flexible as it combines demand and relative factor 
prices.
Added to this, is the ability to specify comprehensively components of the user cost 
series which enables the researcher to isolate the effects on investment of changes in 
specified components, in particular taxation, risk premiums and inflation. Finally, 
while we will discuss the analysis below in terms of manufacturing capital 
(Jorgenson, 1963; Hall and Jorgenson; Poindexter and Jones, 1973; Anderson, 1981; 
Hendershott and Hu, 1981b; Kilpatrick and Naisbitt, 1984; Kelly and Owen, 1985; 
Robson, 1989), the user cost theory can easily be applied to a whole range of assets. 
A common application and one utilised in this study, is to apply the user cost to the 
individual's demand for housing, (Hendershott, 1980, 1983, 1988; Hendershott and 
Hu, 1981a, 1983; Buckley and Ermisch, 1982; Dougherty and Van Order, 1982; 
Hendershott and Slemrod, 1982; Poterba, 1984; Fry and Pashardes, 1986; Bennett 
and Krebs, 1987, 1988b; Spencer, 1987b, 1988, 1989; Ermisch, 1988; Hughes, 
1988a, b; Shear et al. 1988; Bennett, 1990).
1.2.5.2. Tobin's Q.
Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm (PVm) to the replacement cost 
of its assets (K). Whilst the Q theory can stand alone as an explanation of 
investment, the Q ratio can also be introduced into other investment functions as 
described by Oulton (1981, pp. 177), "An investment function containing Q can be 
derived from a "desired stock of capital" model which employs such traditional 
concepts as the marginal efficiency and the cost of capital" and Bemdt (1991, pp. 
260). The main empirical advantage pertaining to the theory is that data is readily 
observable although its weakness lies in the need to forecast stock market levels.
Using the definition above, we obtain the simple formula:
q  = p v m / K (1.15)
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Assuming that the value of the firm is a direct function of the expected future 
profitability of its existing capital stock then we can relate this to the investment 
outlay in a similar way to equation (1.8) where we solve for l0 and substitute in the 
general cost of capital. From these assumptions and introducing r  as the average 
rate of return on the firms existing assets we obtain the general result.
Q =  r / C. (1.16)
We can see that Q is a valuation measure where the firm 's decision rule is to invest 
in new plant and machinery when Q >  1. When this condition holds financial 
wealth holders are (possibly for good reasons) prepared to pay more for a claim to a 
unit o f real capital than it costs to install it.
1.2.5.3. The Accelerator.
The Accelerator Theory of investment states that firms attempt to maintain a fixed 
relationship between their desired stock of capital and their flow of sales (or output, 
Y). This is called the "naive accelerator model". The optimal desired capital to
output ratio is the accelerator coefficient (a*) such that:
K* = a*Yr (1.17)
This fixed relationship between K*r and Y, can only be made by assuming labour 
and capital are not substituted, even ex ante, and that stocks of inventories are 
ignored. It is the difference between current capital stock (K,), endowed from the 
previous period, and the desired capital stock (K*i) which prompts the firm to be net 
investors, I", such that:
I", =  K V  KM =  a*(Y, - Y J .  (1.18)
Stated simply, net investment is the change in output (or expected output) multiplied 
by the accelerator coefficient.
This analysis implicitly assumes that output (demand) is always rising. If output 
falls, then K may not be reduced because of its fixed nature (see Section 1.2.2.). 
Theoretically, if output falls by a significant amount, net investment will be zero and 
the possibility of excess capacity exists. Such an outcome is analysed in Chenery 
(1952) who suggests subtracting an excess capacity parameter from equation (1.18).
- 20 -
When empirically tested, Chenery (1952), found the accelerator above produced poor
results. The solution suggested was to introduce an explicit lag structure to the 
equation on the basis that firms may not react immediately to an increase in demand, 
preferring to wait until it was felt that the probability of it being transitory was low. 
Once the decision to increase K* has been made, it may take several years for the 
investment to be completed and therefore, the lack of a dynamic lag structure could 
lead to severe misspecification. Traditionally, a lag structure was introduced into 
the model via geometrically declining weights attached to previous output levels.
This is called the "flexible accelerator model".
The basic hypothesis states that investment is related positively to the actual level of 
current output and negatively to the existing capital stock. Supply side factors and 
relative prices are ignored.
1.2.5.4. Empirical Evidence of Investment Theory of the Firm.
Jorgenson (1963) argued that, at the time of writing, there was a dichotomy between 
the advance in the acceptance of the neoclassical theory of capital and econometric 
evidence. The author's main premise to explain this was to argue that poor 
econometric evidence was a consequence of misspecified theory and therefore, 
invalidating any hypothesis tests.
Testing investment theories have largely centred around estimating the respective 
elasticities of output and relative prices with respect to capital stock.
Unsurprisingly, Jorgenson (1963, Table 3, pp. 258) finds both relative factor prices 
and the price of output significant. Such work is centred around the confines 
imposed by utilising a Cobb-Douglas production function. Strict neoclassical theory 
would constrain the elasticity of capital with respect to both output and relative 
prices to be unity. Criticism of Jorgenson's results is presented in Eisner and Nadiri 
(1968) who argue that by utilising a putty-clay model the effects of relative factor 
prices and output prices can be separated in a more realistic dynamic investment 
process. They find an elasticity with respect to output close to unity and for relative 
factor prices around zero. The authors conclude that the divergence of results 
originate from Jorgenson's use of a putty-putty model and his uniform lag 
restrictions.
Reviews of investment literature (Jorgenson, 1971; Savage, 1978; Hay and Morris, 
1979, pp. 389-404; Bemdt, 1991, pp. 224-277) conclude, as would be expected, 
that real output is the most important single determinant of investment expenditure. 
Eight years after his first article on the subject, Jorgenson (1971, pp. 1142) still
- 21 -
argued that many studies poorly specify the user cost variable, "In all but a few 
studies we have reviewed, the cost of capital services is measured in a way that fails 
to reflect the underlying durable goods model". A decade and a half later, we find 
Kelly and Owen (1985, pp. 1) arguing, "The failure to estimate significant factor 
price effects is more likely to be connected with the absence of suitable aggregate 
measures of the cost of capital". This argument, which is not restricted to the above 
authors in "Lakatos" terms, is a "protective belt" which can be used to defend the 
Scientific Research Project of economists whose "hard core" (metaphysical beliefs) is 
that, for example, relative factor price effects are important. The immunising 
strategy being that the role of relative prices cannot be refuted as they are not 
specified correctly in empirical tests (Further information regarding these 
methodological points are discussed in Blaug (1980), especially pages 36 and 226).
More recent studies do provide more encouraging support for the use of the user 
cost theory (Anderson, 1981; Kelly and Owen, 1985; Shapiro, 1986). Anderson 
(1981), argues that the correct dynamic specification is crucial to the determination 
of an investment function. By restricting the general putty-clay models, nested 
models of putty-putty and clay-clay were tested and rejected against the general 
model. The author concluded that whilst the effects of relative factor prices were 
diluted once factor proportions are fixed, along with output they are significant. 
Oulton (1981) primarily investigates the relevance of Tobin's "Q" theory in the 
U .K ., but finds relative factor prices generally significant. Kelly and Owen (1985 
pp. 1) list a number of studies finding relative prices significant and note an 
increasing use of these in the latest versions of the Cambridge Growth Project, Her 
Majesty's Treasury and the London Business School's macroeconomic forecasting 
models. Given the flexibility inherent in user cost specifications is coupled with the 
growing evidence that this methodology is increasingly being found relevant, it is 
difficult to argue that this theory can be ignored. This is especially the case in a 
long run model such as that at the heart of the present research which is a putty- 
putty regime in contrast to other empirical applications and therefore testing 
substitution elasticities becomes irrelevant.
In summary the user cost of capital theory represents the optimal vehicle for our 
model as it best facilitates the isolation of the investment implications of taxation, 
inflation and risk. This is particularly the case in a long run model although it is 
difficult to reject the theory over shorter time periods on the basis o f historical 
empirical evidence as this can be critisised on the grounds that they do not measure 
the user cost of capital accurately enough to provide valid tests. Utilising this 
approach is also consistent with the increasing use of the user cost o f capital theory 
in contemporary economic literature.
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1.3. Multisector Models of Resource Allocation.
We have indicated that it is our intention to construct a general equilibrium model of 
resource allocation. In the present Section we review various theoretical and 
empirical models which are utilised to explore this matter. This Section therefore 
forms the methodological grounding for the model presented in Chapter 2.
Research carried out in order to expose the implications o f inflation, taxation and 
risk between different sectors in the economy has, so far, all related to the U.S. 
economy (Hendershott and Hu, 1980, 1981a, 1983; Feldstein, 1982; Ebrill and 
Possen, 1982; Kau and Keenan, 1983; Gahvari, 1984; Fullerton and Henderson 
1987; Hendershott, 1987; Berkovec and Fullerton, 1989). Such papers typically 
include the corporate sector and owner occupied housing, although, in some cases, 
the models include other sectors or disaggregate to various assets within sectors (for 
example, real assets, structures, plant and machinery and inventories or financial 
assets, bonds or equities). With the exception of Berkovec and Fullerton (1989), all 
o f these papers confirm the resource allocation bias towards investment in owner 
occupied housing as a result of the interaction of tax rules and inflation. All of the 
studies share the belief that productivity could be improved if a more "optimal" 
asset allocation split were achieved.
The lack of U.K. research in this area may result from the actual U .K. experience 
commented on by Matthews (1982, pp. 314), "In the U .K ., many of the relevant tax 
provisions are broadly similar, but, whether because of front loading or some other 
reason, residential investment has fallen, not risen, as the rate of inflation has 
increased...". The possibility of front loading (the tilt phenomenon described in 
Section 1.4.10.4.) constraining investment in owner occupied housing is described in 
Hendershott (1983, pp. 5) and HH (pp. 810). As Matthews (1982) alludes to this, 
it may not, however, be the only factor influencing his observation.
The combination of capital market rationing coupled with inflation may have offset 
the bias towards owner occupation. Observing a period of low and relatively stable 
inflation such as 1966 to 1969 when inflation rose by 13.6%, over the period 
(Source: Thompson, 1990, pp. 55) deposits in Building Societies earned a positive 
return (Source: Thompson, 1990, pp. 66) and average earnings (key to mortgage 
advances, see Section 1.4.4.1.) rose by 24.3 % (Source: Monthly Digest of 
Statistics, various issues). All of these factors provided a good basis for investment 
in housing. In contrast, a period of rising inflation such as 1973 to 1977 saw real 
earnings fall slightly (inflation rose by 92 % and average earnings by 90 %) at a 
time when the real return from Building Society deposits was negative. Over this
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period, the loan to income multiple for new buyers fell from 2.24 to 1.17 and for 
existing buyers from 2.01 to 1.64, Building Society advances rose by only 45 % 
(Source, BSA, 1984, pp. 11). The evidence therefore suggests that rationing played 
some part in shaping mortgage demand. If this hypothesis is correct, then a study 
of the effects of inflation and taxation is useful in the U .K ., particularly one which 
can explicitly incorporate capital markets. Any sectoral misallocation is unlikely to 
wholly explain the U .K .'s  productivity performance but may provide some evidence 
to the jigsaw.
HH (pp. 796) state that between 1965 and 1978, the real increase in non-residential 
capital stock in the U.S. was 70 % while that of the residential stock was 47 %. 
Official figures for the U.K. show that comparable increases o f 73 % and 75 %, 
respectively were experienced in the U.K. (Source, see Sections 3.2.1.2. and 
3.2.1.3.). Furthermore, whereas the value of the housing capital stock is relatively 
straight forward to calculate, several authors (Smith, 1986; Wadhwani and Wall, 
1986; Callen and Convey, 1988; Driver, 1989) have questioned the accuracy of the 
manufacturing capital stock data. Using estimates provided in Wadhwani and Wall 
(1986, pp. 51, measure ii) the real increase in the manufacturing capital stock would 
be only 51 %.
The figures presented above represent the outcome given the taxation regimes, 
inflation shocks and capital market conditions actually prevalent at that time. The 
only way to isolate the influence of these factors is to model the environment and 
perform the appropriate comparative static analysis.
Ebrill and Possen (1982) is a typical example of the relative price, asset allocation 
work carried out in the U.S. They construct user costs of capital for two sectors 
(equity in owner occupied housing and equity in corporates) and then shock these 
with different rates of inflation. More specifically, the framework they used was 
short run where the stock of capital is held constant. This is, effectively, a long run 
solution without growth implications (ie. no income effects are included). The main 
result from the study was that as the rate of inflation increased, housing took a 
greater share of asset allocation. This result is typical of most studies in this area, 
although Berkovec and Fullerton (1989) argue that inflation does not raise the cost 
of corporate capital because of interest deductability at a corporation tax rate of 46 
% (this is specific to the 1983 tax regime).
Hendershott and Hu (1980) calculate user cost o f capital series for six categories of 
investment including owner occupied and rental housing and corporates. Tax 
regimes between 1964 to 1965 and 1976 to 1977 were modelled. Productivity losses
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were calculated (a geometric formulation is described in Page 350 with the relevant 
mathematics on Page 351) by taking the divergence of user cost from a mean and 
inferring the misallocation of capital stock and consequent welfare loss.
A similar methodology is applied in Hendershott (1987) to analyse the effects on 
different assets and investor types of the 1985 U.S. tax reforms. This research was 
rather more disaggregated, involving the estimation of thirteen user cost series. The 
model assumes a fixed capital stock and allows relative prices to determine asset 
shares much like Ebrill and Possen's (1982) work. More specifically, a value of 
wealth is set and specific asset size is determined by dividing wealth by each user 
cost and simultaneously solving these to obtain an equilibrium asset split. Whilst 
Hendershott and Hu (1980) utilised detailed user costs, they extended these in a 
subsequent paper (Hendershott and Hu, 1981a) by introducing a more rigorous 
exposition of taxation, depreciation and financing rates. Own product user costs 
were specified. That is, each series incorporated its own assets expected inflation 
figure (equivalent to expected capital gain) and consequent real price changes.
A comparative international study (the U .S., Japan and W. Germany) based on 
Hendershott and H u's (1980) methodology has been carried out by Nakamura
(1981). The user costs were constructed for each country's tax system in the fiscal 
year 1976 to 1977. His conclusions were that across the countries, the lowest user 
cost was for owner occupied housing in the U .S ., costing one half of similar 
investments in the other countries. The average equilibrium user cost was lowest in 
the U.S. followed by Japan and W. Germany. Inefficiency (productivity losses) 
were greatest in the U .S., small in W. Germany and negligible in Japan.
The central thrust of the studies outlined above is the calculation of a series of 
relative prices which can be shocked with varying rates of inflation. Results are 
then reported in terms of relative price ratios or, taking the analysis one step further, 
by solving to infer portfolio asset allocation.
The use of relative prices to compare asset allocation has also been utilised in small 
two sector models of the economy (Feldstein, 1982; HH; Fullerton and Henderson, 
1987). The most straight forward model is that of Feldstein (1982) whose analysis 
is strictly theoretical like Kau and Keenan (1983) and Gahvari (1984). A production 
function relates output to the industrial capital stock and all corporate investment is 
financed by debt issued by the private sector. A similar set of equations are 
expressed for the owner occupied sector, for example, the demand for housing 
services is included where constant proportionality is assumed between housing 
services and the housing capital stock. The demand for money is also included
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which allows inflation to enter the model and provide cash balances as an alternative 
asset. Further equations define real government expenditure, consumption and 
savings.
Using the framework above, the equilibrium effects of changing inflation are 
simulated. The model predicts the typical outcome described above namely, 
inflation reduced the real return from corporate investment while reducing the owner 
occupied user cost and consequently, resulted in a lower equilibrium level of 
corporate capital and reduced productivity. The reallocation towards housing also 
reduces income per capita. Feldstein (1982, pp. 309) concludes that, "It is ironic 
that an easy money policy aimed at stimulating investment in plant and equipment is 
likely to have just the opposite effect: reducing the long-run capital intensity of 
production".
It is interesting to note that these results contrast with those presented in an earlier 
paper (Feldstein, 1981, pp. 29-30, 33) where the author found (theoretically and 
econometrically) that the marginal and average propensity to accumulate housing 
capital was less than actually observed. This study did not incorporate the effects of 
taxation.
A more complex study is presented by Fullerton and Henderson (1987). They 
utilise a simultaneous general equilibrium model in order to compare the merits of 
the 1984 U.S. Treasury Department tax plan with that prepared by the President in 
1985. Hall-Jorgensen user cost methodology is employed incorporating detailed 
modelling of the relevant tax structures paying particular attention to the rate of 
investment incentives. The model is very disaggregated with twelve income- 
differentiated households which allocate investment across four sectors (corporate, 
non-corporate, business and owner occupation). Consumption expenditure is divided 
into fifteen consumer goods and eighteen industries constitute national output. The 
investment incentives are used as inputs to a general equilibrium model developed by 
Fullerton and Henderson (1986) while the consumption side of the model discussed 
in Ballard et al. (1985).
One simulation constituted six equilibria which, in total, culminated in a simulation 
interval of fifty years. Simulations of the two tax proposals were carried out, both 
were found to add neutrality to post tax returns between assets, although the 
Treasury Department's plan increased inter-sectoral and inter-temporal distortions. 
Detailed asset and sector results are reported in pages 429-31 and for industries, on 
page 431.
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A model which falls in between Feldstein (1982) and Fullerton and Henderson
(1987) in terms of complexity is provided by HH. The model is two sector 
(housing and non-residential) which incorporates a production function and demand 
equations for the two sectors assets. The demand functions incorporate disposable 
income and profits respectively along with the relevant user cost of capital series. 
Within these sectors, individuals allocate between four assets, corporate bonds, 
corporate and housing equity and mortgage debt (a negative asset). Two types of 
household are specified - wealthy and non-wealthy - the former lend to the latter and 
the corporate sector to enable them to finance their expenditure decisions.
An interesting twist to the model is its ability to endogenously incorporate risk 
premium attached to the assets. This means that, assuming the investor is rational 
and risk averse, an asset increasing as a proportion of the total portfolio suffers a 
rising risk premium. Tax structures are also comprehensive and clearly relate to the 
personal sector, that is, the corporate user cost includes not only corporate taxes but 
any further taxes which affect the returns to the individual from corporates. The 
need to incorporate all layers of taxation facing the ultimate investor is emphasised 
by Summers (1981, pp. 7). Equations representing household and corporate tax 
payments, retained earnings and disposable income are also included.
Again, the model is of a simultaneous general equilibrium nature and in its basic 
form, solves for fourteen variables. An initial simulation was run with values set at 
levels roughly equivalent to those in 1965. The model was shocked for real growth 
actually experienced over the period and future simulations were expressed as 
divergents from this initial run.
The second simulation consisted of shocking the model by the rise in inflation 
experienced over the period. This was followed by introducing relative price 
changes and finally, mortgage rationing. Both the general and relative price shocks 
disproportionately reduced the relative real user cost of housing and increased its 
share of total wealth. Capital market effects neutralised this bias, although it 
increased the wealth differential in favour of wealthy households. This capital market 
result is contrary to the view expressed by Hendershott (1983). The ability of the 
model to facilitate capital markets is unique among the studies outlined above.
1.3.1. Conclusion.
The above discussion suggests that a U.K. model using a similar approach to those 
presented would be of interest. From this we may gain insight into how the asset 
allocation process developed in the U.K. which would enable us to test the
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hypothesis, how did inflation, risk and taxation under the classical and imputation 
periods affect resource allocation? Would the U.K. model support or refute the role 
o f mortgage rationing as found in HH and argued in Meen (1988; 1989; 1990)
Using the comparative work of Nakamura (1981), we may tentatively suggest where 
the U.K. would feature in the welfare loss analysis and finally, we may test some 
alternative fiscal regimes for both sectors in order to compare the allocative impacts 
as well as the effects on sectoral revenue flows which are also of great importance.
In order to test the hypothesis outlined above, the model presented by HH has 
several distinct advantages. For example Feldstein1 s (1982) paper is purely 
theoretical and possesses no explicit treatment of risk, multiple financing or capital 
market effects. HH does all of this within an empirical framework which aids result 
interpretation. On the other hand, the detail of Fullerton and Henderson's (1987) 
work is impressive, but its results depend on at least two other large modelling 
exercises and would represent overkill in terms of the above hypothesis.
H H 's paper is the culmination of previous detailed work (Hendershott, 1980; 1981; 
Hendershott and Hu, 1980, 1981a, 1981b; Hendershott and Slemrod, 1982) and is 
complex enough to produce surprises and simple enough to enable the origin of such 
results to be traced. For some tax policies, the effect on real cash flows may be 
just as important as the user costs. Incorporation of risk, capital markets, cost of 
finance in a long-run model where a closed or open economy can be imposed should 
represent a good starting point for an analysis of the U.K. The choice of time 
period, 1965 to 1979 has three main motivating factors: there are two distinct tax 
regimes to compare - the period was one with a consistent mortgage rationing policy 
and the base model will afford some comparison with the U.S. experience reported 
in HH.
1.4. Owner Occupied Housing and Manufacturing Capital as Alternative Assets.
Having discussed the investment process and multisector models of resource 
allocation it is necessary to set in context the sectors which will be modelled and 
indicate areas where these sectors impinge on the economy as a whole. The 
following Section crystallises why owner occupied housing and manufacturing have 
been identified as key sectors of the economy. In doing this we highlight important 
influences and main debating areas regarding each sector such as net cash 
withdrawal, labour market rigidity and productivity performance. This Section also 
provides an opportunity to describe and discuss the tax regimes of both sectors and 
asset classes within them, this will form a basis which links directly into our model. 
Comparison of the classical and imputation system along with the interaction of the
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two sectors when shocked with inflation and different mortgage market regimes 
within our model framework will be discussed in Chapter 4. Finally this Section 
includes a review of policy issues relating to the sectors which directly feeds into 
policy simulations presented in Chapter 5.
1.4.1. Housing Investment.
Investment in the housing sector is important to the performance of the U.K. 
economy for a multitude of reasons. Various factors have made owner occupation 
both the dominant form of housing tenure and a key asset to the private sector, yet a 
major difference with manufacturing is that it cannot replicate itself or vary its 
output mix. A similar position to the U.K. has arisen in the U.S. (see Congdon 
(1988, pp. 173-174) and Hallett (1988)) which is contrasted with a higher rented 
proportion in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands (Hallett, 1988). This 
has resulted in a powerful political interest in supporting owner occupiers both 
fiscally and in terms of funding via a dedicated capital market. Despite this, little 
work has been carried out regarding the interaction of the housing sector with other 
areas of the economy. One noticeable consequence of this neglect has been poor 
econometric forecasting in the 1980's, chiefly resulting from a failure to incorporate 
significant wealth effects originating from the sector.
1.4.2. Development of the Owner Occupied Sector.
As a form of tenure, between 1965 and 1979 owner occupation has risen from 46 % 
to 54.7 % and in 1989 (the latest available data) stood at 66.5 % (Source: Housing 
and Construction Statistics). This is the highest proportion as a form of tenure of 
the major European countries and is comparable to the United States of America 
(Hallett, 1988, pp. 5). Moreover using our capital stock data for 1976 and table 3 
in Nakamura (1981, pp. 69) housing as a proportion of the housing and corporate 
capital stock represented 55% in the UK, 32% in the USA, 25% in W. Germany 
and 30% in Japan. During this period house prices rose by around 2.75 % per 
annum in real terms (ie. relative to the retail price index) although for the 1970's 
decade, Dicks (1980, pp. 4) estimates this figure at around 3 % per annum (an 
index of real house price changes are provided in BSA (1987, pp. 21, Table 1)).
The capital stock rose from just under £27 bn to over £200 bn, an increase of 75 % 
in real terms (Source: see Section 3.2.1.3.).
This was by no means an isolated period in the growth of owner occupation. At the 
beginning of the century, owner occupation, as a form of tenure, was small, at 
around 10 %. Since 1914, (Ball, 1983, pp. 2, Table 1.1.) a sharp rise in this form
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of tenure occurred, particularly during in the inter-war period, boosted by 
demographics, a pool of available labour to the construction industry, government 
grants to builders and a cheap money policy. Broadberry (1987) provides an 
econometric analysis of these factors and concludes that the "cheap" money policy 
accounted for around half of this investment. Post the Second World War, a major 
problem facing the government was a shortage of housing, made worse by the poor 
quality in many areas. Flemming and Nellis (1982) point out that in 1951 (the year 
of the first post war census) there was a crude shortage of around 600,000 houses. 
Slum clearance represented the major loss of privately owned housing stock during 
this period, although this diminished greatly in the late 1960's, affecting less than 
20,000 dwellings per annum (Drayson, 1985, pp. 85). Other isolated problems 
remained (or emerged as, for example, crumbling housing schemes), however, the 
status of housing provision in the period after the mid 1960's was not so pressing. 
There was no further round of government policy to actively stimulate the owner 
occupied sector, yet the figures quoted above suggest that, for whatever reason, that 
is exactly what occurred.
1.4.3. Politics and the Investment Environment.
A major area of interaction between government policy and the private sector's 
asset allocation decision is taxation, (Section 1.2.4.1.3.), a key area of our model. 
General aspects of tax policy making in the UK are presented in Levacic (1987, pp. 
99-105). We shall not seek to discuss specific aspects o f housing fiscal policy until 
Section 1.4.10.1., but instead, we will seek to explain why owner occupation in 
particular is a politically sensitive subject and suggest that a key result of this is 
policy inertia, or worse, a policy "ratchet" effect in favour of the sector. A similar 
argument as been attributed to the U.S. by Hendershott (1983, pp. 6). Whilst we 
do not seek to model political factors this influence does have a bearing on the 
choice of policy simulations carried out in Chapter 5.
Particularly in terms of housing policy, the tendency for economists not to discuss 
political factors as an additional step is unfortunate. Without this consideration, 
even the best of intended economist's work is likely to be discarded as a mere 
aphorism. An interesting political analysis is contained in Hettich and Winer (1984) 
who develop a partial equilibrium model where tax payers make both economic and 
political responses which affect the government's use of policy instruments (Kydland 
and Prescott (1980) also make similar assumptions). The rational government's 
objective is to maximise its votes subject to the factors outlined above. As a result, 
it is tempted to tax as many economic activities as possible in order to equalise the 
marginal political cost to each tax payer. It is for this reason that complexity is a
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common feature of most modem tax systems.
Given the owner occupied sectors' voting power (by definition of age), coupled with 
the relatively large size housing expenditure represents to the individual and the 
transparency between that expenditure and government fiscal policy, it is not 
surprising that owner occupation has been a sensitive issue for politicians. Franklin 
(1990) econometrically explores the importance of mortgage rates and voting 
intentions finding that both the mortgage rate and house price inflation are 
significant. Contrasting this with manufacturing (we are not arguing that this is a 
weak political force), it will be the case that the number of people in full time 
employment in this sector is less than the number of owner occupiers. Moreover, 
even transparency of government policy is clouded (management are employed to 
deal with such matters) and the overall perceived effect on well being will be less 
given that for most people, the investment in a house is their largest capital 
commitment.
Taking the political analysis one stage further from a Marxist point of view, owner 
occupation plays a central role in the ideological incorporation of the working class 
into the dominant ideology of capitalism. When discussing the relative tax 
advantage to owner occupation, Buckley and Ermisch (1982, pp. 295) argue that this 
was not the intention of legislation. Boleat (1982) argues that the fiscal position of 
the building societies (crucial to the owner occupation sector as a source of funds) 
arose from a series of independent and sporadic policy measures rather than as part 
of a coherent fiscal strategy. For example, tax on imputed rent (Schedule A) was 
abolished in 1963, a time of low inflation and interest rates when the tax was of 
little consequence.
Whether a favourable fiscal regime was intended or not, it is easy to see how gains 
in popularity can be achieved by benefiting the sector and quickly reversed if 
anything threatens the owner occupiers position (Ball, 1988). In this sense, policy 
follows a ratchet type of progress which protects any benefits received. The most 
recent example occurred in 1988 when the U.K. government failed to charge VAT 
on new housing, a decision which would have been in line with a European court 
ruling, but was "exempt" for "social" reasons, (see Lloyds Bank Economic Bulletin
(1988) and Taylor et al. (1988)).
1.4.4. Building Societies as a Dedicated Source of Finance.
Building societies form a unique aspect of the owner occupied sector in that they 
provide a dedicated source of funding for investors in the sector. Although building
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society behaviour is not a matter for this research, the crucial role they play 
(especially before 1980) in facilitating house purchase means that they cannot be 
ignored (other lenders existed but these were marginal, see Gough, 1975, pp. 219). 
Many economists have attempted to model building society behaviour, a summary of 
such models is given in Anderson and Hendry (1984, pp. 186). Indeed, the 
mortgage demand function in our model differs from that of H H 's because of the 
building societies' need to ration funds resulting from a favourable fiscal treatment 
of the societies' funding operation and their ability to operate an effective cartel.
1.4.4.1. Taxation of Building Societies and Mortgage Rationing.
Building society depositors received income net of the "composite rate of tax". This 
rate was less than the standard income tax rate which made the net return to tax 
paying depositors from building societies relatively attractive. (For a detailed 
explanation of the reasons for and calculation of the "composite rate" see Boleat
(1982), Chapter 13). Given that mortgage borrowers received lower funding rates 
than the market-clearing rate (some of which was passed onto borrowers) and 
mortgage interest relief at source (MIRAS) on interest repayments, this resulted in a 
high demand for mortgage funding and consequently, continual mortgage rationing 
(see Buckley and Ermisch, 1982, pp. 284-285). Over the period of interest it is 
therefore crucial that our model deals with this.
An additional twist to this situation was the effective cartel (primarily administered 
by the Building Societies Association) which operated on both sides of their balance 
sheet. Successive governments were willing to tolerate and sometimes encourage the 
cartel (which included excluding clearing banks from the mortgage market) because 
it helped to maintain mortgage rates below market clearing rates whilst adding 
stability to the housing market. Indeed, in the early 1970's, the Labour Government 
set up the "Guideline System" which provided a forum for it and the societies to 
discuss these matters. During this period the government used mortgage rationing as 
an important facet of policy (for example see Spencer, 1987b, pp. 16). Although 
the cartel's powers effectively diminished in the mid 1970's with the advent of term 
share deposits, it was not until the 1980's that abolishing of the cartel and tax 
advantages were seriously recommended by the Wilson Committee (Wilson (1980), 
Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions, Chairman, H.
Wilson. Final Report Cmnd. 7937, HMSO : London).
The building societies achieved mortgage rationing through various non-price 
techniques (for an overview, see Dicks (1990, pp. 6-8)), for example, the imposition 
o f a loan to valuation ratio at a figure less than unity or a loan to income multiple.
- 32 -
Loans may be limited to larger depositors or established customers and queues 
created. Rationing was significant, for example King (1980, pp. 156-157) found that 
30 % o f households wishing to enter the owner-occupied sector were rationed out 
and that " ...the admission probability into the owner-occupied sector is an increasing 
function of income, a phenomenon which reflects constraints in the capital market 
and the criteria used by building societies to ration mortgages". This finding is 
supported by Lomax (1991, pp. 61).
The building societies reasons for choosing this method were straightforward. If 
each borrower's capacity to default is different through time and unobservable, it is 
impossible for lenders to identify defaulters a priori. Detailed screening by the 
societies would help, but only to a degree, whilst being costly particularly as 
existing mortgage turnover was increasing (BSA, 1980, pp. 94). In a situation 
where the propensity for nominal house prices to fall was low, the societies could 
concentrate on making sure that interest payments were met which were, of course, 
achieved through current income. Thus, it was optimal for building societies to lend 
mortgages subject to the income of the borrower.
1.4.4.2. Liberalisation of the Mortgage Market.
In 1986, "Big Bang", the liberation of stock exchange investment practices received 
much publicity from the media in general. The gradual deregulation of the 
mortgage market has been a much lower key affair, yet its effect on the economy as 
a whole and individual households are arguably greater. The transition to a liberal 
mortgage market began to occur in the late 1970's. However 1979 represents a 
good proxy for the cut off point when the Thatcher government was elected. Meen
(1989) and Davis and Saville (1982) estimate that mortgage rationing had effectively 
disappeared by the early 1980's. The facility to unration our model in a realistic 
manner is a powerful option necessary when looking at contemporary issues.
In 1979, the Building Society Guidance System was scrapped, closely followed by 
the abolition of the corset in 1980, which enabled banks to compete in the mortgage 
market (see Artis and Lewis (1981), Chapter 6). Bank advances for mortgage 
purposes rose from £0.1 bn in 1977 to £2.5 bn in 1981, and almost £11 bn in 1988 
(Source, Financial Statistics, Central Statistics Office, HMSO, various). In this 
environment it became impossible for the building society cartel to survive and its 
role diminished until it was abandoned in 1984. The preferred tax treatment given 
to the industry was effectively withdrawn in 1985, while in 1986, the Building 
Societies Act (briefly described in Boleat (1988), Kleinwort Grieveson Securities
(1988) and BSA (1988a)) widened both the scope of businesses (see Cumming,
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1989) and sources of funds (see Hudson, 1989) which building societies could utilise 
(For a description of the major building societies and their options for future 
development under liberalisation see Wriglesworth (1989a,b)).
Naturally, the convergence of business areas between banks and building societies 
ended the rationing described above although income is still used as a basis for 
mortgage allocation. Deregulation should result in a "one o ff ' move to a new debt 
to income ratio among households, a greater tendency for price to clear the 
mortgage market and a larger impact on the housing market from housing fiscal 
policy changes (the implications of the switch in regimes along these lines is further 
discussed in Meen, 1988, 1989, 1990). Once this is attained, mortgage credit 
growth should increase more in line with income growth. Indeed, Smith et al. 
(1988, pp. 53) rightly warned that when analysing the housing market it would be 
wrong to solely concentrate on rationing at the expense of ignoring other 
fundamental long-run determinants such as incomes, real rates of interest and prices. 
In this sense, our model does not rely on one specific housing formation 
determinant.
1.4.5. Owner Occupied Wealth and the Rest of the Economy.
It has been argued that housing has been fiscally privileged especially as a result of 
owner occupiers political influence and that building societies were important in 
providing a stable and dedicated source of funds. These conditions resulted in 
owner occupied housing being an important source of wealth to the private sector. 
Given the relative importance of this sector any rise in wealth is likely to affect 
individual consumption and saving decision as well as the structure of individuals' 
asset portfolios. These influences should be larger in the 1980's than in the 1960's 
although this is not without complications (see Section 1.4.5.2.). The potential for 
large portfolio shifts is of particular interest to this research.
1.4.5.1. Labour Market Efficiency.
An important suggested area of interaction between owner occupation and the 
economy is the efficiency of the labour market (Bover et al. 1988, Hendry, 1985; 
Meen, 1988; Minford et al. 1987; Muellbauer, 1986b, 1988b,d, 1990c; Muellbauer 
and Murphy, 1989). Essentially, this a domestic inflation spiral where rising house 
prices feed wage growth and wages feed house prices. Bover et al. (1988) argue 
that house prices and wages are "co-integrated" and, whilst in the long-run both 
have consistently outperformed the RPI, house prices and inflation are not related in 
this way. The diversity of house prices on a regional basis can also affect labour
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mobility (and, consequently, unemployment) because regions which are booming will 
tend to pay higher wages in order to attract staff which, in turn, leads to higher 
house prices representing an additional hurdle for workers (possibly unemployed) in 
other regions to fill vacancies (recent data regarding regional house prices can be 
found in BSA (1987, pp. 22-23)). This theory suggests that the housing market 
crucially impinges on the efficiency of the labour market. W ork carried out by 
Egginton (1988) on the other hand rejects this thesis arguing that the variability of 
regional unemployment has been greater than regional earnings and that regional 
earnings are highly correlated with national growth rates of hourly earnings of those 
industries which dominated employment in a particular region.
Another factor which adds to this mobility problem is the probability of a link 
between tenure and socio-economic groups (Munro, 1986). Minford et al. (1987) 
argue that in many instances, there are strong incentives not to move even for 
employment reasons because of rigidities in the council house system and protected 
tenancies. A lack of good accommodation is also problematic. In attempting to 
explain what factors may push people away from rented tenancies, Gordon et al. 
(1987, pp. 248) stress the moral hazard problem associated with rental contracts.
That is, tenants have little incentive to take care of the property and landlords have 
little incentive to allow tenants to alter the property. The moral hazard theory does 
have the problem that people still have to live in the house although low 
maintenance of landlords may be an important factor. Furthermore, Champion et al. 
(1986, pp. 4) provide evidence from the National Dwelling and Household Survey 
which indicates that only 22 % of household moves were for employment reasons, 
whereas 41 % moved for housing related reasons. Ball (1983, pp. 324, Table 11.1) 
provides a list of reasons why existing owner occupation moved in 1981 carried out 
by the Nationwide Building Society which supports the findings o f the Household 
Survey.
The outcome of this theory is similar to that of the one expounded by those 
concentrating on the fiscal differentials, namely an increase in the NAIRU (Non 
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment). These are not necessarily competing 
theories. If the direct link between wages and house prices is likely to be a function 
of the favourable tax treatment of housing, then consequently, this becomes a 
necessary condition of the theory described above. Our model is a national 
aggregate model and does not, therefore, shed any light on the regional issue, 
although if  parameterised correctly, it could produce results at a regional level. The 
model does however have important implications for the house price, wage growth, 
inflation spiral if it is clear that fiscal rules lubricate this spiral.
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1.4.5.2. Effectiveness of Economic Policy.
The accumulation of wealth in housing has also had important effects on monetary 
policy. This arises primarily from the effect on money supply as individuals borrow 
to buy a house or as they increase their credit facilities, given that housing equity 
represents security to the lender. Financial deregulation coupled with a vigorous 
housing market was clearly at odds with the Conservative Government's Medium 
Term Financial Strategy in the 1980's (Johnston, 1983). Having gone through much 
of the deregulation adjustment, monetary policy should be more effective as people's 
financial gearing levels are closer to market clearing equilibrium they will, by 
definition, be more sensitive to fluctuation in the rate of interest (Meen 1988, pp.
1). Ironically, this may be diluted again owing to the growing trend towards annual 
review mortgages (Anderson, 1989). Such mortgages isolate individuals from the 
short-run effects of changes in interest rates which push the burden of monetary 
policy into a smaller sub-sector of the housing market. Davis (1988) argues that as 
wealth in housing increases, individuals' marginal propensity to consume from 
income is reduced. These trends are likely to add to instability and possible policy 
mismatches as monetary policy will display a greater than anticipated inertia.
1.4.5.3. Net Cash Withdrawal.
Financial deregulation has also highlighted the phenomenon of net cash withdrawal, 
sometimes called "equity withdrawal", as an important influence in the economy 
(this is also being increasingly recognised in the U .S.A ., see Canner and Tuckett
(1989) and Canner et al. (1990)). This is defined as the net increase in house 
purchase loans less the private sector's net expenditure on housing. Spencer (1987b, 
pp. 23) correctly indicates that the term "equity withdrawal" is a misnomer since the 
borrower retains full title to the property. Detailed analysis of net cash withdrawals 
are provided in Drayson (1985), Holmans (1986), and Lowe (1990). In response to 
the 1986 Building Society Act, the Bank of England withdrew the Mortgage Lending 
Guidance stating that since societies could now make unsecured consumer loans, 
achieving this by means of a mortgage would only increase the security of the loan 
(Bank of England, 1986b).
If people regard the rise in the equity value of their home as a store of wealth, this 
will engender less saving, and indeed, this has been the trend during the 1980's 
(see Franklin et al. 1989 or Milne, 1990, pp. 4). Lomax (1991, p. 64) notes that 
countries with the least developed housing finance systems have the highest 
household savings ratio. On the other hand, Ermisch (1988) indicates that rising 
house prices transfer wealth from the young to the old who have a higher propensity
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to save and this tempers the general effect. Similarly, most inheritance estimated to 
be currently over £7 bn per annum and reaching £13 bn by the end of the century 
(Morgan, Grenfell, 1987), falls to people in their fifties who have a higher 
propensity to save. In general increased consumption from net cash withdrawal will 
have negative implications for the balance of payments (Lyons, 1988; Miles, 1990).
1.4.5.4. Crowing-in and Crowding-out of Alternative Investments.
That owner occupied housing has represented an especially attractive investment 
vehicle and has effectively "crowded out" alternative investments is a possible 
outcome given the correct facilitating conditions. "Crowding out" is used here in a 
general sense rather than the more traditional reduction in private sector investment 
owing to high rates of interest caused by government expenditure (summarised in 
Levacic and Rebman (1982) and Goodhart (1975)). Under such circumstances, the 
potential for the economy to evolve towards a second stage of evolution, "crowding 
in" is clear (although not directly demonstrated) from the methodology of our model. 
If conditions were conducive, individuals could re-finance housing equity and 
diversify their portfolios towards more attractive assets, assuming a deregulated 
capital market. This outcome is supported by Morgan Grenfell (1987) who argue 
that financial assets in particular will benefit from this process. From the present 
situation of high relative levels of housing wealth in the South of England, this 
process would further concentrate economic power in that region.
Such an outcome could arise if housing becomes a less attractive investment in the 
1990's as the end of the deregulation process reduces expected house price gains 
(thus increasing the user cost of housing capital). Furthermore, the demographics of 
household formation (Ermisch, 1990, Chapter 6) suggest that the demand for housing 
should fall significantly, although some of this will be tempered by a rise in the 
headship rate (the ratio of households to population). A similar conclusion is 
reached by Hokenson (1990) with respect to the U.S. housing market. Further 
discussion regarding demographics and the headship rate is found in Buckley and 
Ermisch (1982) and Dicks (1988) and for the U.S. economy in Hendershott (1987, 
1988a, 1988b). For these reasons, individuals may be forced to seek out other 
investments therefore fiscal measures could play an important factor in both the 
speed and direction of any "crowding in".
1.4.5.5. Macroeconomic Forecasts.
We have argued above that the housing market has significant direct and indirect 
effects on the U.K. economy and acts as a transmission mechanism for many
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macroeconomic shocks. Given this, the large amount of policy advice seems 
disproportionate compared to the level of theoretical and empirical knowledge 
especially with respect to housing's interaction with other sectors of the economy. 
One consequence of this neglect is that many of the larger U.K. macroeconomic 
forecasting models do not (or did not until the late 1980's) incorporate the housing 
sector explicitly. For example, Meen (1988, pp. 4) notes that the wealth component 
of consumers expenditure is usually restricted to financial assets. Recently, treasury 
forecasts have consistently (especially since 1985) underestimated the strength of 
consumer spending and much of this has been attributed to neglect of the housing 
market. This situation has begun to reverse and many more forecasting models 
incorporate the effects of wealth and net cash withdrawal in consumption functions. 
This inclusion is difficult since the period probably represents a structural break 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981, pp. 123-127) in the housing market. Ericsson and 
Henry (1984, pp. 20-21) for example point out that house price data derived from 
building societies will be biased in the early 1980's.
1.4.6. Manufacturing Investment.
Having discussed aspects of the importance of the owner occupied sector we can 
turn to the discussion of the manufacturing sector and present the reasons for its 
inclusion as a sector of particular importance. The size of the manufacturing capital 
stock, defined by the CSO as plant and machinery, buildings and vehicles, ships and 
aircraft, has increased from £27 bn in 1965 to £177 bn in 1979, or 73 % in real 
terms. By 1988, had reached £263 bn (Source CSO). Moreover, in 1989, 
manufacturing accounted for 21 % of the U .K 's GDP, employed 23 % of the 
workforce (services accounted for 18 % of employment) and provided 80 % of 
merchandise exports (Freeman, 1991, pp. 6).
1.4.7. Importance of Manufacturing Investment.
Despite the continual reduction in the proportion of manufacturing output as a 
percentage of GDP (Economic Progress Report, 1985; Freeman, 1991, pp. 9), 
manufacturing continues to play a disproportionately important role in the economy. 
Studies which have singled out in manufacturing as a key sector in the economy are 
Malkiel (1979), Stafford (1981), O'Shaughnessy (1987, 1988, 1989a,b), Brown
(1988), Wells (1989), Haskel and Kay (1990), Freeman (1991), Martin (1991) and 
Skeoch and Hacche (1991). By comparing investment in housing and 
manufacturing, it is not the aim of this research to argue that the latter is necessarily 
more important than other areas of activities such as services, but to provide a 
framework in which to analyse two important sectors of the economy. Indeed, a
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recent study by Hague (1991) argues that international specialisation tells us that the 
U .K .'s  future lies in the service sector rather than manufacturing.
There are, however, a number of arguments which suggests that manufacturing does 
deserve particular attention. Unlike housing capital, manufacturing can duplicate 
itself as well as produce consumer goods. It is the former ability, through the 
resource allocation and investment process, which increases future output and creates 
wealth. Jorgenson et al. (1987) finds that the unprecedented growth in economic 
activity in the U.S. between 1948 and 1979 originates mainly from investment in 
capital stock. In many ways, the stock of fixed capital plays an important role in 
determining the nation's unemployment and inflation trade off (the internal balance) 
and the balance of payments (the external balance).
1.4.8. Productivity.
The purpose of the following sector is to outline the importance of productivity 
growth to the economy. Low capital investment as a result of a bias of resources 
away from manufacturing is one thesis which could explain the productivity 
slowdown witnessed in the U.K. in the 1970's. This is one hypothesis of many and 
in Section 1.4.8.1. other, not necessarily exclusive, hypothesis are discussed in order 
to place the inflation and taxation bias analysed in the present research in context. 
Capital intensity, or the capital to labour ratio, is an important element in a 
country's productivity performance (output per man hour), although caution is 
required when interpreting this derived statistic (Steiner, 1950; Hildred, 1984). 
Greater productivity helps extend production and hence, it is used in wage 
bargaining and contributes to international competitiveness by lowering unit labour 
costs. Since the turn of the century, a productivity trend of around 2 % per annum 
was normal in the U.K. (manufacturing productivity is displayed graphically in 
Muellbauer, 1986a, pp. 3 and Oulton, 1988, pp. 66). In the 1960's, this rose to 
around 3.75 %, only to fall in the 1970's to no growth at all. Spencer (1987a, pp. 
7) argues that the underlying productivity trend is between 2.5 to 3.5% . The 1980's 
witnessed a sharp revival, sometimes exceeding 5 % per annum (for a summary, see 
Maynard, 1988, pp 90-92). The performance of the 1980's has been used to herald 
the success of Thatcher supply-side policies (for a discussion see Kilpatrick and 
Naisbitt, 1984; Budd, 1988; Wolf, 1988 and Godley, 1991, pp. 33) although Mendis 
and Muellbauer (1983) correctly caution against the danger of short-run cyclical 
movements compared to long-run trends when interpreting productivity data.
Boosting the performance of manufacturing industry is clearly a priority of the 
current Labour Party (Smith, 1990). Although productivity growth is not only a 
function of the growth in the capital stock it is one of the more influential variables
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and the route which our model feeds into the overall picture.
1.4.8.1. Productivity Slowdown.
Wren-Lewis (1989) provides an international analysis of productivity trends finding 
that U.K productivity growth was comparable to other nations in the 1960's. 
However, during the general growth slowdown in the 1970's, the U.K. did not 
perform well. A general summary of the U.K. experience can be found in 
Muellbauer (1986a) and Oulton (1990). Much work has been carried out by 
economists in an attempt to explain this slowdown. It is unlikely that any one 
theory holds the entire answer but a lack of investment owing to a "crowding out" 
effect from more attractive assets could arguably form a piece of the jigsaw. Below 
we shall outline some of the competing explanations thus setting the above 
proposition in context.
One of the main theories to emerge as an explanation for the manufacturing 
productivity slowdown in the 1970's is the relative price thesis. This has been 
expounded in various forms. For example, the oil price, and other commodities 
shock may have resulted in projects being assigned higher risk profiles or large 
scale mispricing may have occurred. Similarly, such price rises may have rendered 
energy intensive capital goods uncommercial. In order to test this, Bruno (1982) 
extended the conventional two factor production function by introducing purchased 
materials or intermediate goods as a third input. Utilising econometric evidence 
across several countries, he found that, "On average, raw materials explain about 60 
% of the slowdown, with the demand squeeze explaining the remaining 40 %" 
(Bruno, 1982, pp. 89). Muellbauer (1986a, pp. 14) contributes to this theory by 
suggesting that low investment and scrapping may have induced a switch to older 
vintages of capital designed for the relatively higher energy prices of the 1950's and 
I960 's. Similarly, Darby and Wren-Lewis (1988) and Oulton (1990) also find 
relative prices to be of some significance whilst Nadiri and Schankerman (1981) 
working in the U .S., stress the fall in demand.
Although often presented as a thesis to describe the high productivity gains o f the 
1980's induced by a labour "shake out", the Labour hoarding hypothesis can be used 
to explain the performance in the 1970's. Details of the labour hoarding hypothesis 
can be found in Bowers et al. (1982) and a shorter summary in Oulton (1990). The 
theory suggests that firms find it more cost effective to even out their employment 
paths over the economic cycle owing to the costs incurred when hiring and firing. 
Labour hoarding was also rationalised by the advent of implicit contract theory (see 
Grossman, 1981; McDonald and Solow, 1981 and for a summary, Stevenson et al.
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1988, pp. 111-125). By introducing the exchange of an incomplete insurance policy 
in the labour market, to some extent, wages and employment could be stabilised, 
relative to the outcome produced from a short-run myopic spot market.
A further employment stabilising theory is expounded by Darby and Wren-Lewis 
(1988) who argue that during the 1970’s, firms displayed "over-optimistic 
expectations" regarding output (demand) and consequently, maintained higher than 
average levels of employment. Whether the main reason in the 1970's for stable 
employment was a result of labour hoarding and/or implicit contracts or "over- 
optimistic expectations", these strengthen the procyclical nature of productivity 
(referred to as Okun's Law). In fact, these theories are likely to be complementary 
in that labour hoarding or implicit contracts to fully explain the productivity path in 
the 1970's would require demand to be lower than firms anticipated.
The role of trade unions has been presented as a cause of higher than optimal 
employment levels and inefficiency, owing to restrictive work practices (for a 
summary, see Stafford, 1981, pp. 14 and 74). Oulton (1990) carries out a 
disaggregated analysis and finds that industries with a higher degree of unionism 
displayed lower productivity growth. On the other hand, recent work carried out 
using corporate data (Nickell et al. 1989; Wadhwani and Wall, 1989; Wadhwani, 
1989) rejects the hypothesis that unions adversely influence productivity growth or 
investment. Work carried by Christiansen and Haveman (1981) emphasise the 
effects on productivity of interventions to the market process as a result o f public 
regulations, while Bishop (1989) emphasises the decline in the rate of growth of 
human capital using academic records data.
1.4.9. Manufacturing Investment and Economic Growth.
We have argued so far that, whilst cautioning against over-emphasis of 
manufacturing, the size and productivity growth of the sector is of particular 
importance to a country's economic development. While economy wide shocks may 
weigh more heavily in destabilizing investment than changing tax parameters 
(Chirinko, 1988) these can only be reacted to. The emphasis of this research is to 
discuss the impact of inflation, taxation and capital markets on investment in 
competing sectors. This is important not only because it affects manufacturing 
capacity, but through the rate at which technology is introduced into the capital 
stock.
Freeman (1991, pp. 6-7) argues that about 40 % of the growth in GDP in the U.K. 
can be attributed to technical progress and that manufacturing is responsible for
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around 85% of investment in research and development. Thus, despite the constant 
reduction in the proportion of output of manufacturing as a percentage of GDP 
(Economic Progress report, 1985; Freeman, 1991, pp. 9) manufacturing continues to 
play an important role in wealth creation. Indeed, if Aurther's (1990) vision of 
increasing returns to scale from the new "micro chip" industries is correct, the 
secular decline of manufacturing may soon reverse.
The importance of investment and scrapping of equipment is emphasised by Mendis 
and Muellbauer (1983), Muellbauer (1986a), Oulton (1988, 1989) and 
O'Shaughnessy (1987, 1988, 1989a, b). This can be discussed in terms of a vintage 
approach where allowance is made for reductions in efficiency as capital ages. In 
this way, technology, investment and the capital stock are related. Better methods 
or technology which can be applied to the existing capital stock (disembodied 
technical change) are usually not as significant as technology introduced with new 
investment (embodied technical change). Testing this theory is difficult owing to 
data problems (Muellbauer, 1986a, pp. 3), but it could be argued (Oulton, 1988) 
that the 1970's slow-down was a result of low investment, whereas the 1980's pick 
up was a result of scrapping.
The work of O'Shaughnessy (1987; 1989a, b) argues that manufacturing capacity has 
been a significant constraint on macroeconomic performance in the U.K. 
Consequently, any policy to expand employment (policy alternatives are discussed in 
O'Shaughnessy, 1988) would require to be accompanied by an increase in 
manufacturing investment. The author argues that the trade-off between the external 
balance and the internal balance has worsened over the years, in particular the late 
1960's to early 1970's, between 1973 and 1974 and from 1980 to 1984. Common 
to all of these periods is a fall, not only of output, but of manufacturing capacity. 
O'Shaughnessy emphasises the "stop-go" cycle as an important discouragement to 
investment because entrepreneurs, anticipating policy responses in these phases, tend 
not to invest in capacity necessary to meet higher demand, preferring instead to 
increase prices and not hold levels of capacity which would be inappropriate for the 
anticipated downturn as policy tightens.
This response, over time, leads to a smaller manufacturing base than optimal, a 
higher inflation propensity and reliance on imports to support the demand at the top 
half of the cycle. This is crucial to the balance of payments given manufacturing 
output accounted for around 80 % of merchandise exports in 1989 (Freeman, 1991). 
Even if manufacturing in the 1980's is more competitive in foreign markets, as 
proposed by Haskel and Kay (1990) and Ray (1990), the actual size of the sector 
has been argued to be too small (O'Shaughnessy 1987; 1989a, b; Wells, 1989,
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1991; Muellbauer and Murphy, 1989).
Although the work of O'Shaughnessy is carried out in a non-neoclassical framework 
which ignores the problem of relative prices (O'Shaughnessy; 1988, pp. 16) the 
emphasis of his work is not, in principal, contrasting to the present study where the 
the structure of the tax system and capital markets is emphasised in determining 
capacity and productivity growth (discussed in Section 1.3.). Indeed, if 
manufacturing is starved of investment whilst at the same time, individual's wealth is 
increasing owing to house price rises, then the trade-off problem becomes more 
critical. The argument can be extended further in that in an unrationed mortgage 
market environment investors wishing to "sit out" the "stop-go" cycle may be 
attracted to housing as an alternative investment. This logic can lead to a spiral 
where increasing demand coupled with low capacity creates inflationary bottlenecks 
and balance of payments crisis which are precisely the conditions which make 
housing investment attractive. If this analysis is even partially correct, then those 
authors concentrating solely on labour market rigidities as the only obstacle to full 
employment, are being unnecessarily myopic.
1.4.10. Fiscal Structures and Policy Debate.
It is now appropriate to outline the relevant fiscal structures of each sector which are 
modelled in Chapter 2. We also discuss the policy debates which mainly centre 
around these issues and form the basis of the work presented in Chapter 5.
1.4.10.1. Housing Fiscal Structure.
Before reviewing the arguments for and against various aspects of the housing fiscal 
structure, we can state what these were in the period of interest and comment on the 
major changes post this period. Prior to 1969, interest payments on all personal 
borrowing were tax exempt, after this date only mortgages remained. The amount 
of MIRAS received by an individual is a function of the mortgage rate, house 
prices, the individual's income tax rate, and the ceiling for relief. The last change 
to the ceiling was in 1983 when it was increased to £30,000 from £25,000 set in 
1974. MIRAS has made mortgages the cheapest form of personal sector debt 
available, although the real value of this has diminished because of the non­
indexation of the ceiling. Ironically, a tax cut increases the cost of servicing 
mortgage debt and therefore acts to neutralise the benefits to highly geared 
households. MIRAS does not apply to a second home.
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Tax on imputed rent was a feature of the U.K. fiscal system until Schedule A was 
abolished in the 1963 Maulding Budget. Initially, this tax was aimed at private 
landlords with owner occupiers happening to fall into the same net. Similarly, for a 
main residence, owner occupiers do not pay CGT on nominal or real returns despite 
the U.K. having a fully fledged CGT since 1965.
Owner occupiers do pay stamp duty (currently 1 %) if  they purchase a residence 
with a value greater than a specified amount (currently £30,000). Also, during the 
period of interest rates were abolished. Rates were, in essence, a tax on imputed 
rent, being a function of the poundage and property valuation set by the relevant 
local authority. Rates were often criticised, especially on a regional level, for 
inconsistency among rateable values with actual or potential market rentals and for 
the lack of revaluations (the last one in England and Wales being in 1973). The 
Community Charge (Poll Tax) arose from the fourth green paper aimed at reforming 
the rating system since 1971. Its introduction occurred in Scotland in 1989 and 
England and Wales in 1990. This tax is not related to property but individuals.
1.4.10.2. Housing Policy Debate.
The importance and complexity of the housing market has led to a disproportionately 
high number of policy alternatives compared to actual theoretical and empirical 
analysis. We will briefly indicate some of the policy approaches suggested to 
reform the housing market and then focus on these which can be incorporated for 
analysis into our model, namely, fiscal policy and capital market controls. Not all 
policy suggestions centre on fiscal policy, powerful arguments are also found 
eminating from alternative directions.
The demise of the private rented sector (figures provided in Dicks (1989, pp. 66- 
67)) throughout the century has occurred owing to fiscal privileges of the owner 
occupied sector coupled with restrictive rent acts. King and Atkinson (1980, pp. 12) 
(and to an extent Muellbauer (1992, pp. 38)) suggest reforming the sector by 
equating the "cost" of both tenures. Generally, the liberalisation of both sectors is 
proposed although Hunt (1988) suggests that the effect of this would be to increase 
rents and not to stimulate the tenure. Studies which link the labour market to 
migration rigidities (Champion et al. 1986; Muellbauer, 1986; Minford et al. 1967; 
Bover et al., 1988) typically propose stimulating the rented sector. The sector is 
generally emphasised because of low moving costs unlike the owner occupied sector 
which suffers because of regional house prices (Bover et al. 1988, pp. 52-53) and 
large transactional costs (Ermisch, 1988, pp. 23). Council house tenants are also 
"sticky movers", Hughes and McCormick (1988) find council house owners least
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likely to move for job related reasons. This is also argued in Minford et al. (1987) 
who conclude that labour mobility would increase, and unemployment decrease, if 
rent restrictions were abolished and council house rents were set at market levels.
Restrictive planning and land controls have also been criticised for adding to house 
price inflation (Brittan, 1988b; Muellbauer, 1990c) and therefore a policy to make 
more land available has been suggested to ease the problem. Hallet (1988, pp.
205), on the other hand, argues that there is a case for making land available for 
more housing in "parts of Southern England, but not elsewhere". Muellbauer 
(1990c, pp. 24) suggests support for the home building industry, whilst Malpas 
(1986, pp. 237) argues that an improved system of maintenance and improvement 
grants is required for those on low incomes in order to maintain the standard of the 
whole housing stock. A comprehensive list of housing policies ranging from the 
taxation of owner occupation, the reform of local authority and housing associations 
to housing benefit and improvement grants are contained in Hills (1991, pp. 29-40).
1.4.10.3. Model Specific Housing Policy Debate.
In broad terms, the objective of many economists advocating housing reform is to 
realign house purchase to match desired housing services and break the link as a 
speculative investment. Thus, for example, King and Atkinson (1980, pp. 12) state, 
"Ideally, reform of the tax treatment of housing would be based on an appeal to a 
fully articulated set of principals. Unfortunately, theoretical principals have played 
little role in the evolution of the British tax system; and this makes it extremely 
difficult to propose a systematic plan for reforming the treatment of housing which 
is consistent with all other aspects of taxation". Many reformers are driven by 
inequality of taxation between assets, while others envisage the housing market 
playing a more sinister role in the economy. Arguments for a favorable tax 
treatment of housing are summarised in De Leeuw and Ozanne (1981, pp. 316-317). 
These include the benefit to society in general from good housing stock, both 
aesthetically and socially.
We have already described the theory that regional house prices adds to labour 
immobility and wage price pressure (Section 1.4.5.1.). Muellbauer (1986b) states 
that, "The housing market may be the major channel by which the money supply 
influences inflation directly rather than via interest rates". Other economists take a 
more sanguine view. Brittan (1988b) argues that house prices are not the cause of 
inflation, but a symptom and part of the transmission mechanism. Spencer (1987b) 
also casts doubt on the inflationary stimulus of house prices arguing that they merely 
react to inflationary expectations faster than labour or goods markets owing to its
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asset market characteristics (Brittan (1988a) also supports this view). He cautions 
against full acceptance of the labour rigidity theory because the evidence is not 
powerful enough to explain the statistical relationship between the two price series.
If house prices are an indicator of inflationary expectations, then they may be 
adopted as an intermediate policy objective in the spirit o f Friedman (1975) and 
discussed in Stevenson et al. (1988, pp. 297-299).
Turnbull (1990) also supports Spencers (1987b) proposition arguing that house prices 
reflect the overall monetary and fiscal stance in the economy. He strongly attacks 
the tax reformers arguing that the housing market is a disguise for their "hidden 
agenda", namely, if  you can afford a big house then you should pay big taxes.
Whether such doubts are correct or not, the fact remains that there exists a 
significant body of literature dedicated to the reform of owner occupier taxation. By 
far, the most common area for reform is MIRAS, on the grounds that it encourages 
investment from other assets towards housing, particularly those in higher rate tax 
bands. This relief is also extended to those whose mortgage interest outgoings may 
represent only a small part of disposable income. MIRAS also helps to protect the 
owner occupier from the worst effects of inflation, thus supporting the link between 
expected inflation and house prices, although Meen (1990, pp. 6) argues that 
mortgage rationing may have broken the theoretical link between inflation, the tax 
system and real house prices.
1.4.10.4. Abolition of MIRAS.
Atkinson (1989) provides an entire paper devoted to why MIRAS should be 
abolished. Congdon and Warburton (1987) argue that almost all housing capital 
gains stem from MIRAS, while Fitzgerald and Davies (1987) feel that abolition 
would stem leakage from the mortgage sector to consumption and imports. Malpas 
(1986, pp. 236) and Muellbauer (1986b) propose achieving this over three years of a 
buyer's life. The Labour Party are reported to be considering a policy which would 
abolish higher rate relief and restrict the subsidy for the first ten years of an 
individual entering the owner occupied sector (Stephens, 1989) (higher rate relief 
was abolished in 1991). Maintaining MIRAS for a certain number of years is a 
recognition of the "tilt" or "front end loading" problem, that is, mortgage payments 
represent a much larger part of first time buyer's income and therefore, they are 
vulnerable to increased interest rates which increases the real burden of debt 
payments on current cash flow. Both King and Atkinson (1980, pp. 11) and 
Buckley and Ermisch (1982, pp. 283) argue that the importance of this phenomenon 
is diluted in the long run.
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Abolition through a gradual reduction in the real value of the relief by maintaining 
the current threshold level has been proposed by King and Atkinson (1980), the 
Fabian Society (1990) and Hills (1991). Buckley and Ermisch (1982) suggest 
abolishing MIRAS, but at the same time, introduce a direct subsidy or tax credit 
arguing that this would break the link with inflation. Similarly, Keating (1986) 
argues for abolition of MIRAS at higher rates o f income tax coupled with a 
reduction in the level of higher marginal tax rates claiming that this would provide a 
"rare example of a Pareto-efficient improvement", since it would help reduce 
regional imbalances, raise no one's tax bill and leave the PSBR (Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement) virtually unchanged. Muellbauer (1988a) also suggests 
removal of higher tax rate relief.
The reason Keating (1986) includes a cut in higher tax thresholds is the fear of "tax 
capitalisation" invoking a typical asset market response resulting in lower house 
prices. This phenomenon occurs as prices fall until the post-tax return to the 
investor is equal to that achieved before the tax increase (change). If  this happened, 
then many households could find the value of their home worth less than the value 
o f the mortgage which, in turn, would add to labour mobility problems.
King and Atkinson (1980), Muellbauer (1986b) and Turnbull (1990) also emphasise 
the "tax capitalisation" problem. Research carried out by Meen (1988; 1989; 1990) 
suggests that its significance depends on whether the mortgage market is rationed or 
not. Following from his conclusions, tax reform of the owner occupied sector 
would only have affected prices slightly under conditions of rationing, the main 
effect being to reduce the mortgage queue. A corollary to this conclusion is that the 
real effect of inflation in the 1960's and 1970’s was not to increase real house 
prices, but to increase the length of mortgage queues (Meen, 1990, pp. 19-20) and 
by implication, reject the hypothesis that over-investment in housing occurred during 
this period. This link between taxation, investment and mortgage market conditions 
should be important for policy makers.
Both Brittan (1988b) and Callender (1990) argue that MIRAS is not the real problem 
claimed noting that similar subsidies to MIRAS operate in other European countries, 
often more generous, without displaying similar housing inflation problems.
Although King and Atkinson (1980) and Buckley and Ermisch (1982) propose some 
reform of MIRAS, they express the view that the real taxation bias lies in the 
absence of capital gains tax or a tax on imputed income. Like other economists (eg. 
Hills, 1991) they accept that political expediency makes MIRAS the least cost policy 
option. Indeed, MIRAS has been reduced in real terms over the past two decades 
and multiple mortgage tax relief was abolished on the first of August, 1988,
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although this had been suggested by the chancellor since 1986 (HMSO, 1986, pp. 
27).
1.4.10.5. Taxation of Capital Gains and Imputed Rent.
Many economists feel that conditions in the housing market are so crucial that 
political misgivings must be put aside and radical reforms introduced. The 
introduction o f capital gains tax has received some support (Muellbauer, 1986b), 
although for equity, mobility and again, political reasons, this has been in the main 
ruled out (King and Atkinson, 1980; Fabian Society, 1990; Hills, 1981). The 
increased research into net cash withdrawal has, however, brought forward proposals 
to tax such sums at a capital gains tax rate (Spencer, 1990; Spencer and Scott,
1990; Muellbauer, 1990). This policy has been criticised by Anderson (1990) who 
argues that alternative assets should be made more attractive (for example personal 
equity plans) in order to fund more productive alternative investments.
A more popular policy is the imposition of a tax on imputed rent. In its basic 
form, this is a tax on the market value of the property, assuming constant 
proportionality between imputed income and the capital value. Hallet (1988, pp.
202) argues, like many economists, for the introduction of such a tax on the grounds 
of neutrality with the private rented sector and with other assets. King and Atkinson 
(1980, pp. 13) modify this concept by proposing the taxation of imputed income 
from the equity held by each owner occupier arguing that this would make housing 
costs independent of the individuals tax rate and the rate of inflation. They propose 
that MIRAS be retained. One result of this, at least in a deregulated mortgage 
market, would be an increase in the levels of mortgage debt.
The case for a tax on imputed rent has also been proposed by Muellbauer (1986b) 
and expanded upon in Muellbauer (1987a, pp. 14-15; 1987b, p. 19-20; 1988b,c) 
who suggests taxing current capital values at a rate of 3 %. In a postscript to his 
(1987b) paper, he discusses the alternative of taxing the underlying value of land. 
This has the advantage of eliminating the disincentive to carry out home 
improvements prevalent under the standard proposal and encourage the utilisation of 
vacant land zoned for residential development. Muellbauer (1989b) suggests that a 
tax of 1 % of the current value of each plot of residential land above some 
exemption limit be levied. In between these papers (Muellbauer, 1988c) the author 
does accept that difficulties would occur at a practical level, for example, assessing 
land values and incorporating land use with planning controls. Given this, 
Muellbauer (1990c) concludes that one of the above taxes would be better than none.
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Hills (1991, pp. 23) explores the effects of imposing income tax on a 3.5 % 
assumed real return to owner occupiers. He concluded that whilst the average 
outcome may be desirable, the disaggregated distributional effects were poor. Like 
capital gains tax, both Hills (1991, pp. 29) and the Fabian Society (1990, pp. 46) 
reject such a tax on political grounds. Ball (1983) argues that the tax was first 
introduced in the nineteenth century and was aimed at landlords, not owner 
occupiers. The tax has immediate problems given capital values may diverge 
relative to incomes and there is an absence of actual cash flow to tax.
1.4.10.6. Local Taxation.
We discussed rates in Section 1.4.10.1. and indicated that this had been replaced by 
the community charge. Today's policy debate therefore begins from this basis. 
Policy alternatives to the community charge are currently difficult to identify. At 
the moment, the government is reviewing the situation (the council tax being the 
outcome) while the Labour Party have announced the outlines of two possible 
schemes (Muellbauer, 1990c). One scheme is based on current capital values, while 
the other is a function of the square footage or building cost of the property. Some 
economists (Muellbauer, 1990c) would use a tax on imputed rent, the Social and 
Liberal Democratic Party favour a local income tax while The Fabian Society (1990, 
Chapter 11) advocate a mixture of the two.
1.4.10.7. Mortgage Rationing.
The reintroduction of mortgage rationing has been suggested by Potter (1988) and 
the tightening of banks and building societies' ability to lend has been proposed in 
Muellbauer (1990a). Potter's (1988) proposal is to ban new mortgages in excess of 
60 % of the valuation of any property costing over £100,000. Rationing is not a 
common policy suggestion because of the nature of today's financial structure 
(Muellbauer, 1988b) and European integration (Turnbull, 1990, pp. 10). Lenders 
may tighten controls on loans in response to the new market environment although 
they may find this most efficiently achieved by fine tuning loan to income multiples 
rather than introduce a multiple screening process as proposed by Rose (1987).
1.4.10.8. Manufacturing Fiscal Structure.
The fiscal structure for the manufacturing sector is relatively complex. Not only is 
there a wide variety of taxes and subsidies to deal with, but two taxation systems. 
Given that we are interested in the taxation of manufacturing capital to the 
individual, it is necessary to account for the taxation of the corporate entity and any
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further taxation of returns to the personal sector.
After 1947, corporates, like individuals, paid income tax at a standard rate on 
profits. Shareholders were regarded as "partners" in the company. When the 
company paid a dividend, it was entitled to recoup income tax at the standard rate. 
Corporate profits were then subject to both an income tax and a profits tax. The 
system was, in effect, though not in legal form, an imputation system. U.K. 
corporate taxation is summarised in the Institute for Fiscal Studies (1991, Appendix
B). The pre 1965 system is described in Voge (1968), Adams and Whalley (1977, 
pp. 17) or Devereux (1987), while summary statistics of revenues between 1965 and 
1985 are presented in Her Majesty's Treasury (1984, part II). For the purposes of 
this research, we are interested in modelling the classical and imputation Systems of 
corporate taxation.
1.4.10.8.1. Classical System.
The classical system was introduced in the 1965 Finance Act (for a summary see 
Adams and Whalley (1977, pp. 50-51) King (1977, pp. 50-51) or James and Nobes 
(1988, pp. 277-279)). This system also prevailed in the U.S. for the 1965-79 
period of interest and is modelled in HH. Under this system, corporation tax was 
levied at a uniform rate on all profits, whether distributed or not. The corporate 
was regarded as a separate entity from its owners and consequently, any distribution 
required the corporate to deduct income tax at the basic rate. Schedule 11 of the act 
defined distribution widely, including any redeemable share capital issued in the 
form of bonus or interest paid on any type of security such as convertables. A 
complex system of surtax was aimed at wealthy individuals. On receipt of 
distribution, the individual was then automatically subject to income tax at their 
marginal rate. This "double taxation" of income was the main focus of criticism 
regarding the classical system.
Both corporates and individuals were subject to CGT on nominal gains. CGT was 
first introduced in 1962 with the imposition of a speculative gains tax in which 
individuals' short-term gains (those made in less than one year) were taxed at their 
marginal rate of income and surtax rates (Prest and Barr, 1985, pp. 198-199). CGT 
became much more comprehensive from 1965, individuals' long-term gains were 
taxed at 30 % or their marginal rate depending on which was most favourable. For 
corporates, the distinction between short and long-term gains was abandoned and all 
gains were treated as part of corporate profit and taxed as such at the corporation 
tax rate.
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Like individuals, corporates were also charged rates. In this instance, rates were 
levied on buildings, the land associated with them and on plant and machinery fixed 
to the buildings or deemed part of the structure. The main area of contention by 
corporates to this local tax was that unlike domestic rates, no voting rights were 
attributed to them. More detailed discussion can be found in Kay and King (1980, 
Chapter 10), and Bennett and Krebs (1987, pp. 25-26; 1988a, pp. 164-165).
Subsidies to business were provided in two broad forms. Firstly, all interest paid on 
debt finance could be deducted against corporation tax and secondly, a wide range of 
accelerated depreciation allowances and grants were available. The rules and rates 
of these fluctuated over the period.
Inflation and the rapid speed of technological change encouraged many businesses to 
argue that standard depreciation methods were too long resulting in a growing 
divergence between the true cost of replacing an asset and its historical replacement 
cost. Although fixed assets appear on the corporates balance sheet at cost less 
aggregate depreciation to date (net book value) and depreciation is subtracted from 
the statement of profit and loss, it is nevertheless advantageous to the corporate to 
write this off as quickly as possible. This is because the balance sheet is not a 
valuation of the assets worth and as companies are valued over time, reducing 
current tax liabilities, increases the present value of the firm.
There has been a frequent change of allowances over the years, however, as 
Auerbach (1981) indicates, the effect of these differ with varying tax rules and 
inflation. A table of depreciation allowances and grants can be found in James and 
Nobes (1988, pp. 302). The most common accelerated depreciation method is first 
year allowances - first introduced in 1945. Under this scheme, a corporate investing 
in fixed capital could claim a larger percentage of its allowance entitlement in the 
first year at the expense of subsequent years. The total allowed remained at 100 % 
of the initial historical cost. If the corporate replaced its capital evenly through time 
then the date of repayment could be postponed indefinitely. Such allowances can 
only be utilised if the firm is generating enough profit to be subject to corporation 
tax. If it does not, then the firm is "tax exhausted" and its user cost of capital will 
rise (Devereux, 1987).
One hundred percent initial allowances are similar to the first year allowances, but 
they correct for the inadequacy of historic cost depreciation. A more flexible system 
is that of "free depreciation", first introduced in 1963. This scheme enabled firms 
to write-off costs to a timetable chosen by themselves. In some ways, this helped to 
circumvent the tax exhaustion problems as firms could write off more in years of
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strong profits. All of these schemes were used periodically and were sometimes 
targeted at specific assets.
Investment allowances, first introduced in 1954, were akin to a special allowance in 
a particular year. This took the form of a net addition to the total allowances 
granted over the life of the equipment. For example, if  the investment allowance 
was 25 %, then the total allowance over the duration of the asset's life would be 
125 %.
At various stages, the government also provided cash grants in addition to, or, 
instead of, the above allowances. Investment grants were used between 1966 and 
1970, when they were abolished principally in favour of first year allowances 
although they returned in 1972 as part of the government's regional policy.
1.4.10.8.2. Imputation System.
The "imputation system" was introduced on 1st April, 1973 (for a summary, see 
Adams and Whalley (1977, pp. 18-19), King (1977, pp. 51-52) or James and Nobes 
(1988, pp. 277-287)). The main effect was to end the double taxation of income 
associated with the classical system. This was achieved by allowing a partial set-off, 
or imputation, of corporate taxation against personal taxation, which were no longer 
separate entities.
The system centres around Advanced Corporation Tax (ACT). ACT serves two 
purposes, it represents a tax credit to individuals which could be used to offset 
income tax while the corporate could set ACT against its Mainstream Corporation 
Tax (MCT).
Corporates paid ACT directly to the Inland Revenue of an amount equal to the basic 
rate of income tax that would be payable on dividends if they were grossed up at 
the basic rate of income tax, 0 . For example, if  a corporate distributes £70 by way 
of a dividend, then its ACT charge is (0 /l-0)£7O . As far as the Inland Revenue is 
concerned, the tax charge to the individual is levied on the gross amount ("gross 
equivalent"), that is 0  (Dnd (1 +  (0 /1 -0 ))) where Dnd is the distribution of net 
dividend.
The imputation system also changed the method in which CGT was applied to 
corporates. Capital gains ("chargeable gains") were still added to the corporates 
profits to face corporation tax. However, the size of the changeable gains was
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scaled down such that the effective rate was equivalent to individuals, 30 %. 
Throughout the imputation system, the corporate tax deductability of interest 
payments, rates, allowances and grants were maintained.
Significant changes since 1979 include the introduction of Enterprise Zones (see 
Bennett, 1990), the indexation of capital gains on assets held for more than one 
year, introduced in 1982 (see Prest and Barr 1985, pp. 338) and the 1984 
corporation tax reforms which removed the protection of stock relief and initial 
allowances (See King and Wookey (1987, pp. 150-152). Independent Personal 
taxation has more effect on separate taxation of husband and wife than any 
investment implications. Finally, Personal Equity Plans (PEP's) were introduced in 
1987 after being announced in the 1986 Budget. PEP's enabled personal investors 
to invest directly in equities's tax free (for a discussion, see Brown (1989)). A brief 
summary of the personal and corporate tax structure in the late 1980's is provided 
in Adams (1988, Chapter 2).
1.4.10.9. Manufacturing Policy Debate.
As can be observed from the previous Section, there have been far more changes to 
the taxation of manufacturing than housing. We have already indicated in Section 
1.2.4.1.4. that some form of inflation accounting has been a popular policy 
proposal. King and Wookey (1987, pp. 60-61) discuss the merits of a cash flow tax 
which taxes total receipts resulting from the sale of real (as opposed to financial) 
goods and services. The authors point out that this would be difficult to apply to 
service-based industries.
Recently, Griffiths (1989) reports that three prominent engineering organisations 
submitting a joint Budget proposal suggest the introduction of a number of 
investment incentives. These included full tax allowance for investment expenditure 
at the time of incurring the expense and an improvement in depreciation allowances 
for plant and machinery from 25 % to at least 40 % per year.
More recently, a study by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (1991) has proposed a 
restructuring of corporation tax. They call this the ACE system (Allowance for 
Company Equity) and as the name suggests, the proposal is to allow the cost of 
equity against the corporation tax liability in a similar way that relief is extended to 
interest payments. Such a system is aimed at achieving neutrality between sources 
of finance and choice of asset.
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1.5. Conclusion.
The role of this Chapter has been to provide the background to the importance of 
investment direction in the economy with particular reference to two key sectors, 
manufacturing and owner occupied housing. Important concepts of investment were 
discussed followed by a review of investment theory which enabled the identification 
of general rules which our model could appeal to. A review of asset allocation 
models which stressed the user cost of capital theory was provided and we concluded 
that the work of HH represented the most fruitful starting point for a U.K. study. 
Following from this we identified owner occupied housing and manufacturing as 
important sectors in the evolution of the U.K. economy which could be modelled. 
Examples of areas which these sectors impinge on economic activity were discussed 
in order to set in context the results of the model presented in Chapter 4 and 5.
This was followed by a summary of the actual fiscal structures of the period which 
directly link the model described in Chapter 2 and the results of Chapter 4. Finally 
a discussion of various policy proposals was given which forms the basis of the 
simulations presented in Chapter 5.
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2. A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL FOR THE U.K.
2.1. Introduction.
In this Chapter we present the basic general equilibrium simulation model which we 
shall use as a suitable paradigm to analyse the questions contained in Section 1.3.1. 
of Chapter 1. The model is in real terms and consists of two sectors, manufacturing 
(or corporate) and housing (owner occupied) and five assets, short and long-term 
corporate debt, mortgage debt, corporate and housing equity. The basic model has 
the risk-free rate of interest determined exogenously. User cost o f capital measures 
are central to the allocative process and these have been comprehensively specified. 
The model uses the tax system's prevalent between 1965 and 1979. Risk premiums 
and the ability to ration mortgages are also incorporated. The economy is closed, 
although it is possible to exogenously fix the risk free interest rate as if  it were set 
at levels determined in international markets. Below we shall outline some of the 
main assumptions underlying the model and then discuss areas where the model 
theoretically diverges from Hendershott and Hu (1983) (denoted HH). Following 
this, the basic model is presented in detail in order to expose microeconomic 
foundations often only partially presented in many studies. This also enables us to 
expose many of the assumptions implicitly made in similar research.
2.2. Main Assumptions.
This Section outlines the main assumptions of the simulation model. The basic 
model is presented in Section 2.4. which contains further assumptions more 
efficiently exposed within the model itself. The model is embedded in a neoclassical 
long-run general equilibrium framework. Equilibrium is used in the traditional sense 
(Chiang, 1983, pp. 35; Hendry, 1985, pp. 223), namely, a state where no inherent 
tendency to change exists. The model is aggregate in nature and therefore abstracts 
from the heterogeneous aspects of the housing market (see O ’Sullivan, 1985) and 
specific individual situations such as age and income (see Hendershott, 1988a). 
Perfect competition prevails and all markets clear. Relative factor prices matter and 
capital is allocated according to the marginal productivity theory of income 
distribution. As adjustment costs are ignored there are no dynamics, we are only 
interested in steady state solutions and therefore, the model sheds no light on 
adjustment paths between them. We shall assume that individuals own all net wealth 
(see Section 1.2.2.) and allocate resources according to the marginalist principal 
oudined above. There is no explicit government sector, although the government sets 
taxes and subsidies, it has no expenditure function or explicit control over money 
supply or interest rates.
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In order to maintain consistency and ease of interpretation, we will ignore many of 
the less significant tax changes, concentrating on the main structure of the U.K. 
taxation environment throughout the period of interest. This simplification is not 
unusual in a long-run model and is similar to, for example, King and Wookey 
(1987).
Ermisch (1988, pp. 17) criticises the assumption that individuals allocate resources 
from a single tax base. The author bases his argument correctly on the basis that 
individuals enjoy other favourable tax vehicles for investing such as pension funds 
(this would also include life assurance and PEP's) which may affect some of the bias 
found in the U.S. studies. Indeed Feldstein and Jun (1987, pp. 104) suggest 
modelling with all taxes and then excluding personal taxes on the premiss that 
changes in the return to pension funds will, through portfolio substitution, affect the 
return to other investors. A study by the Bank of England (1986a, pp. 546) argues 
that life assurance and pension funds have become major vehicles for personal sector 
saving (for more technical detail relating to pension funds, see Blake (1986b)). In 
1984, investment in these areas represented two thirds of all personal sector saving. 
In 1965, total assets of life assurance and pension funds was about £12.5bn (Bank of 
England 1986a, pp. 547) compared to our value for the manufacturing sector that 
year of £27bn (source: see Section 3.2.1.1.) which suggests that significant funding 
was being channelled from other sources, particularly as the funds typically also 
invest in government debt and in overseas markets.
For the purpose of the base model, we maintain that it is important to model the 
basic tax structure as a starting point. The existence of tax free investment vehicles, 
which invest mainly in corporate property, debt and equity (of which manufacturing 
is a sub sector) will result in our model slightly over-estimating the manufacturing 
user cost and consequently, understating the sector's share in the balance sheet. The 
model's inherent flexibility enables simulations to be carried out assuming any 
proportion of tax free investment in this sector.
2.2.1. Consequences of the Long-Run Assumption.
Given that all markets clear, the most obvious consequence of the long-run nature of 
the model is the irrelevance of the supply side. That is, the model focus is on 
quantity effects. In the long-run, capital supplies are infinitely elastic and therefore, 
an increase in demand will meet with no real price feedbacks. This implies that in 
our model dx^/dx* = dx^/dx* =  1, where x* is the expected rate of inflation and 
x** and x** are the expected price increases (capital gains) of housing and 
manufacturing capital respectively. All models discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.
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also ignore supply side complexities either by the route used here or by analysing 
the short-run and assuming the supply of capital is fixed (eg. Ebrill and Possen, 
1982).
These assumptions enable the models to remain relatively simple, thus easing the 
interpretation of changes in complex tax systems. The assumption of a Vertical or 
horizontal supply curve is particularly common in studies of housing issues (which 
is arguably a bigger assumption than for manufacturing) in the U.K. (eg. Buckley 
and Ermisch, 1982; Meen, 1988, 1989, 1990) and the U.S. (eg. Poterba, 1984; 
Shear et al. 1988). When econometrically modelling U.K. house prices, Hendry 
(1984, pp. 219) assumed a horizontal supply curve arguing that, "An upward sloping 
supply curve would not materially change the analysis..".
Apart from adding to the complexity of the analysis by the incorporation of the 
construction industry (see Turner, 1987) or planning policies (see Ellson and 
McDermott, 1987) introducing a supply side would make the exclusion of complex 
dynamic lag structures more difficult to justify. This would make matters 
particularly difficult for the housing side of the model where empirical knowledge 
regarding the supply side is sparse. The supply of owner occupied housing can be 
augmented not only by construction activity (both from the construction industry and 
private house or extension building) but as a result of the transfer from other 
sectors.
A discussion of housing supply elasticities is contained in Hughes (1988b, pp. 34- 
37), Bartlett (1989 pp. 1-2, 49) and Spencer (1989, pp. 19-20). In his survey 
Bartlett (1989) finds that the best available estimates of the long-run supply elasticity 
of housing services in the U.K. is 5.5. This is lower than the U .S., which he 
reports as being around 11.5. Topel and Rosen (1988, pp. 719) also find that in the 
U.S. most of the difference between the short- and long-run supply erodes within 
one year.
The relative price implication of this assumption has, to some extent, been addressed 
by HH. Hendershott (1980, pp. 431) comments that "The model was not extended to 
incorporate feedback effects because no relatively straightforward extension seemed 
useful. The most obvious extension would be to make the relative price of housing 
endogenous" (this work was a precursor to HH). He further justifies this by arguing 
that his "..treatment has implicitly assumed that the rise in the real price is largely 
exogenous to housing demand and irrelevant to builder's supply" (page 432). In 
HH, the introduction of relative prices is achieved with the introduction of a supply 
elasticity (set at 4), the method used to incorporate this is unusual and is not
- 57 -
extended to non-residential capital. Parameterisation of the productivity parameters 
(pp. 806, Equations 4 "  and 19) is complex and duplicating with any conviction for 
the U.K. would be difficult. Our basic model is general enough to allow for a 
simple feedback in the form of relative price changes. In many ways, this adds to 
the model's appeal by using a basis which has clear implications rather than being 
dependent on matching the correct relative supply elasticities. Given the model's 
aim of exposing the long-run allocative implications of taxation, risk and inflation, 
short-run implications are a secondary issue.
In conclusion, our interest lies in quantity rather than price effects. Although 
empirical evidence supporting the long-run assumption of infinitely elastic supply is 
more powerful in the U .S ., an empirical case can still be made for the U.K. All of 
the other arguments outlined above favour retention of the assumption in the basic 
model.
2.3. Main Departures from H H 's Model.
The main departures from H H 's model are outlined and discussed below. Where 
necessary, these shall be expanded further in the model derivation. The main areas 
are as follows:-
1. The assumption of an homogeneous personal sector.
2. The incorporation of the classical and imputation systems of corporate taxation.
3. The incorporation of a specific mortgage demand equation utilising a loan to 
income multiple along with a user cost of mortgages which facilitates switching 
between rationed and not-rationed states.
4. The treatment of tax depreciation and investment grants.
5. The assumptions that corporates fund debt of both long and short duration. 
Short-term debt only is assumed risk-free, while long-term debt attracts a risk 
premium.
6 . The explicit introduction of MIRAS.
7. The introduction of a mortgage risk premium which does not follow the mean- 
variance approach.
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2.3.1. Discussion.
Before expanding on the departures highlighted above, it is useful to remind the 
reader of the key aspects of H H 's model. The model contains two sectors (housing 
and non-residential) which incorporate a production function and demand equations 
for the two sectors assets. The demand functions incorporate disposable income and 
profits respectively, along with the relevant user cost of capital series. Within these 
sectors, individuals allocate between four assets, corporate bonds (not separated by 
duration), equity and mortgage debt (a negative asset). Two types o f household are 
specified - wealthy and non-wealthy - the former lend to the latter and the corporate 
sector to enable them to finance their expenditure decisions.
An interesting twist to the model is its ability to endogenously incorporate risk 
premium attached to the assets. This means that, assuming the investor is rational 
and risk averse, an asset increasing as a proportion of the total portfolio suffers a 
rising risk premium. Tax structures are also comprehensive and clearly relate to the 
personal sector, that is, the corporate user cost includes not only corporate taxes but 
any further taxes which affect the returns to the individual from corporates. The 
need to incorporate all layers of taxation facing the ultimate investor is emphasised 
by Summers (1981, pp. 7). Equations representing household and corporate tax 
payments, retained earnings and disposable income are also included.
The model is of a simultaneous general equilibrium nature and in its basic form, 
solves for fourteen variables. An initial simulation was run with values set at levels 
roughly equivalent to those in 1965. The ability of the model to facilitate binding 
capital markets is unique among the studies outlined above.
2.3.1.1. Homogeneous Personal Sector.
We have not differentiated between wealthy and non-wealthy individuals, as HH did, 
principally because the question of wealth splits is not directly related to the 
objectives of this research. Moreover, having carefully attempted to parameterise 
their model for a specific period, HH then apply an arbitrary equal split between the 
sectors. Although this results in one additional user cost and balance sheet, their 
model does not split out real cash flows of the two sectors.
The advantage which HH best exploit is the ability to show wealthy households 
lending mortgage funds to the less wealthy. In our model, we assume that such 
funds are exogenously provided by financial institutions (eg. building societies) 
which operate through some form of bank multiplier. All individuals have access to
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mortgage debt. This is advantageous because, given the favourable tax treatment of 
mortgage debt, it will be optimal for all individuals to hold some amount of 
mortgage debt. This is impossible in the HH model. Although the amount of 
mortgage debt does not alter the size of wealth directly, it features in the balance 
sheet and plays a crucial role in the model by influencing the loan to valuation ratio, 
MIRAS and risk premiums.
2.3.1.2. Tax Systems.
Over the period studied by HH, the U.S. system was classical in nature unlike the 
U.K. which replaced this with the imputation system during the period (Section
1.4.10.8.). The U.K. model, therefore, requires us to model both systems. This is 
relatively straightforward, involving the respecification of taxation in the model and 
the introduction of a switching facility in the model solution programme.
Throughout both systems we have incorporated corporate CGT, HH only apply CGT 
to the personal sector.
2.3.1.3. Tax Depreciation.
HH do account for the treatment of tax depreciation and grants through the 
parameter t \ .  A time series for is derived and presented in an earlier paper, 
Hendershott and Hu (1981b, pp. 94). The disadvantage in this procedure is that 
whilst the value of may be correct, the effect on the user cost is that these 
allowances change in value only if the corporation tax rate changes. The present 
research utilises a more conventional method of incorporating these allowances (see 
Section 2.4.6.1.2.) which expands the range of influences which the allowances 
operate through.
H H 's parameter t2 acknowledges the use of historic rather than replacement cost and 
is based on work carried out in Hendershott (1981) and Hendershott and Hu 
(1981b). Like t j ,  we ignore this parameter and follow a more conventional user 
cost approach (see Section 2 .4.6.1.2.). Using the methodology contained in the 
above papers, it is possible to calculate t2  for the U.K. However, the assumptions 
necessary to do this and the data availability make it an unattractive proposition.
Given this, we do not utilise equation 12 in HH (pp. 799) which represents their 
vehicle for incorporating the effect of investment allowances and the use of historic 
cost accounting.
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2.3.1.4. Corporate Debt.
Corporate debt has been divided between long and short-term financing. This has 
the effect of introducing a further asset to the individual's portfolio and requires the 
specification of a risk premium on long-term debt. This change results in a more 
realistic model without unduly adding to its complexity. It is arguably more 
consistent to assume short-term debt (rather than all corporate debt) is risk-free, 
particularly when the model attributes an albeit small risk premium to housing 
equity.
2.3.1.5. MIRAS.
There are several reasons for explicitly introducing MIRAS as an endogenous 
variable. Section 1.4.4.1. described the significance of MIRAS to individuals, its 
importance to government as an uncontrollable area of marginal expenditure while 
Section 1.4.10.4. describes its high profile as a policy issue in the U.K. The effect 
of the MIRAS ceiling is also accounted for in order not to over estimate its 
influence by incorporating a scaling factor which represents the threshold limit 
imposed.
2.3.1.6. Effective Mortgage Demand and Rationing.
Effective mortgage demand is assumed to be the minimum of the actual supply or 
demand existing in the market. We have defined mortgage supply to be a function 
of income and a loan to income multiple. This is a result o f the variable rate 
mortgage regime prevalent in the U.K. (which differs from fixed rate mortgages in 
the U.S.) and the use of the loan to income multiple as an optimal screening method 
in assessing applicants' ability to service loans (see Section 1.4.4.1.). On the other 
hand mortgage demand is assumed to be a function of individuals income and the 
real mortgage user cost.
HH (p. 800) specify a mark up paid by borrowers which is determined by a 
quadratic function which progressively bites as the loan to valuation ratio rises above 
a specified level. Below this level no mark up is paid. The authors do not provide 
any sources pertaining to theory or parameterisation and as such, suggests an 
instrumentalist approach to the problem (concepts of instrumentalist methodology are 
discussed in Blaug (1980, pp. 105-107) and Wible (1984)). Whilst this is an 
interesting method of incorporating risk which the authors argue reflects differences 
in commitment rates for level payment fixed rate mortgages, it cannot be said to be 
representative of the U.K. market. The variable rate mortgages in the U.K. charge
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individuals' the same mortgage rate independent o f their particular gearing levels.
The mortgage rate charged was greater than the risk-free rate, the margin fluctuating 
depending on building society costs over time and the lenders' ability to generate 
funds.
Clearly, the loan to income and the loan to valuation ratios are directly related (see 
Mathematics Appendix, Section A) if mortgage supply is less than mortgage demand. 
The loan to income ratio allows us to switch between regulated and deregulated 
regimes and the model to compute the effect on the loan to valuation ratio. HH (p. 
809-810) also use income along with housing costs to provide a form of rationing. 
Their methodology, whilst straight-forward, is more complex than that actually used 
by lenders although both achieve the same result. Obtaining an empirical parameter 
for non-utility housing costs (HC in HH) would also have been difficult for the 
U.K. with scope for errors. Our model stresses the role of quantity in a 
disequilibrium framework to represent the U.K. mortgage market. We make the 
distinction between individuals facing a binding constraint because of their perceived 
ability to finance a mortgage by lenders, and individuals being rationed out of the 
market by lenders imposing a lower loan to income multiple than they otherwise 
would in a competitive environment. This is an important distinction not often 
emphasised. Thus, in a deregulated mortgage market if  notional demand for 
mortgages is greater than actual supply, we define this as individuals facing a 
binding constraint as lenders believe that to provide greater loans would result in 
them facing the unacceptable risk that borrowers income flow could not cover 
interest payments. We define mortgage rationing as the setting of the loan to income 
ratio at levels below that which would pertain in a competitive market. If  notional 
demand is less than potential supply under any mortgage market environment 
individuals demand is naturally fully satisfied. By changing the value of the loan to 
income multiple the effects of a shift in the mortgage market may be analysed.
2.3.1.7. Mortgage Premium.
The premium paid for mortgage debt does not conform to the standard mean- 
variance approach. That is, lenders do not (at the moment) generally charge 
different rates to borrowers depending on their exposure to a mortgage. More to 
the point, the margin between the risk-free rate and, for example, building societies' 
ordinary deposit rate tends to be a function of expense ratios rather than a risk 
premium for uncertainty of returns. Building societies which paid a return subject 
to the composite rate would also, for this reason, not require to fund from wholesale 
markets (see Building Societies Association, 1988a, pp. 21). When borrowers enter 
into a mortgage agreament they endure the theoretical risk that lenders could increase
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the mortgage rate substantially at will. This would result in borrowers dissatisfaction 
and potentially bad debts would occur. It is however possible to imagine that an 
implicit contract exists between the parties which results in borrowers accepting the 
above risk while the lenders agree to maintain a stable mortgage premium.
Moreover, given the sensitivity of the mortgage user cost to changes in its 
components, large fluctuations in the mortgage premium would be required in order 
to equilibriate the mortgage market.
2.4. Basic Model.
2.4.1. Output.
We assume an economy with two goods, owner-occupied housing services and 
manufacturing output. The manufacturing good is produced by labour and 
manufacturing capital via a Cobb-Douglas production function. Constant returns to 
scale are assumed (the function homogeneous of degree one), that is an 
equiproportional increase in inputs results in an equiproportional increase in output 
such that,
Y =  C*K<W-a* , (2.1)
where Y is real manufacturing output, C* is an efficiency parameter representing the 
state of technology, K and L are real capital and labour inputs respectively and ak is 
a production coefficient.
By assuming the Cobb-Douglas to be linearly homogeneous and assuming that each 
input is paid by the amount of its marginal product, then the relative share of total 
product (profit) accruing to capital is ak. Similarly, the wage share paid to labour is 
represented by l-a k (See Mathematics Appendix B, Section B or Chiang (1984, pp. 
416)).
We assume that C* and L are constant, such that Q ^ ' ak =  and Equation (2.1) 
becomes,
Y =  C«K«* . (2.2)
2.4.2. Demand for Manufacturing Capital.
Equation (2.1) is subject to the constraint Y <  / ( K) where / ,  in this case,
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represents the Cobb-Douglas production function. Firms are assumed to be profit 
maximisers and hence never produce where Y <  / ( K), the function becomes an 
equality. In the long-run, the demand curve facing the corporate for its output is,
p  w =  P  wOD (2.3)
where P w is the price of manufacturing output. Given the production function 
equality, we can express the firm 's total revenue, TR, as,
This result enables us to determine the corporate's cost and revenue with its input 
and therefore corporate output need not appear explicitly in its profit maximisation 
function.
Assuming that corporate activity is funded by retained earnings and investment from 
the personal sector (and therefore personal taxation has a bearing on financing) the 
corporate's objective can be written,
where U C ^ is the real user cost of manufacturing capital where the terms are real in 
the sense intended in equation (3) in Kelly and Owen (1985, pp. 4). Assuming that 
K >  O (equation (2.5)) implies that,
where TR' =  dTR/dY is the corporates marginal revenue (MR) and f  \  =  dY/dK is 
the marginal physical product of capital (MPP^). The corporate's marginal revenue 
product (MRP*) therefore is TR '•/ '*  which equals dTR/dK. Equation (2.6) 
represents the standard text book equilibrium condition, namely, the corporate will 
pay for an extra unit of capital input up to the point where the user cost of capital 
(rental cost) equals MRPfc. Rearranging equation (2.6) we obtain,
TR(Y) =  T R [/(K )]. (2.4)
max* T R [/(K )] - U C JK ),, (2.5)
(2.6)
M RM PP* =  U C „. (2.7)
We know by the product rule (Chiang, 1984, pp. 161-162) that,
MR =  dP^dY -Y  +  P w. (2 .8)
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Under the conditions of perfect competition, the condition dP^/dY =  O holds (ie. 
the demand curve facing each individual firm is horizontal) and therefore equation 
(2.8) simplifies to,
MR =  P w. (2.9)
In turn, this allows us to write equation (2.7) as,
P WMPP* =  U C ^. (2.10)
Noting that the corporate's marginal cost (MC) equals UC^/M PP* then dividing both 
sides of equation (2.7) by MPP* provides the condition marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost.
Given equations (2.7) and (2.9) and dividing both sides by P w, we obtain the 
equilibrium relation (assuming P w equals unity),
MPP* =  U C ^. (2.11)
Note that this solution is not inconsistent with equation (2.5) as the user cost in 
(2.11) is real with respect to corporate cash flows and the terms in the user cost 
function become nominal. This methodology is explained and demonstrated in Kelly 
and Owen (1985, pp. 4-5).
Solving equation (2.2) for the MPP*, we find (see Mathematics Appendix, Section
C)
A  =  <**Y/K, (2.12)
applying the equilibrium equation (2.11) and solving for K we obtain,
K =  ofcY/UC*. (2.13)
Thus, demand for real manufacturing capital depends on the sector's profit share of 
real output and the user cost of capital.
2.4.2.1. Demand for Housing and Mortgage Capital.
All households are assumed to have identical tastes. The housing production 
function is assumed to employ capital only to produce housing services and we
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egnore the effect of land as an input. This assumption is tantamount to imposing 
constant proportionality between the housing capital stock and its service flow. This 
assumption is common in the housing literature, utilised for example by Buckley and 
Ermisch (1982, pp. 278), Gahvari (1984, pp. 213) and Poterba (1984, pp. 731). 
Housing services are derived from non-Cobb-Douglas technology such that the 
demand for housing capital takes the form,
H =  ^ (D ) f (U C J -" ,  (2.14)
where H is the real stock of housing capital, ah is a constant, D represents real 
personal disposable housing income while e is the elasticity of housing demand with 
respect to income, UCAa is the real user cost of housing capital and n is its 
elasticity. The assumption of a log linear demand function rather than a strictly 
linear one allows the use of constant elasticities over time (Ripley and Seddighi, 
1988, pp. 15-18) and thus taking logarithms we obtain,
InH =  lna* +  elnD - wlnUC^, (2.15)
where In specifies a natural logarithm.
The specification of a demand for mortgages is complicated by the implications of 
rationing and liberalisation. The supply of mortgages as determined by lenders in 
any environment (H ^) is assumed to be a function of the personal sectors gross 
income (ak represents the income share split between capital and labour, see Section 
2.4.1) and a loan to income multiple, T, (Section 2.3.1.6.) and therefore,
H - = r[(l-a*)Y], (2.16)
Our mortgage supply equation takes this form because of lenders' use of income as a 
least cost screening method (see Section 1.4.4.1.). In a liberalized market, the value 
of T is likely to rise. Making this the only mortgage market equation in the model 
is theoretically weak as one could envisage the situation where housing costs rose 
and individuals' optimal mortgage stock was less than the funds potentially made 
available to them by lenders. Under these conditions it is desirable to model a 
separate mortgage demand equation incorporating the user cost of mortgages, UCm, 
such that following the methodology of equation (2.14) and (2.15), we may write 
mortgage demand as,
lnUmd = \nam + eln[(l-oi*)Y] - «lnUC„„ (2.16’)
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where UCm is the user cost of housing capital financed purely by mortgage debt.
We assume that the relavent income definition is at the pre-tax level which results in 
mortgage demand being less volotile than overall housing demand given the 
increased potential influences on disposable income (see equation 2.63). In addition, 
for simplicity, we assume similar elasticities across both demand functions.
Effective equilibrium mortgage demand, Hmb, would be the minimum of the two. 
Thus, Hm* =  min(Hwu/, H"*). This methodology is similar to that outlined by Hall 
et al. (1987, pp. 30) in their model o f the labour market. Further methods which 
have been employed in models to effect mortgage rationing are described in Meen 
(1988, pp. 9-10).
The mortgage market in our model is described in Graph 2.1. Given our definitions 
contained in Section 2.3.1.6. individuals receive their desired stock of mortgages 
when Hmfc =  H"** <  Hm at the given mortgage rate. If H™ crossed the horizontal 
line irfnb at a point to the right of Q2 then the effective mortgage stock would 
continue to be Q2. If the market is liberalized and Hmi =  H™ <  H"** then 
individuals face a binding constraint as income is too low to finance the desired 
mortgage stock. In Graph 2.1 this constraint would be the difference, Q2 - Q l.
On the other hand if T was lower than its deregulated level and Hw <  H"^ the 
same picture would emerge as in Graph 2.1 but the difference between Q2 and Q l 
would contain an element of (or be totally) mortgage rationing. Even in an 
unrationed market, asymmetry exists as excess supply has no effect on the market.
If we assume that Graph 2.1 is constructed in a rationed environment then 
deregulation would shift Hm vertically to the right. A rise in income, under any 
conditions, shifts both H"“ and H ^  to the right. An increase in the mortgage rate 
narrows the gap between Q l and Q2.
The asymmetry noted above is in part a result of the tie between the mortgage rate 
and base rates which may at some point in the future weaken. If we, as an 
alternative, were to assume that lenders supply of mortgages was a function of the 
deposit rate, (which they set) this would involve not only modelling this component 
of saving behaviour, but doing so under both regulated and deregulated environments 
(the latter of which we do not possess a significant history). The mortgage market 
presented here represents a reasonable simplification and is consistent within our 
model framework.
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Graph 2.1. Mortgage Market.
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2.4.3. Wealth and the Personal Sector Balance Sheet.
We assume that individuals are the ultimate wealth holders in the economy and that 
they costlessly allocate resources between the manufacturing and owner occupied 
housing sectors. The real stock of wealth (Wr) consists of the capital stock of the 
sectors described above thus,
W r =  K +  H. (2.17)
In order to introduce relative price effects (through asset markets), we can write the
total value of wealth (W) as,
W =  qK +  pH, (2.18)
where q is the ratio of the market value of manufacturing capital to its replacement
cost (Tobin's Q) and p is the ratio of the price of housing to the price of non­
housing goods. When no relative price movements occur (basic simulations) p =  q 
=  1 and Wr =  W.
The personal sector balance sheet includes both short and long dated corporate debt 
(Sb and Lb respectively), equities (E) and the total housing stock, some of which is 
financed by mortgaged debt. The balance sheet is,
Sb +  Lb +  E +  Hm/ +  H =  W +  Hmi, (2.19)
where Hm/ is the mortgage stock lent and by definition, HmZ> =  Hm/. Housing stock
which is paid up and represents equity (Hp*4) is equivalent to H - Hm/. Total
corporate debt (B) is split into its two components by a ratio, z, such that, Sb =  zB 
and Lb =  (l-z)B. The portfolio is a simplification as individuals would have the 
option of holding a wide range of alternative assets such as cash, precious metals, 
art or a range of financial derivatives such as options or warrants.
The two sectors combine to form net or "outside” wealth (Goodhart 1975, pp. 202- 
203; Stevenson et al. 1988, pp. 19-20). That is, there is no net liability (debt) 
outstanding which finances W itself. The asset Hm/ is exactly offset by HmZ> and as 
described in Section 2.3.1.1. and therefore H represents "outside wealth".
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2.4.4. Risk Premium and the Demand for Risky Assets.
All the assets on the left hand side of equation (2.19) except Sb are regarded as 
risky by individual investors. Given a current portfolio, if  individuals' expectations 
altered with respect to prospective asset yields then they will attempt to reallocate 
the proportions of assets across the portfolio so as to maximise return subject to 
risk. This process is encapsulated in the von Neumann-Morgenstem choice under 
uncertainty framework. A background and brief outline of the theory of portfolio 
demand for risky assets is provided in Stevenson et al. (1988, pp. 150-154). This 
methodology does not apply to mortgage stock although it is attributed a risk 
premium (discussed in Section 2.4.6.2.) and is assumed to be a component of wealth 
in the individuals portfolio.
Utilising mean-variance portfolio analysis (see Green, 1978, pp. 242-247) we assume 
homogeneity of expectations and a frictionless capital market (infinitely devisable 
assets and zero transactions cost). In equilibrium, the market price of risk - the 
ratio o f the expected risk premium on risky assets to the variance of return on those 
assets - equals the market value of all risky assets multiplied by a function of each 
individual's measure of absolute risk aversion, (local risk aversion or risk 
aversion in the small, Pratt (1964)).
If  U(W) represents the individual's utility function, with respect to wealth, we can 
assume that more wealth is preferred to less, thus the marginal utility of wealth is 
positive, dU/dW =  U'(W ) >  O and assuming individuals are risk averse, then 
U "(W ) <  O (producing a concave utility function). Absolute risk aversion is 
defined as, - U "(W )/U '(W ) and relative risk aversion, R, (local proportional risk 
aversion, Pratt (1964)) as - W *U"(W )/U'(W ). R represents the wealth elasticity of 
the marginal utility of wealth (slope of the investors' utility function), that is, it is a 
measure of aversion to risk as a proportion of assets (see Green, 1978, pp. 268).
The traditional Arrow-Pratt analysis suggests that as wealth rises, investor's R^ falls 
or remains constant, while R rises (Friend and Blume, 1975, pp. 901;
Bhattacharyya, 1979, pp. 423; Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1983, pp. 160-161; Molana, 
1990, pp. 4). Recently, however, there has been a growing body of work which 
either empirically challenges (Friend and Blume, 1975) the traditional assumption for 
R finding that it is constant and those who assume it is constant in their analysis 
(Grossman and Shiller, 1981, pp. 224; HH, pp. 802; Nickell and Wadhwani, 1989, 
pp. 13). Friend and Blume (1975, pp. 915) conclude that, "Perhaps the most 
accurate single statement is: if there is any tendency for increasing or decreasing 
proportional risk aversion, the tendency is so slight that for many purposes the
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assumption of constant proportional risk aversion is not a bad first approximation". 
This assumption of a constant R, the elasticity of substitution between assets is 
constant regardless of wealth, is equivalent to equation 6.2 in Molana (1990; pp. 2) 
where gamma is constant. This assumption is utilised in the present study.
Following the methodology of Friend and Blume (1975, pp. 902) and aggregating 
individual investors, we can write the equilibrium market price of risk as,
E*(rm - i) /  <r2m = JS[EE*(1 / RA)]'' , (2.20)
where E* denotes mathematical expectation and the subscript m represents the 
market portfolio, Js is the market value of all appropriate risky assets (J  ^ =  E j  =
Lb +  E +  HP*) and a2m is the variance on the return of the portfolio. The wealth 
conservation equation is,
W.+J, = W ,[l +  [i +  (jyW )E*(rm - i)]dt +
(jyw)<rmy(t> /d t], (2.21)
where am is the standard deviation of the returns of the portfolio of risky assets and 
y(t) is a standardised normal random variate. Equation (2.21) simply states that 
future wealth is a function of current wealth plus or minus the expected risk adjusted 
return (the ±  term is dropped because of y(t)).
The proportion of the risk-free asset can be written as the residual 1 - (J5 +  HmZ / 
W). This is incorporated, for example, as part of the financial sector of the London 
Business School model (LBS) in Keating (1985, pp. 90-91). The LBS model also 
assumes that all non-risky assets are perfect substitutes and therefore must have the 
same yield. Given the small part short dated bonds play in the total portfolio 
(around 6 %) we shall assume this forms part of W in the interests of model 
simplicity (HH also make this assumption regarding total bond debt).
By expanding U(Wr+<&) about Wt, in Equation (2.21), taking expected values and 
dropping terms involving dt to the power of two or more (these fractions become 
infinitely small) we find,
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E*[U(W .+*)] =  U(W,) +
U'(W,)W,[i +  (VW )E*(rm - i)]d t
+  0.5 U"(Wr)W2< y W )2a2mdt. (2 .22)
By differentiation, we can optimise the proportion of risky assets in the portfolio by 
setting dE*(U) / dW equal to zero,
U'(W,)E*(rm - i) +  U"(W ,)W ,(yW )ff2m =  0. (2.23)
Recalling Pratt's definition of R, and implicitly including expectations and taxation, 
we can rewrite equation (2.22) in terms of the proportion of wealth invested in risky 
assets as (see Mathematics Appendix, Section D),
We assume that the return from bonds (and therefore the risk-free asset) are untaxed. 
This arises because of the widespread use of a legal loophole which enabled "bond 
washing". Simply, individuals who held bonds but were subject to income tax on 
interest could sell bonds to tax exempt institutions (such as pension funds) a number 
of days prior to the coupon being paid and purchase them again after a specified 
time period. A similar assumption is used by Thompson (1990, pp. 62) when 
calculating bond returns.
Equation (2.23) can be transformed to relate to an individual asset in the portfolio 
by substituting J for and j for m (see HH, pp. 798). We define the after tax 
expected risk premium from the jth asset as p , where,
V W  =  (rm - i) / Ra2m. (2.24)
Pj =  Ra2XJ/W), (2.25)
and,
(2.26)
2.4.5. Market Clearing Equations.
The following equations (2.27) to (2.31) represent the demand for each asset in the 
individuals portfolio, and stem from the demand for manufacturing and owner 
occupied housing stock. The debt to equity split is determined by b, and the debt
component is split by duration depending on the appropriate ratio of short dated to 
long dated debt, z. The loan to valuation ratio, v, which shows the split between 
paid up and mortgaged housing stock, is determined endogenously in the model. The 
equations are as follows,
Sb =  zbqK, (2.27)
Lb =  (l-z)bqK, (2.28)
E =  (l-b)qK, (2.29)
and
R mb = vpH, (2.30)
We impose the conditions 0 <  z,b,v < 1 .  By definition, we can write that part 
of housing equity that is fully paid for as,
Hpd =  (l-v)pH. (2.31)
The model has already defined Hmb (equation (2.17)) and equation (2.30) can be 
rearranged such that the model determines v,
v =  H ^ /p H . (2.32)
2.4.6. Real User Costs of Capital.
We have discussed the concept of the user cost of capital in Section 1.2.5.1. and 
shown that this plays a crucial role in the asset allocation models outlined in Section
1.3. When incorporating the user costs into our model they have been specified 
comprehensively in order to reflect the parameters impinging on the allocation 
decision. This detail should pervade throughout the model.
We shall define real user costs for the housing and manufacturing sectors which 
includes modelling the relevant tax treatment of the sectors. Complementary to this, 
the cost of capital for both sectors is included along with expected capital gains and 
risk premiums.
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2.4.6.1. Real User Cost of Manufacturing Capital.
We have demonstrated the relevance of the user cost of capital to the capital stock 
(eg. equation 2.14) and are now in a position to specify it. Abstracting from labour 
input in the production function and following the methodology of Jorgenson (1963) 
the capital stock at time t is,
K,= I * e‘V*>Ifds. (2.33)
Capital services decay exponentially at a rate 5k, that is, a unit of capital aged t is 
equivalent to e~ ^ . ls is investment at time s with, s <  t. Differentiating (2.33) 
with respect to t obtains the result equivalent to equation (1.4).
In equation (2.5) we stated the firms objective function in terms of cash flow.
Under the competitive conditions assumed in the present model, this is equivalent to 
assuming that the firms maximise the total value of wealth, W, (Hall and Jorgenson, 
1967, pp. 392; Gravelle and Rees, 1981, pp. 412-414) which we can write as,
w  =  \o  e-rfa[Pw/(K ,) - P„I,]dt. (2.34)
This implies that the firm should invest in units of capital up to the point where the 
NPV of the marginal additional unit is zero. Substituting for Kt in equation (2.34) 
with equation (2.33) and differentiating with respect to I„ we obtain this result,
P7 =  I ,  e~Tk(S-tjPWsf ' Afs-^ds. (2.35)
The familiar user cost of capital expression can be obtained by substituting for I, in 
equation (2.34), then using equation (1.4) and solving with respect to Kr  
Optimisation allows the Euler condition to hold (see Chiang, 1984, pp. 413) and we 
obtain an expansion of equation (2.11),
f \  =  UCte  =  (Pfl/PwXr, +  - tt,). (2.36)
This methodology can also be found in Auerbach (1983, pp. 913) or Kelly and
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Owen (1985, pp. 4).
2.4.6.1.1. Economic Depreciation.
We have discussed the nature of depreciation in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2. 
Incorporation into the user cost is usually concurrent with the assumption that 
depreciation occurs at a constant exponential rate (this is confirmed in Jorgenson 
(1973, pp. 1128-1129)). This assumption is generally made because it simplifies the 
user cost considerably. Feldstein and Foot (1971, pp. 57) express reservations 
regarding this assumption whilst conceding that constant proportionality has some 
justification in the long run. This sentiment is also echoed by Hendry (1984, pp. 
223). Empirical studies, however, may introduce an incompatibility if they utilise 
capital stock data which is constructed by assuming finite lives and non-geometric 
depreciation. In the U.K. this latter technique is used by the CSO to construct 
estimates of the gross capital stock of manufacturing (Griffin, 1976, pp. 130-131, 
and pp. 137-140) in the form of a perpetual inventory method with finite lives.
The implications of this inconsistency are investigated in Downs (1986) who 
concludes that significant margins of error may arise which results in the violation of 
the equilibrium assumption of marginal zero NPV. Comparing a theoretically and 
empirically consistent user cost series with one suffering from this inconsistency, he 
found them to be different by a margin of 6.5 % (Downs, 1986, pp. 300) which 
would have resulted in the corporate investing in projects with negative NPV's. Of 
greater pertinence to the present research the margins of error multiplied when the 
user costs were used in comparative studies. The author concludes that, "A 
researcher estimating elasticities of substitution or analysing the distortional impact of 
government tax policy on resource allocation may have significantly different results 
if he or she were to switch from a Hall-Jorgenson type user cost to a user cost 
consistent with the capital stock", (Page 301-302). Researchers can overcome this 
problem by modifying the theoretical exposition of the user cost in order to account 
for fixed asset lives (by using the formula provided in Downs (1986, pp. 299, 
equation 5) or utilise depreciation data which is consistent with finite life capital 
stock. Naturally, either of these routes should produce identical results. This 
research employs the latter option (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.5.9.) to maintain 
model consistency.
2.4.6.1.2. Corporation Tax, Investment Allowances and Grants.
Although there was a change of taxation systems during our period of interest (See 
Chapter 1, Section 1.5.3.), in its basic form corporation tax has featured in both
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systems. This is also the case for investment allowances and grants, although the 
present study incorporates these in a different manner to the work of HH (see 
Section 2 .3.1.4.).
We follow the conventional route of deducting the present value of depreciation 
allowances and grants from the purchase price of the asset. This methodology is 
also a feature of Auerbach (1983) and Kelly and Owen (1985).
The post grant cost of a unit of capital is, P/r(l-g)I„ where g is the rate at which 
grants are applied. We denote the depreciation allowances given on a unit of 
capital, M l, and equation (2.34) becomes (See Auerbach, 1983, pp. 915),
We can see that r  is applied to cash flow followed by the effect of grants and 
finally depreciation allowances.
Simplifying (2.37),
+  r (2.37)
W =  J o  e-r4 ( l  - r)PWlf(K J  - P„(l - g - rM )I,]dt +
e~rfoMl"sds, (2.38)
00
where M = 0 e"rfaMl'dt.
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Setting (g - rM) =  A we can multiply equation (2.36) by (l-A )/(l-r)  to incorporate 
investment allowances and corporation tax.
2.4.6.1.3. Own Product User Cost.
We have already commented on the expectational nature of investment in Chapter 1, 
Section 1.2.2. The explicit incorporation of real prices, P7 and Vw and expected 
capital gains for manufacturing, Tek, means that the user costs relate directly to the 
specific sector whilst adding flexibility to the model. Own product user costs are 
crucial to the incorporation of relative price changes in such models. The 
construction of an own product user cost series is clearly outlined in Kelly and 
Owen (1985, pp. 3-7 and 16-18). It is also stressed as a key user cost component 
by Dougherty and Van Order (1982) and Kollintzas and Rowley (1985). The former 
authors clarify the rationale for expected capital gains, "It is expected future inflation 
that matters, as that is what enters the hypothetical landlord's maximisation 
calculations. Actual inflation is not directly relevant", (Page 157).
2.4.6.1.4. Local Authority Rates.
The inclusion of domestic rates in the user cost of housing capital is common (eg. 
King and Atkinson, 1980; Spencer, 1987b; Hughes, 1988a,b; Shear et al. 1988).
This contrasts with the exclusion of rates in manufacturing user costs (eg. Kelly and 
Owen's (1985) comprehensive study). The manufacturing sector does pay rates 
which are levied against structures and certain fixed plant and machinery. 
Explanations for this omission may lie in the difficulty of parameterisation or the 
likelihood of rates being of little importance to the overall user cost. King and 
Fullerton (1984, pp. 51-52), Bennett and Feamehough (1987) and Bennett (1987) do 
discuss non-domestic rates as part of a user cost framework. HH include rates for 
both sectors. For model consistency and theoretical rigour, we include rates in both 
our user costs.
Manufacturing rates ($*) enter the user cost with the prepositive 1* which is defined 
as (l-r)/( l-A ) because rates can be offset against MCT (Bennett, 1987, pp. 68-69) 
and rateable values are not a function of the post tax allowances and grants price of 
capital goods, but are set by applying a rental equivalent. Rates become further 
detached from the post allowance price when the rate poundage applied to the rental 
equivalent is set by each local authority. This latter complication was eliminated 
when the rate poundage was centralised with the introduction of the "uniform 
business tax" (Bennett and Feamehough, 1987).
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We are now in a position to write a general user cost for manufacturing capital. 
Letting n =  P/P*,, dropping the time subscript and allowing for corporation tax, 
taxation allowances and non-domestic rates, equation (2.36) becomes,
UC* =  (l-A )/(l-r)n(r* +  5k - ^  +  1*$*). (2.39)
The term 1* naturally drops out of the equation when multiplying through by (1- 
A )/(l-r).
2.4.6.1.5. Cost of Finance.
In Section 2 .4.5., we described the corporate's ability to fund through capital 
markets in terms of short and long term debt and equity. We also defined the 
corporate's post tax cost of capital from the jth asset in equation (2.26). Combining 
these allows us, by aggregation, to define rk and rto (which split into profit plus 
capital gains) as the corporate's overall pre and post tax cost of capital where the 
required rate of return from each funding source is weighted according to the market 
clearing equations.
This also requires the incorporation of the effect which capital market valuation may 
have on the user cost to the individual. Whilst the term n provides a corporate user 
cost which is real with respect to the price of capital good inputs, the existence of 
capital markets which effectively lie between the physical cost of manufacturing 
capital and the individual requires to be modelled. Multiplying the user cost by q 
(defined in Section 2.4.3.) introduces this concept into the model. For the purposes 
of the user cost, we are interested in the post tax required returns from each asset 
which are best described within the context of the appropriate tax system.
2.4.6.2. Classical System.
We assume that the return to the personal sector from corporate bonds do not suffer 
income or capital gains tax, thus rB=rBa. The concept of bond washing which 
allowed the investor to avoid paying income tax on interest is described in Section 
2.4.4. Capital gains could also be easily offset by purchasing bonds which were 
priced greater than par and would automatically generate capital losses.
Using equations (2.25) and (2.26), we can write,
%  =  i I  R j2L*qLb/W. (2.40)
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We have already defined %  =  i in Section 2.4.4. and therefore, we can write 
(Section 2.4.3.),
rB =  i +  (1 -z)Ra2i*qLb/W. (2.41)
The nominal equity rate paid by corporates, rEc (the subscript c denotes classical 
system) differs from the after tax equity rate received by shareholders, rEac by taxes 
at the personal level on dividend income and increases in share values as a result of 
inflation and retained earnings (capital gains). The relationship between r ^  and rEac 
is given by,
rEac = ^ ( l-0 )(rJfc-*'*) +
( l - ^ [ ( l - « ( r a -ir*) +  t^ ]  , (2.42)
where <j> denotes the dividend payout ratio, 0  is the personal income tax rate and p 
is the rate at which capital gains are taxed to the personal sector. Effectively, 
equation (2.42) splits the return into dividends, retained earnings and capital gains. 
Simplifying (2.42) and letting x =  <f>Q +  (1 -<f>)pp then (See Mathematics Appendix, 
Section E),
=  (l-x)r*  +  4>(0-pp) ^ K  (2.42’)
Using the same methodology which derived equation (2.40) and simplifying in terms 
of tEc (See Mathematics Appendix, Section F) we can write,
rEc = [i - <£(0-^)t *  +  Rcr2£qE/w ] / (1-x). (2.43)
Substituting rB (there is no need for a c subscript as the tax treatment was uniform 
over the two systems) and rEc into rk in equation (2.39) whilst incorporating q, 
allowing for the tax deductability of corporate debt interest and including corporate 
capital gains tax (/x^ ) we obtain from equation (2.39),
(l-A )(l-b)r£c
u c ^  = qn[(l-A)hr, + ---------------
(l-r)
(1-A)5* (l-A )(l-Mt)T*
+ -----------------------------------+  (2.44)
(l-r ) (l-r )
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Theoretically capital gains (chargeable gains) are taxed as part of the corporation tax 
bill (Saunders, 1982, pp. 24). We now introduce in order to maintain flexibility 
within the model because the effective CGT rate may deviate from r. Substituting 
for tb  and r ^  in equation (2.44.) and collecting in terms of i, pjy *** and others, 
we can write the fully tax adjusted real user cost of manufacturing capital, under the 
classical system as,
UCjfeac =  qn[ a cii +  - “ cJ*** +  a c4.L (2 -45)
where,
a a  = (l-A)b + [(l-A)(l-b)/(l-x)(l-r)], 
a c2 =  (l-A)(l-z)bRa2u, +  [(l-A)(l-b)Ra2e /
(1-X)(1-T)],
= [(1-A)(1-^) + «A(l-A)(l-b)(e-Mp) / (1-x)] /
(l-r),
= (l-A)/(l-r)8t +
2.4 .6 .3 . Imputation System.
We shall maintain the methodology of the above Section and all assumptions, unless 
otherwise stated, in order to write a user cost under the imputation system. The 
imputation system is discussed in Section 1.3.9.2. The main change from the above 
Section is the scaling down of capital gains tax to the corporate in order to make the 
official rate 30 %, equivalent to that paid by individuals. The double taxation of 
income is also avoided.
Individuals receive a tax credit along with any distribution thus avoiding the double 
taxation of income. Equation (2.42) can be rewritten as,
*Eai = +  ( l - ^ ) [ ( l - 0 ) ( rf i - ^ )  +***], (2.46)
where the i subscript denotes imputation system. Simplifying (2.46) and letting y =
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pp( l -0), we obtain,
r Eai =  (l-y)r£i - (2.46’)
Note that the term -p 4>irek is not saying that any capital gain is detracting from rEi 
because capital gains are a part of rE. Following the same methodology used to 
obtain equation (2.43) we can write,
rs  = [i +  V pt**  +  Rff2£qE/w] / (1-y). (2.47)
Substituting rm and p ^  into Equation (2.44), we obtain the fully tax adjusted real 
user cost of manufacturing capital under the imputation system as,
UCfeH- =  q n [a l7i +  a^qK/W  _ a  J  (2.48)
where,
a tI =  (l-A)b +  [(l-A )(l-b) / ( l-y )(l-r)] , 
oca =  (l-A)(l-z)bRff2/i,
+ [(l-A)(l-b)R<r2£ / (l-y)(l-r)]
=  [(1-A)(l-Mte) - <#>(l-A)(l-b)Mp / (1-y)]
/( l-r) ,
a i4 =  (1-A)/(1-t)5* +
We have now developed user costs of capital for manufacturing for the classical and 
imputation systems and we can now progress to develop user costs for the housing 
sector.
2.4.6.4. Real User Cost of Housing Capital.
In terms of the user cost of capital for investment allocation purposes, we can treat 
housing in a similar manner to manufacturing. The returns to housing do not occur 
in actual cash terms, but take the form of imputed rent and capital gains net of
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depreciation. Following from the assumptions made in Section 2.4 .6 ., then from 
equation (2.39), we can write the user cost of housing capital as,
UCh = p(r* +  6h - ^  +  **), (2.49)
where the subscript h denotes housing and $ h is domestic rates. Given that there is 
no secondary market between the personal sector and housing capital any real house 
price changes will be incorporated into the term p.
The term rh consists of a financing cost in the form of the mortgage rate and an 
opportunity cost to that proportion of the capital stock which is owned outright. We 
must split rh into its component parts because mortgages attract mortgage interest 
relief. The rate at which the opportunity cost is applied varies widely between 
studies. Fry and Pashardes (1986, pp. 62) assume this to be the return on housing 
equity (which we assume) while Hughes (1988b, pp. 54-55) uses the yield from
index-linked gilts and Buckley and Ermisch (1982, pp. 279) assume that the
opportunity cost is equal to the nominal borrowing rate. Miles (1992, pp. 74) 
argues that the relevant risk premium should be equal to that of the stock market 
which contrasts to the more conventional low risk comparison.
We can write the required rate of return from the housing stock as,
Th =  V T ffn b  +  (l-v)rrfd. (2.50)
There are no tax implications for r^d , but the difference between the mortgage rate 
and the mortgage rate actually paid by the personal sector lies in the MIRAS 
subsidy, thus,
rjfnba =  Tfjmb / (1-0^), (2.51)
where £ scales down the relief because of the imposition of ceiling above which the 
full interest cost is borne.
While this method of including the ceiling is the most appropriate for the present 
model, other authors have varied the method of incorporation. In a more simplistic 
form, the mortgage rate (i+m p), where mp is a mark up, would be reduced by the 
common marginal personal income tax rate, giving, ( i+ m p )(l-0 ) . This is assumed 
by Feldstein (1982) and Dougherty and Van Order (1982). Ermisch (1988) also 
utilised this specification, but switches 0  =  0 for any mortgage debt greater than 
the imposed ceiling. Hendershott and Shilling (1982), Fry and Pashardes (1986) and
- 82 -
Shear et al. (1988) also deploy this technique. Spencer (1987b) uses a net interest 
cost, which he calculates by dividing the total value of the net of tax relief interest 
payments and divides this by the outstanding mortgage stock. This empirical 
methodology is similar to that used in the present study and can also be found in 
Breedon and Joyce (1992, pp. 179).
Owing to the nature of the mortgage market, like Sb, we do not apply the mean- 
variance analysis to mortgages. While there is a risk of bankruptcy or default such 
that the mortgage rate should be at a premium to the risk-free rate, the premium is 
not derived by conventional portfolio theory. The mortgage rate may be more 
determined by precautionary motives, lenders' expense ratios and the building society 
cartel when it existed. Even under the deregulated market, this relatively constant 
premium has been maintained and has not been visibly affected by portfolio risk. It
may well be the case that in years to come, one of the longer term consequences of
a liberalized mortgage market is that the risk premium complies to that specified in 
equation (2.25) (this is discussed in Section 6.3.). F ° r present study, it is
optimal to write the required return from mortgage stock as,
r Hmb = (i+mp)(l-0q) (2.52)
and,
Tfpd =  i -I- R c r^ p H ^ /W . (2.52')
Incorporating these equations into equation (2.50) and simplifying, we obtain,
Tha = (l-v0g)i +  vm p(l-0g) +  (l-v)R<j2HpdK pd / W. (2.53)
Collecting in terms of i plus mp, and pH/W and others, we obtain the fully tax
adjusted real user cost of housing capital as,
UCh„ =  p[f); i +  82mp +  B2pH/W +  f i j ,  (2.54)
where,
B j  =  ( l-v ? 9 ),
B2 =  v ( l-0 $ ),
=  (l-v)R a2/*Pd,
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& 4 ~  8 h ~ ^  + $ h '
Finally, we can specify the user cost of housing capital financed purely by 
mortgages, which is used in equation (2.16') as,
UCm =  p [( i+ m p )( l-e ?) + 8h - ^  + * J .  (2 .16")
2.4.7. Real Cash Flows.
The following Section of the model represents various tax and subsidy real cash 
flows as well as corporate retained earnings and personal sector disposable income. 
These functions follow directly from the model specification above and represent an 
integral part of the overall working model. As such, it is vital that the specification 
of the equations is fully consistent with the tax structures modelled above. Real 
cash flows of interest are MIRAS, corporate and household net tax payments, 
corporate retained earnings and individuals disposable income.
2.4.7.1. MIRAS.
The MIRAS subsidy is discussed in Section 1.3.8. and 1.3.8.2.1. and is clearly 
regarded as an important factor in reducing the user cost and as a form of 
government expenditure. For these reasons, MIRAS is endogenous to the model. 
MIRAS is a function of the mortgage rate, the personal tax rate, the outstanding 
mortgage stock and a scaling factor which allows for the MIRAS ceiling,
MIRAS =  rffnbOqH”'b. (2.55)
2.4.7.2. Manufacturing Sectors Real Tax Flows.
2.4.7.2.I. Classical System.
From the assumptions above, we can write the tax paid by manufacturing industry 
during the classical system, TX^,, as,
TXk = r[a*Y - (&k +  br6 - (l-r)$* + QA)K]
+  M ^ K ,  (2.56)
where U is the proportion of new investment which received the investment grants
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and allowances. That is, allowances are not continually provided on the entire 
manufacturing capital stock. Under the classical system, all profits are taxed at the 
corporation tax rate less depreciation, debt interest payments and allowances plus 
capital gains tax and rates. Again, we have allowed for the possibility that capital 
gains may not be taxed at a rate equal to r  (specifically =  0.57). Where we do 
not specify a subscript c or i, after an equation (eg. TXfc or TX^) then these can be 
implicitly assumed depending on the time period specified.
2.4 .7 .2 .2 . Imputation System.
From the corporate perspective, taxation paid differed from the classical system 
because r was scaled down by a factor such that the effective rate o f tax on capital 
gains became 30 % and implicitly because corporation tax is split into ACT and 
MCT. Our model recognises this by the reduction of such that fx^ =  n . We 
can therefore write tax paid under the imputation system, TXfa, as,
TXfa. =  r [ a tY - (5t  +  brfi - ( l- r )* t
+  QA)K] +  (2.57)
We briefly commented on the problem of tax exhaustion in Section 1.4.10.8.1., 
further explanation is provided in Devereux (1987) and James and Nobes (1988, pp. 
289-290). Normally, a corporate paying a dividend will be able to offset the 
corresponding ACT against its MCT. This may not be the case if  the dividend paid 
is large in proportion to profits, or, if profits themselves are negative. In this 
instance, unrelieved or "surplus" ACT is created. Such problems do not arise in 
this steady state growth model as we fix 4> and ak such that 0 <  0 , otk <  1, thus 
profits rise consistently through time.
2.4 .7 .3 . Personal Sector Real Tax Flows.
2 .4 .7 .3 .I. Classical System.
We have assumed that all personal sector income is taxed at a rate 0 . Returns to 
households from the corporate sector (dividends) are distributed after economic 
depreciation, corporate tax and retained earnings. The former subtraction takes 
account of the long-run steady state nature of the model by changing the gross 
capital stock into a net one. Households are also subject to CGT, rates and the 
MIRAS subsidy. We ignore personal allowances and therefore specify tax paid by 
the personal sector under the classical system, TX ^, as,
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TXAc =  6(Y - 5^K - TX* - RE) - MIRAS
+/zp(RE +  ^*qE) +  $*PH, (2.58)
where RE represent corporate retained earnings.
2.4.7.3.2. Imputation System.
Specification of the personal sector tax flow under the imputation system, TXW, 
differs only from equation (2.58) by the incorporation of the tax credit associated 
with corporate dividend distribution. This is achieved by specifying the dividend, 
Dnd, and allowing it to be multiplied by the personal income tax rate,
TXW =  0(Y  - 6*K - TX* - RE - Dnd)
- MIRAS +  np(RE +  v ekqE) +  4>^pH. (2.59)
This eliminates the double taxation of income.
We define Dnd as,
Dnd =  4>[akY - T X k - (St  +  brB - bx**)qK], (2.60)
where b ^ q K  represents the addition to real earnings from the erosion of the real 
value of corporate debt. Dnd simplifies to <^[eAT +  b ^ q K ]  where EAT 
represents real corporate earnings after tax, (akY  - (8k +  br5)K - TX^).
Having specified corporate and personal sector tax flows, it is possible to combine 
these in order to obtain a government balance, GB,
GB = TX* +  TX*. (2.61)
This equation is of limited use as the government's role in the model is the setting 
of tax systems not controlling money supply, issuing bonds or injecting expenditure. 
Comparing values of GB will allow us to assess the net effect on the real 
government balance of any taxation changes.
2.4.7.4. Retained Earnings.
Corporate retained earnings consist of earnings after tax (EAT) plus the erosion of
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the real value of corporate debt less dividends paid. Thus, retained earnings can be 
written as,
RE =  (l-<#>)[ortY - TXt - (6k + brfl
- bir*‘)qK]. (2.62)
2 .4 .7 .5 . Personal Disposable Income.
Real personal disposable income, D, is the sum of all factor payments received less 
all taxes paid, plus all subsidies, thus:
D =  Y - 5*K - TX* - RE - TX*. (2.63)
2.5. Conclusion.
This Chapter has outlined the main assumptions of the U.K. model and indicated the 
key theoretical divergences from HH model. The result of these assumptions and 
changes have been discussed. The basic U.K. model was then presented in full 
which represents a closer representation of the U.K. economy than any other model 
of its kind and offers greater detail in many areas than HHs' model, for example 
our treatment of MIRAS. Key areas were discussed from their theoretical 
groundings up to the working equations. Although some components may have been 
ignored, the level of detail provides several key benefits, such as an emphasis on 
model consistency, a clearer understanding of model interaction and the exposure of 
further subtle assumptions.
Asset allocation between the respective sectors, the user costs of capital, the loan to 
valuation ratio and real cash flows are key outputs of the model. The basic model 
can easily be adapted to allow for endogenizing the risk-free interest rate if  desired 
and switching to an unrationed mortgage market. Before presenting the results from 
the model it is necessary to parameterise it by either generating the required data or 
appealing to empirical evidence from relevant economic literature. This is presented 
in Chapter 3 along with detail regarding the model solving technique. Following 
this we may discuss the model output which is presented in Chapter 4.
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Mathematical Appendix.
Section A.
Rearranging and solving equations (2.16) and (2.32), we can 
see that,
V = r[(i-a^y]/pH.
Section B.
Using equation (2.1), capitals relative share is 
defined as,
K(dY/dK) KQkak(K /h)ak-i
Y LQk(K/L)<*k
=
and labour's relative share is,
L(dY/dL) LQk(l-a,)(K/L)<Xk 
Y LC*(K/L)a*
= l-at.
Section C.
From equation (2.2), differentiation gives,
A  =
expanding, we obtain,
A  =
and simplifying,
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“ifcCjfc/K0'*
K
which using equation (2.2) simplifies to the standard 
result,
A  = “ *y /k .
Section D.
From equation (2.23), we can take E*(r-i) to the right 
hand side while multiplying both sides by -1,
-U "(W ,)W /yW )a2/
--------------------------  =  E*(rm-i).
V(W)
From Pratt (1964), we have defined R as -W,U1' (W,)/U ’ (W,), therefore,
R(yW )(j2m =  E*(rm-i).
Dividing both sides by R and a 2m and implicitly including expectations, we derive 
equation (2.24).
Section E.
Simplifying equation (2.42) by expansion, we obtain,
TEac =
setting x =  <£0-^(1+</>).
Section F.
Setting equation (2.42') equal to the equilibrium 
condition implied by equations (2.25) and (2.26), then,
(l-x)rEc+<}>(e-fjLp)Trek =  i+Rcr2£qE/W.
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Taking 0(0-/* )x** to the other side and multiplying both sides by l/( l-x ) , we obtain 
equation (2.43).
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3. IMPLEMENTATION.
3.1. Introduction.
The purpose of the following Chapter is to present and discuss the data utilised in 
the model derived in Chapter 2 and to describe details o f the model solution 
technique.
3.2. Data.
The basic model requires initial values for Y, K and H, along with 24 further 
parameters. Given the different tax systems which were effective over our period of 
interest, we have specified the model such that it could run with any of the 
following options:
Period 1 covering the classical system,
Period 2 covering the imputation system and,
Period 3 covering both systems.
Each parameter specified in the model therefore contains a maximum of three 
possible inputs which depend on the time period specified. This detailed treatment 
o f the data is complementary to the thrust of Chapter 2 and allows the model to 
elucidate differences between the two systems. Many parameters are averages over 
the specified period. Simulations for period 3 run the classical model for the 
appropriate number of periods and then switches the relevant equations to run the 
imputation system automatically. Although the imputation system becomes effective 
in the fiscal year, 1973/4, we assume that it occurred at the beginning of the 
calendar year, 1973. Period 3 data, in many instances, is therefore a weighted 
average of Period 1 and Period 2 data.
3.2.1. Output and Capital Stock.
Initial values for Y, K and H are provided as a means of fixing a term of reference 
and to provide initial asset holdings and cash flows. For this reason, it is 
advantageous to set Y =  K = H.
Averaging also eliminates the problem of the model displaying sensitivity to the 
starting values. For example, we may obtain a different distribution of Y, K and H
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by choosing 1966 just because of relative effects of the business cycle. The starting 
value in 1965 for Period 1 and Period 3 is the same and therefore, we require two 
separate figures, an initial value for the classical system and one for the imputation 
system. The following sections contain the actual values while we present the 
average figures in Section 3.2.1.3.
3.2.1.1. Manufacturing Output.
GDP for the manufacturing sector was obtained from United Kingdom National 
Accounts Table 3.2 ., various issues. This provided figures of £11,040m for 1965 
and £20,920 for 1973.
3.2.1.2. Manufacturing Capital Stock.
The gross stock of manufacturing capital was obtained from unpublished data 
provided by the CSO. This utilises the perpetual inventory method (see Giffin,
1976; United Kingdom National Accounts: Sources and Methods, 1985, pp. 199- 
203) and, consequently, assumes finite asset lives. The quality o f data produced by 
the CSO has been generally criticised (eg. Mayes, 1984) and as such alternative 
estimates have been produced by independent sources (see Section 1.3.). Despite 
this, the official data was used as other methods also have their estimation problems 
although it would be a straight forward matter to use an alternative series for K.
This would not affect the starting values presented here, but some of the parameters 
which are proportional to K.
The data provided a figure of £27,120m for 1965 and £64,257m in 1973. Averages 
used are as reported in Section 3.2.1.3.
3.2.1.3. Owner Occupied Capital Stock.
The stock of owner occupied housing is the product of the Department of the 
Environment mix-adjusted house price series (see Flemming and Nellis (1985) or 
Nellis et al. (1989) for a discussion of alternative price series) and the number of 
owner occupied dwellings. The data series was kindly provided by Andrew Scott of 
the London Business School. Both of these series can be found in various issues of 
Housing and Construction Statistics: Great Britain, HMSO.
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For the year 1965, a figure of £29,089m was obtained and for 1973, this was 
£107,145m. Averaging the data over Y, K and H, initial capital stocks were,
Period 1 =  Period 3 =  £22,500m; Period 2 =  £64,000m.
In terms of the actual results, the aggregate starting values are not critical, but by 
setting them close to the actual values, nothing is lost. Clearly, the variation of 
values is greater in 1973 than in 1965, making the latter values more representative.
3.2.2. Taxation.
3.2.2.1. Personal Rate of Income Tax: Q.
The average basic marginal rate of personal income tax was obtained from 
Thompson (1990, pp. 68). We ignore the effects of personal allowances and higher 
rates as there inclusion would multiply the complexity of the model. In our model 
we assume that,
Period 1 =  40.62 %; Period 2 =  33.17 %; Period 3 =  37.15 %.
3.2.2.2. Personal Capital Gains Tax: nr
The rate of personal capital gains tax has been 30 % throughout the whole time 
period (Prest and Barr, 1985, pp. 198-9; James and Nobes, 1988, pp. 178). Net 
receipts from this tax are provided in the Inland Revenue Statistics. (1988, pp. 10).
King (1977, pp. 65-71, 86) argues that empirical studies employing this figure will 
overstate the tax actually paid owing to allowances, loss offsets and other forms of 
avoidance. He suggests multiplying the tax rate by a coefficient of 0.5 in order to 
derive an "effective" rate. This methodology has been followed by subsequent 
empirical studies such as Buckley and Ermisch (1982, pp. 281) and Nickell and 
Wadhwani (1987, pp. 21). Consequently, we assume,
Period 1 =  Period 2 =  Period 3 =  15 %.
3.2.2.3. Domestic Rates:
Domestic rates as a proportion of H was calculated by dividing a total rates series 
by the capital stock described in Section 3.2.1.3. Unfortunately, a published rates 
series for the owner occupied sector is not directly available and therefore,
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unpublished data provided by the CSO was used. This series was a disaggregated 
version of rent, rates and water charges which form part o f consumer's expenditure 
(eg. Economic Trends, 1990, pp. 42). The rates series was gross rates less rebates 
(CSO mnemonic CCGB). This figure was then scaled down by multiplying the 
percentage of households in the owner occupied sector, thus avoiding the assumption 
that the total rates bill was borne by the sector. The split of owner occupiers as a 
form of tenure is provided in various issues of Housing and Construction statistics, 
HMSO. The result is an approximate $ h. This is because we would expect rateable 
values to be higher, on average, in the owner occupied sector than other tenures and 
because the proportion of rebates to the sector is also likely to be proportionally 
lower.
Few user cost studies incorporate rates (eg. Buckley and Ermisch, 1982; Fry and 
Pashardes, 1986) perhaps as a result of data difficulties or the small overall impact 
rates may have in the user cost. A property tax is included in H H 's study. Spencer 
(1987b, pp. 8) provides rates as a percentage of the owner occupied housing stock 
which are generally twice the size of those reported below. This arises because in 
his study he scales down the value of private residential buildings (Table S2, 
Financial Statistics, 1987) in order to estimate the value of the owner occupied 
housing stock and takes the rates, sewerage and water charges from the Family 
Expenditure Survey. The actual aggregate rate probably lies somewhere between 
these figures, for the present model we estimate that,
Period 1 =  1.1 %; Period 2 =  0.9 %; Period 3 =  1 % .
3.2.2.4. Rate of Corporation Tax: t .
The marginal rate of corporation tax was obtained from Inland Revenue Statistics 
(1988, pp. 120) and various other issues. We ignore the smaller companies rate and 
overseas tax liability effects. Corporation tax for each period is,
Period 1 =  41.25 %; Period 2 =  52 %; Period 3 = 46.27 %.
3.2.2.5. Manufacturing Effective Capital Gains Tax: nv..
Officially, corporates were charged a capital gains tax rate equal to the rate of 
corporation tax under the classical system. This was scaled down under the 
imputation system to produce a rate of 30 %, equivalent to the personal sector.
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Imposing this in the model would, again, overestimate the influence of the tax. 
Corporates could employ accountants to minimise this bill at little cost. For 
example, capital gains could theoretically be postponed indefinitely by utilising "roll­
over" relief. That is, when replacing an asset, any gain made on the old one can be 
deducted against the cost of the new asset. Other benefits such as loss relief are 
explained in Sinclair and Silke (1982, Chapters 2 and 4) and James and Nobes 
(1988, pp. 309-313).
Given the above evidence, we will also apply a coefficient of 0.5 to the 
manufacturing sector throughout both systems. The effective rates of capital gains 
tax are,
Period 1 =  20.625 %; Period 2 =  15 %.
In period 3 the rate is split at 23.14 % for 8 terms and 15 % in the remaining 7 
terms.
3.2.2.6. Manufacturing Rates:
Deriving the rates paid by the corporate sector as a proportion of the manufacturing 
capital stock suffered the same data limitations as described for $ h. King and 
Fullerton (1984, pp. 52) obtain the yield from non-domestic rates in 1980/81 
provided by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy and divided 
this by the net capital stock in buildings other than dwellings to give an average 
corporate wealth tax on buildings of 2.46 %. This institute did not have any figures 
for manufacturing or even a time series of rates yields.
Bennett and Krebs (1988a, pp. 167) provide a series of effective tax rates on 
buildings between 1960 and 1986 for industry. The series was calculated using the 
net stock of buildings. A series of rate yields was obtained by multiplying the 
Bennett and Kreb's series by the stock of buildings (Source: National Income and 
Expenditure Blue Book, various issues). The resulting rate yields series was divided 
by K to obtain $ k. Our figures for manufacturing rates are smaller than both papers 
cited above as their series is a proportion of the net stock of buildings, whereas our 
data is a proportion of the total capital stock. We assume that the industry sector 
endures a similar rates environment as manufacturing. Manufacturing rates enter the 
model as,
Period 1 = 0.5 %; Period 2 =  0.63 %; Period 3 =  0.56 %.
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3.2.2.7. Present Value of Investment Allowances and Grants to Manufacturing: A.
The present value of depreciation and investment grants is based on the work of 
King and Fullerton (1984, pp. 42-50). A series for A was kindly provided by Dr 
C.M. Kelly of Her Majesty's Treasury which was utilised in Kelly and Owen (1985) 
and relates to manufacturing. Oulton (1981, pp. 190) also provides estimates for A, 
choosing a central rate of 0.33. Data utilised in the present study are,
Period 1 =  0.39; Period 2 =  0.41; Period 3 =  0.4.
3.2.3. Risk.
Levels of risk are inherently difficult to measure. This is especially so given that 
investors' attitudes to and experience of risk varies through time. Assuming constant 
risk parameters is necessary within the framework of the present model although 
these parameters can be altered. This assumption would be of greater significance in 
a short-run forecasting model. All variance figures displayed below were calculated 
using a standard population variance calculation described in Mendenhall (1979, pp. 
44).
3.2.3.1. Common Risk Aversion Term: R.
The common risk aversion term relates to the individual and not specific assets.
The equivalent parameter was assigned a value of 3 in HH study and was based on 
econometric work carried out by Friend and Blume (1975) in the U.S. Similar 
estimates in the U.K have been carried out by Bhattacharyya (1979) who finds 
estimates of between 2 to 3.3 depending on the estimation technique. Utilising 
evidence from the U.S. and the U .K ., we also set R =  3 although we accept that 
this figure is subject to a degree of uncertainty. We therefore set R in the basic 
model,
Period 1 =  Period 2 = Period 3 = 3 .
3.2.3.2. Post Tax Manufacturing Equity Variance: a2^ .
Data used to calculate the post tax variance of manufacturing equity was obtained 
from Thompson (1990, pp. 66). This equity return series includes net income 
reinvested. Although this data represents the total equity market rather than the 
manufacturing subsector, we assume that any divergence in relative volatility is 
minimal.
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The methodology described above was also applied to the U.S. Standard and Poor's 
Composite index (unpublished data, kindly provided by Mr Bryan Allworthy at 
Barclays de Zoete Wedd) which produce a figure of 0.03. This compares to 0.04 
reported in HH. Figures calculated for the U.K. were,
Period 1 =  0.062; Period 2 =  0.360; Period 3 =  0.20.
These figures are a clear example that risk fluctuates through time. The high figure 
in period 2 reflects the economic chaos of the first oil shock. Stock market returns 
were extremely volatile falling by 51 % in 1974 and recovering 145 % in 1975. 
These figures could have been smoothed, however, given the limited analysis of 
Period 2, it was felt that actual figures should apply. The more heavily used 
period 3 is more representative although still high compared to the long run standard 
deviation produced in Seigel and Kaplan (1989, Table 12) which suggests period 1 
as being more representative.
3.2.3.3. Post Tax Manufacturing Long Bond Variance: a1 Lb.
Data for the post tax long bond variance was derived from Thompson (1990, pp.
64). The actual series was annual returns on gilts with gross income reinvested.
This is consistent with our assumption of bond washing. Although corporate bonds 
provide higher yields than gilts, we assume that the effect of this on the variance of 
returns is minimal. The Period 3 figure is consistent with the work of Seigal and 
Kaplan (1989, Table 12) and Brown and Seigel (1990, Table 1). Data used in the 
model are,
Period 1 =  0.008; Period 2 =  0.041; Period 3 =  0.024.
3.2.3.4. Post Tax Paid Up Housing Variance: o2//**.
In order to calculate the post tax paid up housing variance, it was necessary to 
calculate a total return series such as that used in Sections 3.2.3.2. and 3.2.3.3.
This was achieved by finding a capital gain derived from the house price index used 
in Section 3.2.1.3. and adding imputed income from the rent o f owner occupied 
dwellings obtained in various issues of National Accounts (eg. National Accounts, 
1980, pp. 30). This calculation was made more straight forward by the lack of tax 
on housing returns. Values for the paid up housing variance were,
Period 1 = 0.002 Period 2 =  0.037 Period 3 = 0.019.
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3.2.3.5. Mortgage Mark Up: mp.
The mortgage mark up premium, mp, was calculated by taking the difference in the 
risk free rate and the actual mortgage rate charged over the period of interest. The 
source for the risk free rate is that described in Section 3.2.4.4. and for the 
mortgage rate is that described in Section 3.2.5.4.
Performing this calculation produced a figure of one and minus one per cent for the 
periods 1 and 2 respectively. The negative result in period 2 arose as the building 
society cartel kept the mortgage rates as relatively low as possible in the volatile 
inflation and interest rate environment of the mid 1970's in order to prevent a large 
repossessions problem. Despite this, properties taken into possession rose from 
0.025 % in 1973 to a peak of 0.093 % in 1976 (BSA, 1985, pp. 198). In the long- 
run, a negative premium could not be sustained and in the period 1980 to 1986, the 
premium averaged 1.2 %. It would be rational to expect that in a deregulated 
mortgage market, premiums will be on average, positive.
Given the long-run nature of the model, we set mp at 1 % which should be treated 
with some caution. Thus,
Period 1 =  Period 2 =  Period 3 =  1 % .
3.2.4. Prices and Interest Rates.
We have explained in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1. that one of the main consequences 
of assuming a long-run state is that relative prices do not change. In some 
simulations we shall relax this assumption by allowing supply side feedback in the 
limited form of relative price movements. Data described below is, therefore, 
somewhat sterile with respect to initial simulations. When relative prices are altered, 
the magnitude of these shall be reported along with the simulation and the 
justification for these magnitudes lies in the data sources described below.
3.2.4.1. Real Price of Manufacturing Input: n.
The real price of manufacturing input is a series derived such that n =  Pz/P w. An 
index of manufacturing input prices, P7, effectively the rate of inflation of capital 
goods, was calculated by dividing the series gross fixed investment in manufacturing 
at current prices by the same series based on 1985 constant prices. Both series were 
extracted from Economic Trends (1990, pp. 68).
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The index of manufacturing output prices, P w, was calculated using the same 
procedure. Today, the basis for this is called the producer price index. This series 
was introduced in 1980 and only calculated retrospectively to 1974 (see Economic 
Trends 1984, pp. 211). Given this, the present study utilised the old wholesale 
price index for output (which the new series replaced) for all manufacturing products 
home sales. This series was obtained from Economic Trends (1983, Table, 114) 
and covered the entire period of interest.
The output price series was then rebased such that 1985 =  100 and values for n were 
obtained by division. During runs of the basic model, we set n equal to one. As 
we allow relative prices to deviate, n will rise or fall accordingly.
3.2.4.2. Ratio of the Market Value to Replacement Cost of Manufacturing Capital:
The ratio of the market value to replacement cost of manufacturing capital was 
obtained from various sources. This series is calculated in Oulton (1981, pp. 193) 
between 1960Q4 and 1977Q2 for industrial and commercial companies. Unpublished 
data for this sector was also kindly provided by Dr John Lomax at the Bank of 
England which spanned the time period 1966Q4 to 1989Q4. Finally, data specific 
to the manufacturing sector was kindly provided by Professor Sean Holly of the 
London Business School which covered the 1971Q1 to 1986Q4 period. Utilising 
industrial and commercial data requires a similar assumption regarding the relative 
performances of the sectors which we made in Section 3.2.3.2. None of the above 
data sets were suitable candidates for splicing.
Movements in q were sensitive to the quarter or year taken as the starting or end 
date. Over period 3, q fell substantially with the bulk of the fall occurring in the 
turbulent second period. Using Oulton's (1981) data, q fell by about 41 % or just 
under 2.5 % per annum (all compound figures were calculated using Table 29 in 
Kmietowicz and Yannoules (1980, pp. 45-46)). HH report a fall o f 30 % over a 
similar period for the U.S. Data between 1952Q1 and 1976Q4 of q in the U.S. is 
reported in Von Furstenburg (1977, pp. 351-355).
As with n, in our basic model we set q =  1 over all time periods.
3.2.4.3. Ratio of the Price of Housing to non-Housing Goods: p.
The real change in the price of housing was calculated using the following method. 
The house price series reported in Section 3.2.1.3. was transformed into an index
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based on 1987=100. This does not result in any inconsistency with indices reported 
in Section 3.2.4.1. as no indices were mixed with different bases, and, for example, 
inputs n or p are then independent of base dates used. The following calculation 
was carried out:
RPI - (House price component x weight in the RPI),
1 - weight in the RPI
where RPI is the retail price index obtained in Economic Trends (1990, pp. 128) 
and rebased appropriately. This methodology is implicitly used to obtain our results 
in Fry and Pashardes (1986, pp. 50). The house price series and its weight in the 
RPI were obtained from the Department of Employment (1987). The result of this 
calculation is to produce an RPI which excludes the effect of house prices in the 
index. Real house price movements were then derived by taking the ratio of the 
house price index to the RPI ex housing. This parameter is separate from mortgage 
costs, which are also a component of the RPI (see Johnson, 1987; BSA, 1988b).
Over period 3, the ratio rose by 42 %, or 2.75 % per annum. Hughes (1988b, pp. 
6) states that over the long-term, real house prices have risen between 1.5 % and 3 
% per annum, although Hendry (1985, pp. 241-5) demonstrates this is not 
monotonic. This figure would be lower on a hedonic basis (Dicks, 1989, pp. 70), 
that is, adjusting for the effects of quality improvement through time (see Goodman, 
1978; Fleming and Nellis, 1984, 1985; Fry and Pashardes, 1986). This concept is 
an index problem which may apply to any capital stock price series where 
technological and innovative progress occurs. Thus, more specifically, Hughes 
(1988b, pp. 54) states that between 1970 and 1985, real house prices increased by 
about 2.5 % per annum, but assumes for his empirical work that on a hedonistic 
basis, this falls to 1 %.
Like q and n, we set p =  1 in our basic model.
3.2.4.4. Expected Inflation and Capital Gains: tt*,xc*,xc*.
The general rate of expected inflation, ir*, was not obtained from the RPI index 
described in Section 3.2.4.2. The basic model requires a starting value equivalent to 
the actual rate experienced in 1965 and 1973. This assumption enables the model to 
explore the effects of altering from its base level. Thus, for 71*,
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Period 1 =  Period 3 =  4.7 %; Period 2 =  9.0 %.
Expected capital gains for the manufacturing sector, irek, were kindly provided by Dr 
C.M. Kelly of Her Majesty's Treasury and represent the data series discussed in 
Kelly and Owen (1985, pp.7). This term is the inflation rate of manufacturing 
capital (P7 in our study) adjusted by a coefficient of 0.5 in order to restrict the 
capital gains term. The authors argue that this "inevitably arbitrary" scaling should 
be applied in order to take account of the absence o f developed and efficient markets 
for second hand capital goods. For example, the problem of asymmetric information 
between buyer and seller, Lemons Law (see Akerlof, 1970), would ensure that firms 
could not fully liquidate installed capital at replacement cost. An alternative series 
for x** has been generated by Kilpatrick and Naisbitt (1984, pp. 28-29) who 
regressed the inflation rate of capital goods prices on lagged values of itself and 
other exogenous variables. The best equation was identified and used to generate 
predictions which form an expected rate with rational expectations origins.
The series was not displayed and the authors were unable to provide it. This is 
unfortunate only for comparative purposes as the methodology applied to the data 
actually used is closer to the methodology applied in the rest of the model.
Work carried out in order to estimate house price movements has ranged from 
simple moving averages (Dicks, 1988, pp. 22-23) to more complex econometric 
estimations such as Hendry's (1984, pp. 228) "sensible expectations" which utilises 
lagged values of house prices, interest rates, earnings and flows of mortgage loans. 
Maintaining model consistency expected housing capital gains in our model, x*\ 
were based on the data for x* and the real house price gains discussed in Section
3.2.4.3. We therefore assume that any expected real gain is added to x* to form 
fKeh. In the basic model, we restrict x** = x** =  x*. Where expected capital gains 
do occur it is assumed that the reasons for this are exogenous to the model.
3.2.4.5. The Risk Free Rate o f Interest: i.
The risk free rate of interest is assumed to be equivalent to the U.K. Government 
Treasury bill yield. Yields over the relevant period were obtained from Economic 
Trends Annual Supplement (1990, pp. 213). The yield for the year 1965 was 5.6 
% and in 1973, this was 12.82 %. Therefore,
Period 1 =  Period 3 =  5.6 %; Period 2 =  12.8 %.
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3.2.5. Miscellaneous Parameters.
3.2.5.1. Elasticity of the Demand for Housing Services with Respect to Income: e.
The housing income elasticity was assumed to equal 0.8. This figure was presented 
in King (1980, pp. 155) and is also used in Hughes (1988b, pp. 28). The figure 
used by HH (pp. 802) was 0.85. Further details of U.K. estimates can be found in 
King (1980, pp. 154). We assume this figure throughout, therefore,
Period 1 =  Period 2 =  Period 3 = 0 . 8 .
3.2.5.2. Elasticity of the Demand for Housing Services with Respect to the User 
Cost of Capital: n.
The housing user cost elasticity assumed is -0.7. This compares to a figure of -0.5
used in HH (pp. 802). This figure is consistent with that found in King (1980,
pp. 156) and utilised in Hughes (1988b), although Hughes (1988a, pp. 115) 
incorporated the marginally higher figure of -0.75. These figures are to the upper 
end of the Green Paper, "Paying for Local Government", (Cmnd, 9714, January, 
1988) which provides a range of possible elasticities between -0.5 and -0.8 (reported 
in Spencer (1988, pp. 15)). Again, this figure is assumed throughout and 
consequently,
Period 1 =  Period 2 =  Period 3 =  -0.7.
3.2.5.3. Aggregate Loan to Income Multiple: T.
The principal of the user costs of capital is to achieve the most realistic environment 
facing the investor making a marginal investment. As a result of this, we estimate 
the whole economy's portfolio structure and real cash flows. In the case of the loan 
to income multiple which is used to determine total mortgage debt for the whole 
economy, an aggregate must be used.
The loan to income multiple was calculated by dividing the actual total mortgage 
stock outstanding (Source: Financial Statistics (1987, July, pp. 150) and various 
others) by the total number of owner occupied housing units (Source: see Section
3.2.1.3.) to obtain an average mortgage per house. This figure was then divided by 
a measure of U.K. average incomes (Source: Donald and Phauge (1990, pp. 22)) to 
obtain a series for T between 1965 and 1988. Results for periods 1 and 2 were 
close at 0.78 and 0.74 respectively. The latter figure fell as incomes rose strongly
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in the post oil price hike. It was decided to consolidate a rationed loan to income 
multiple as 0.75 for all periods, thus,
Period 1 =  Period 2 =  Period 3 =  0.75.
We have discussed the process of mortgage market liberalisation in Section 1.4.4.2. 
and argued that this culminated with the 1986 Building Societies Act. Between 1986 
and 1988, the average T was 0.9. Given that all individuals may not have fully 
adjusted to the new deregulated environment in the short-run, we decided to set T at 
1 to represent our best estimate for a deregulated market. Given the lack of data 
and adjustment lags, we accept that this estimate should be used with caution.
3.2.5.4. MIRAS Scaling Factor: q.
MIRAS is defined in Chapter 2, this equation (2.55) can easily be solved for q.
The resulting equation was calculated using annual data to estimate q over the 
period. Sources for 0  are as in Section 3 .2 .2.1., Hmb as in Section 3 .2 .5 .3 ., actual 
MIRAS figures were obtained from Inland Revenue Statistics (1988, pp. 44) and the 
average annual mortgage rate obtained from the Building Societies Association 
(1984, pp. 6) earlier figures being obtained from the Building Societies Association 
directly. Using this methodology, we set q as,
Period 1 =  0.709; Period 2 =  0.887; Period 3 =  0.792.
3.2.5.5. Manufacturing Debt to Equity Ratio: b.
The manufacturing debt to equity ratio is defined as the market value of debentures, 
plus loan stock plus net bank borrowing divided by the market value of total 
ordinary plus preference shares. Net bank borrowing is defined as bank advances 
less liquid assets.
Values for b were calculated from unpublished data kindly provided by the Bank of 
England. The data pertained to non-fmancial companies and originated in 1967. 
More disaggregated data was unavailable and we therefore assume that the 
manufacturing industry was not significantly detached from the rest of the sector. A 
slightly older version of the Bank of England data between 1975 and 1980 is 
presented in King and Fullerton (1984, pp. 65). Over this period, and using this 
table, the debt to equity ratio was 0.24. Using the latest available data and the 
methodology outlined above, we find that the debt to equity ratio for the model is,
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Period 1 =  0.1846; Period 2 =  0.3349; Period 3 =  0.2547.
3.2.5.6. Manufacturing Short-Term to Long-Term Debt Ratio: z.
Data for the manufacturing debt structure forms a part of the debt to equity ratio 
calculation and therefore, the source and assumptions discussed in Section 3.2.5.5. 
apply to this Section. The calculation applied was to divide short-term debt by the 
total debt outstanding. This provided the following input,
Period 1 =  0.331; Period 2 =  0.684; Period 3 =  0.496.
King and Fullerton (1984, pp. 64) argue that the increased inflation volatility 
experienced during the 1970's resulted in firms becoming reluctant to lock 
themselves into long-term interest rates. This may explain the dramatic rise in the 
proportion of short-term debt in Period 2.
3.2.5.7. Investment Scaling Factor: Q.
The investment scaling factor was calculated by dividing total gross fixed investment 
in manufacturing (Source: Economic Trends Annual Supplement (1990, pp. 68)) by 
the gross manufacturing capital stock described in Section 3.2.1.2. Input to the 
model for Q was,
Period 1 =  0.049; Period 2 =  0.036; Period 3 =  0.043.
3.2.5.8. Manufacturing Dividend Payout Ratio: 0 .
The divided payout ratio is defined as dividends per share divided by earnings per 
share where earnings are defined as profit after tax less interest on borrowings and 
preference shares (Rutterford, 1983, pp. 140). Data was only available to the level 
of the industrial and commercial companies sector. The following data was obtained 
from Economic Trends Annual Supplement (1990, pp. 189), profit, tax paid, interest 
paid on all borrowing while dividend payments were obtained from various issues of 
Financial Statistics (eg. 1984, June, pp. 86) under the title "Payments of Dividends 
on Ordinary Shares". The following figures were found for the model,
Period 1 =  0.44; Period 2 =  0.34; Period 3 =  0.39.
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3.2.5.9. Depredation Rate of Manufacturing Capital Stock:
We have discussed the importance of using a rate of depreciation that is consistent 
with assumed asset lives used in the calculation of the capital stock in Section
2.4.6.1.1. Work carried out by King and Fullerton (1984) utilises CSO assumed 
asset lives to produce a figure for manufacturing depreciation which is consistent 
with the theoretical work of Downs (1986). Kelly and Owen (1985, pp. 12-13) also 
use the methodology described by King and Fullerton (1984, pp. 29).
We assume a constant rate of depreciation over our time periods and utilise the 
figure calculated by King and Fullerton (1984, pp. 47) of 7.9 %. Therefore,
Period 1 =  Period 2 =  Period 3 =  7.9 %.
3.2.5.10. Depreciation Rate of the Housing Capital Stock:
Given the methodology described in Section 3 .2 .5 .9 ., we assume that owner 
occupied housing have an expected life of one hundred years. This is similar to 
Hendry (1985, pp. 32) who finds the mean life o f a house to be 95 years. The 
Central Statistics Office assumes that commercial property has a life of eighty years 
and industrial property of sixty years (Central Statistics Office, 1985, pp. 199-203). 
Using the formula derived in King and Fullerton (1984, pp. 29) we have 2/100, 
which provides a rate of depreciation of 2 %. This figure compares with 1 % 
assumed by Dicks (1988, pp. 22), although the author also added 1 % for 
maintenance and 2.5 % for the U.S. assumed in HH (pp. 802). Thus, we input,
Period 1 =  Period 2 =  Period 3 = 2 % .
3.3. Model Solution.
The model described in Chapter 2 is nonlinear simultaneous general equilibrium in 
nature. We shall explain how and why the model was solved computationally, 
outlining some of the key procedures and concepts involved. Solutions to the model 
could be obtained by finding the derivatives of the implicit functions (see Chiang, 
1984, pp. 210-214) however given the size of the model in terms of the number of 
endogenous variables (the feedback block) and the objective of analysing subsequent 
changes to parameter values and model structure alterations, this manual technique 
would be slow and cumbersome. The usefulness o f partial derivatives is limited as 
there is a functional relationship between the independent variables. The model was, 
therefore, written in TURBO Pascal and solved using the Gauss-Seidel method.
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The basic model determines 18 endogenous variables and utilises the three 
predetermined variables outlined in Section 3.2.1. along with 24 parameters and 11 
initialised parameters (eg. ak, aC]). A number of post-recursive variables were also 
calculated, for example, GB, E and risk premiums which are outlined further in 
Chapter 4. The endogenous variables are (Y), (H), (K), (W), (Wr), (UC^), (v), 
(fij), ( iy ,  O y , (HmZ>), ( U C J ,  (TX*), (RE), (MIRAS), (TX„), (D) and (Dnd). The 
technical progress parameter (Cw) was shocked for the desired rate of growth to 
create the simulation.
3.3.1. Initialisation.
The purpose of the initialisation process is to produce starting values for the model 
by logically using the equations, parameters and predetermined variables. The 
starting values being variables or parameters not directly specified, such as Hmb, TXA 
ak, a lc, etc. To enable the model to achieve this, the sequence in which the 
equations are solved is of crucial importance.
As an example, the basic model for period 1 solved its initialisation using the 
following ordering (from left to right):
(W), (Wr), (x), (acl), (<*c2), (ac3), (ac4), (U C *J, (U C J, (H -) , (H-*), (H**), (v)
(MIRAS), (iy, (ly, a y , (ly, (u c y , (tx * ), ( r e ) ,  ( tx * ) , (d ),
The parameters ak, ah, am and were obtained in this way and subsequently had 
there values fixed for further simulations.
If the period 2 was initiated, then an If - then statement (see Findlay and Watt,
1981, pp. 52-55) built into the initialisation run would switch equations specifically 
devoted as being of the classical system to those pertaining to the imputation system, 
for example equations (T X y  and (T X y  would switch for (TXfa), (TXht)  and 
introduce a calculation of (Dnd). If  the model ran for period 3, then after eight 
years, a further initialisation procedure was performed which reset and substituted 
the user cost parameters for the imputation system in the order outlined above. 
Changes required for the initialisation procedure were minimal for non-basic model 
solutions and are specified when appropriate in Chapter 4.
3.3.2. Solution Algorithm.
In order to solve the non-linear system, an iterative or numerical procedure must be 
used such as Gauss-Seidel or Newton methods. Hughes Hallett and Fisher (1990),
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favour the Gauss-Seidel method for computational efficiency and this solution is used 
in the present study (also discussed in Nash (1979, Chapter 17) and Challen and 
Hagger (1983, pp. 33)). Ripley and Seddighi (1988, pp. 185-195) provide an 
application to a personal computer using Basic language.
Having obtained starting values for the model, iterations occur until a solution 
condition specified is obtained. The first iteration consists of passing through the 
entire model and solving for each of the endogenous variables, given the starting 
values. The second iteration proceeds along the same path using values for the 
endogenous variables derived in the first iteration. This process continues until the 
absolute change of,
I EV,„ - EVInJ | <  crit (3.1)
or the absolute proportionate change is such that,
| (EV,,„ - EV ,^)/EV ,„_; | <  crit (3.2)
where EV is the estimated value of the endogenous variable, t denotes the time 
period, n represents the iteration number and crit is the specified tolerance limit or 
critical value. If, for example, the tolerance limit was 1 %, then the model would 
solve for a particular time period when the absolute change in all endogenous 
variables from the last iteration is less than 1 %. The value for crit in the model 
was set at 0.0001 %, or one thousandth of a percent.
This technique has been followed such that the algorithm becomes a two part 
iteration with only the feedback set of variables requiring the tolerance test.
3.4. Conclusion.
This Chapter is complementary to Chapter 2. Having discussed the data used in the 
model and the various aspects of solving the model, we are now in a position to test 
and obtain results for analysis. Any structural changes to the model should be 
consistent with the model described in Chapter 2 and the data and model solution 
described in the present Chapter. We are now in a position to generate and analyse 
the models output and this is contained in Chapter 4.
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4. BASIC MODEL SIMULATIONS.
4.1. Introduction.
The purpose of the present Chapter is to explore the results generated when carrying 
out various simulations using the model effectively contained in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Our principal interest being the resultant asset allocations between our portfolio 
constituents and the effect on the real user costs of capital. Utilising these, and 
other variables, we will be in a position to highlight key influences on these sectors 
of the economy between 1965 and 1979. Comparisons with similar studies 
conducted in the U.S.A. will be of interest. In particular whether inflation, coupled 
with taxation, channels resources towards owner occupation.
More specifically we concentrate on exploring the effects of the period 1 and period 
2 environments on our model. We describe the methodology used in this 
comparative static analysis and indicate some extensions to the reported results.
When comparing period 1 and 2 attributes a selection of parameter shocks are 
discussed in Section 4.3. which also serves to describe various aspects of model 
interpretation. Given our particular interest in inflation, risk, taxation and capital 
markets these areas are focussed on in particular. Following this we simulate the 
model combining both periods using the parameters presented in Chapter 3. At this 
stage the model is altered so that the cumulative effects of growth, inflation, relative 
inflation and rationing can be analysed. This involves the endogenisation of the risk 
free rate and the exogenisation of real wealth. The final objective of this Chapter is 
to provide and analyse a long run model based mainly on period 3 which will 
provide a vehicle capable of being used in Chapter 5 for the comparison of various 
taxation policy regimes.
4.2. Results Analysis and Model Stability.
The objective of the present Section is to present the methodology which is used to 
achieve consistency in our comparative static analysis (Section 4 .2.1.). We explain 
the complexities involved in assessing the implications of our CGT assumptions and 
stress the comparative static nature of the results. In Section 4.2.2. we outline the 
format of the results presented in the Results Appendix, Sections B and C which 
forms the basis for our discussion in Section 4.3. Finally, before our results 
analysis we comment on the models stability in Section 4.2.3.
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4.2.1. Methodology.
Our Methodology Section outlines those aspects of the model which require to be 
consistently treated among specific sets of simulations (Section 4.2.1.1.). Before 
interpreting our results the implications of our alternative influences on corporate 
capital gains is discussed which explains why there is no individual simulation 
focusing solely on this parameter (Section 4.2.1.2.). Finally, we stress that the 
usefulness of the results lie in relative comparisons, either between periods or within 
a period (Section 4.2.1.3.).
4.2.1.1. Model Consistency.
We can now outline those factors maintained constant within a group of simulations 
which is crucial in facilitating the comparative analysis presented in the following 
Chapter. In order to compare the effects of a change in either an existing parameter 
or a change in model structure on the variable output it is necessary to maintain 
consistency all in other areas. Values for the constant parameters determined in the 
initialisation run for each period are reported in the Results Appendix Section A, 
these parameters remained fixed during all simulations unless a sensitivity analysis 
was being performed on one of them. The parameter am was calculated assuming 
that the mortgage market was initially in equilibrium such that H"“ =  Hmd =  
and T =  1. That is, am was initialised in an unrationed environment. The 
technology term (Cjy) was increased in order to produce a growth rate described in 
Section 4.4.3. and the size of the increase was not altered during the results 
reported in the present Chapter or Chapter 5. Similar consistency is applied to Wr 
when it is endogenised in Section 4 .4.4., that is, we always apply a constant growth 
rate of real wealth within relevant simulation sets.
4.2.1.2. Corporate CGT.
Interpretation of the results of changes in the corporate CGT rate is complicated by 
the parameters equivalence with other separate tax rates in each period.
Consequently it is of use to outline the implications of this before the model results 
are interpreted. The effect of a reduction in each parameter of one percent is 
indicated above the appropriate simulation in the Results Appendix. The changes are 
mirrored between period one and two however it is worth stressing the effects of the 
CGT changes between the periods. In period one the CGT was levied at the same 
rate as the rate of corporation tax and was independent of the personal CGT rate.
For this reason in period one we simulate an independent reduction in the rate of 
personal CGT (/*). When we simulate a cut in the corporation tax rate this
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implicitly reduces the rate of CGT to the corporate and therefor this simulation 
produces the effects of the taxes being cut in unison. This is in effect what would 
happen under this system. The introduction of the imputation system switched the 
above relationship in that manufacturing CGT was concomitant to the rate of 
personal CGT. Consequently when we reduce p  we automatically assume a 
reduction in p ^ .  It follows that the parameter p ^  does not explicitly appear in the 
simulations reported in Section B or C of the Results Appendix because of its fixed 
relationship with other taxes although the associated effects are incorporated.
4.2.1.3. Comparative Analysis.
The interest in the results generated by our model lie in their comparative nature. 
Failure to comply with this restriction would however result in the possibility of 
over interpreting the data. This Section briefly outlines the importance of this 
condition. The result of, for example, a tax increase in our model should increase 
the variable GB although we have indicated that the government does not play on 
explicit role in the model (Section 2.2. and 2 .4.7.3.2.). This may present a 
difficulty typical in assessing tax policy changes, the "ceteris paribus problem" (See 
Prest and Barr, 1985, pp. 32-34, Section 1.2.4.1.3.). Simply stated a reduction in a 
tax, with government expenditure remaining constant should reduce the governments 
budget balance which consequently would effect the level of money income and 
expenditure. If we assume the stock of money to remain constant then the 
deterioration in the budget may result in higher interest rates.
For these reasons the results reported should be thought of as comparative tax effects 
rather than the effects of a single tax change considered in isolation.
4.2.2. Reporting of Results.
The purpose of the present Section is to equip the reader with the rationale for those 
results reported in the Results Appendix. The term N/C is inserted when the 
specific simulation result is unchanged from that reported in the previous column. 
Each column in Section B and C represents one simulation and is split into five 
sections. These are the individuals balance sheet (£m), real user costs of capital, 
user cost of capital parameters, the loan to valuation ratio and real cash flows (£m). 
The variables Sb, Lb, E and HPd are post recursive in nature and stem from the 
variables K and H. Appropriate addition of the balance sheet produces K, H and 
W. UCm is fixed on initialisation but is presented mainly to show the effect changes 
in parameters have on it and because it is a relatively long manual calculation to 
perform. The real user cost of housing and manufacturing capital parameters are
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reported for the same reason although to ft3 are endogenous variables. This 
affords a more detailed analysis of the results following a change in the levels of tax 
or risk associated parameters which is central to the study. R4 is included for 
consistency and the other variables are self explanatory. A calculation of Dnd is not 
required for the classical system and is therefore not reported but it is under the 
imputation system and thus Section C contains this variable. Actual figures are 
presented, often with many decimal places (eg. user costs), in order to expose 
variable responses to relatively small parameter changes. For this reason there is a 
cost in using sensitivity results to analyse differences between systems in that these 
are, in many cases, only exposed after many decimal places.
4.2.3. Sensitivity Analysis.
Sections B and C of the Results Appendix represent the majority o f the simulations 
carried out for sensitivity analysis purposes. The role of sensitivity analysis is to 
assess the models robustness in the face of parameter changes. For example, it 
would be undesirable if  a small change in a particular parameter caused large 
movements in the model output. It also provides results in terms of insights into the 
model and the significance of various parameters which allows us to introduce our 
convention for presenting elasticities.
In total there are sixty four simulations and two sets of initial values reported 
between the two periods. The results show the effect o f a one percent reduction in 
each parameter for periods 1 and 2. One percent changes were applied in order to 
ensure responses were mainly linear in the limit. Elasticities can easily be 
calculated, for example, if we take the reduction in income tax in period 1 (Section 
4.3.2.) then we can see that compared to base the reduction in 0  results in a 0.4 % 
reduction in Hm/. This is equivalent to (dHm//d 0 )(0 /H m/) which we shall denote as 
6i h«* 0  which reads, the elasticity of Hm/ with respect to 0  in period 1.
Simulations have also been reported which shift R to 2.5 and 3.5 as the range of 
possible values for the common risk aversion term was wide (see Section 3.2.3.1.). 
In order to quickly expose some of the effects of inflation this has been reduced to 
zero while the real rate of interest has been kept constant. These results are 
reported at the end of Sections B and C.
Increases of one percent for each parameter were also simulated although the results 
have not been reported in the interest of consiseness and clarity. Given that thirty 
two columns of results were reported for each period if we included period three 
and reported a one percent rise in each parameter we would have to report one
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hundred and eighty individual sets of results. Although the model is nonlinear this 
did not cause any notable divergence from symmetric results when an 
equiproportional increase or decrease in a parameter was simulated.
When altering parameters significantly, as can be observed from our risk aversion 
and inflation examples this did not engender any model stability problems. In 
conclusion the model presented stable characteristics throughout its range of 
parameters.
4.3. Analysis of Period 1 and Period 2 Systems.
The purpose of this Section is to draw out some of the differences between the 
results generated in period 1 and 2 models which form the basis for our period 3 
model. The main differences lie in the change from the classical to the imputation 
system of taxation and contrasting parameter values. Many parameters, particularly 
corporation tax, income tax, asset variance and corporate debt funding ratios, reflect 
the change from a stable growing economy to one of rapid change in the wake of 
the oil price shock and associated inflation and uncertainty. It would be 
unreasonable to discuss every result in turn and therefore some of the more 
interesting parameter changes will be focussed on with particular reference to 
taxation, inflation, risk and capital markets. All results reported in this Section 
assume unrationed mortgage market (T = 1). The results reported in the Results 
Appendix can be thought of as a core set of results. Utilising these results along 
with the relevant equations described in Chapter 2 and the parameters described in 
Chapter 3 it is possible to calculate further variables. Examples are, risk premia, pre 
and post tax required returns and components of cash flow. There are many such 
configurations and in this Section our objective is to indicate when required the 
possibility of extrapolating from the core set of results.
4.3.1. Base Run Simulations.
The purpose of this Section is to introduce the base run simulations of the period 1 
and 2 models. This Section also forms an appropriate vehicle to contrast the effect 
of the economic conditions of each period on our model. Following this we can 
discuss the effects of the growth simulation in greater detail. The portfolio split of 
individuals is significantly different between the two periods. Under the economic 
conditions prevailing in period 2 the proportion of bonds in the portfolio (16.7 %) is 
much higher than under period 1 (9.2%). Within this there is a switch in period 2 
towards short dated bonds from long bonds which rise from less than half in period 
1 to more than double the amount of long bonds in period 2. Corporate equity falls
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from 40.8 % to 33.2 %. While the total proportion of housing investment remains 
fixed at 50 %, within this there is a dramatic shift in the proportion which is funded 
by a mortgage which falls from 39 % in period 1 to 17.6 % in period 2.
An appropriate additional variable to discuss is the relative risk premia which the 
portfolio asset allocation implies. The portfolio in the Results Appendix effectively 
provides us with J (a specific risky asset) and W (by addition), coupled with 
equation (2.25) and the appropriate parameters R and a2j  from Chapter 3 we can 
obtain risk premia. At the end of period 1 we find that p ^ ,  p E and Pjpd are 
0.149% , 7.628% and 0.066% respectively. Given that we have argued that paid up 
housing represents the safest asset (Section 1.2.4.2.5.) which is consistent with our 
findings of variance data for all periods, that is o2iPd <  a2u> < j 2e, and we find p E
> Pu, > Pfjpd. While the above variance condition holds for all periods this does 
not constrain the risk premia to conform also. In period 2 for example we find p ^ d
> p ^  because paid up housing is relatively a much larger component of the 
portfolio.
All user cost of capital figures rise in period 2 compared to period 1. If we impose 
equal tax rates, interest rate, inflation and risk premiums the imputation systems' 
manufacturing user cost is lower than the classical system as expected. The higher 
user cost observed under the imputation system is a result of a combination of a 
higher real rate of interest, a higher corporation tax rate and, most significantly an 
almost six fold increase in the corporate equity variance. The subsequent rise in the 
risk premia manifested in a dramatic increase in a 2i over a 2c.
The user cost of housing and mortgages also increases in period 2, though not by 
such a large factor. The latter movement arises mainly from the 2.82 % increase in 
the real rate of interest although this is tempered to some extent by a lower rates 
burden and a higher proportion of mortgages eligible for MIRAS. The period 2 
housing user cost suffers principally from the higher real interest rate and a higher 
paid up risk premium (3.6 % compared to 0.23 %) owing to the increase in a2rPd 
and the much larger proportion of the individuals portfolio invested in paid up 
housing under the period 2 environment.
The switch from mortgages to paid up housing in period 2 is reflected in the fall in 
the loan to valuation ratio but results principally from the rise in the profits share 
parameter a k which is fixed at initialization to equal the real user cost of 
manufacturing capital (see equation (2.13) and note that Y =  K and see Section
3.3.1.). This effectively means that for every pound of national product only 35 % 
is distributed to labour compared with 78 % in period 1 and consequently
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represents a dramatic fall in labour's income share which restricts households ability 
to service mortgage debt (equation's 2.16 and 2 .16 '). The low housing user cost 
makes it an attractive investment but individuals can not rely on mortgage funding to 
the extent witnessed in period 1. While the mortgage user costs are similar there is 
an almost three fold increase in the housing user cost when we move into period 2 
which arises as a result of the eighteen and a half times increase in the variance of 
paid up housing, a higher real interest rate and the far smaller loan to valuation 
ratio.
In a similar manner to risk premia above we can extend the user cost analysis when 
desired to isolate required returns from assets. We know that the pre-tax cost of 
short dated corporated debt (rsb) is the risk free rate o f interest. It follows from 
equation (2.40) that the pre tax cost of long corporate debt in period 1 is 5.749% 
compared to 13.457% in period 2. As the corporate can offset interest payments 
against corporation tax the effective post tax interest rate paid on long debt for 
example is ( l - r ) ^  which is 3.378% for period 1 and 6.459% in period 2. Given 
that our assumed inflation rates for the periods are 4.7% and 9% respectively the 
ability to offset interest payments (r is 10.75 % higher in period 2) results in the 
real post tax cost of funding long term debt falling from -1.322% in period 1 to - 
2.541% in period 2, despite the real pre tax funding cost being 3.408% higher in 
period 2. In a similar way we could calculate to total (weighted) cost of corporate 
debt (pre or post-tax) by using equation (2.41). These figures represent the cost of 
finance as discussed in Section 1.2.4.2.1.
Although more cumbersome we can calculate the post tax expected return from 
corporate equity by using equations (2.42') and (2.46') and multiplying these by (1- 
A )/(l-r). The individual receives a return in the form of a risk free rate, the risk 
premium and any capital gains, all after tax at the manufacturing and personal level. 
Utilising the variables E and W along with the appropriate parameters, and 
calculating x, (<£0 +  (1 -<f>)pp =  0.2348) and y, {pp (l-<£) =  0.099) we obtain a 
required return of 16% in period 1 compared to 56.6% in period 2.
Similar calculations can be obtained for the housing sector. The mortgage rate is 
equal to i +  mp which is 6.6% in period 1 and 13.8% in period 2 while the 
aggregate post subsidy rate is given by equation (2.52) which is 4.699 % and 9.739 
% respectively. Again, the real rate is lower in period 2. An individual with a 
mortgage at or under the MIRAS ceiling would effectively pay (i +  mp) (1 - 0 ) or 
3.9% in period 1 and 9.2% in period 2. The opportunity cost o f paid up housing is 
given by equation (2.52’) and is 5.7% in period 1 and 16.4% in period 2. When 
tjfnb < ifpd, any change which reduces the loan to valuation ratio (eg. a reduction
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in T) will increase U C ^ and result in a shift away from housing. We may also 
calculate mortgage interest payments as a proportion of gross or disposable income. 
For example the former can be obtained by calculating r ^ H ^ ^ l - c ^ Y  and 
represents 4.6 % at the end of period 1 and doubles to 9.5 % at the end of period 
2 .
Real income flows are also greatly affected by the profits share parameter. 
Manufacturing's increased profit share results in the sector paying a higher tax bill 
which is reflected in the ratio T X h/T X k which falls from 7.34 in period 1 to 0.58 in 
period 2. Similarly as a percentage of output disposable income falls from 47.8 % 
to 30.6 % while MIRAS as a percentage of output remains constant at around 1.5 
%. The residual of Government expenditure and revenue is given by equation 
(2.61) and is £9,508m (39.2 % of output) at the end of period 1 and £32,128m 
(43.1 % of output) at the end of period 2. As an additional source of information it 
is possible to identify the contribution to any cash flow by isolating the respective 
term. For example we can identify the contribution to Government revenue 
resulting from domestic rates using equation (2.58), that, is $,,pH which equals 
£263m and £652m at the end of each respective period.
We can now discuss in more detail the results of applying economic growth to the 
model. Each model was run for eight periods to provide a consistent base 
simulation, a summary of the key results are contained in Table 4.1. In both 
periods all asset classes rose in absolute terms as did real cash flows. 
Manufacturing's higher income elasticity resulted in a general switch towards bonds 
and manufacturing equity therefore the risk premium on manufacturing equity 
increased relative to housing and thus the user cost of manufacturing capital rose 
while the user cost of housing capital remained lower than the initial values for both 
periods. The Tables presented in this Section display at a glance the absolute and 
relative changes in asset allocation and the user costs of capital (the relative user 
costs represent the ratios U C ^/U C ^ and UC^/U Cm). Table 4.1. represents the base 
run movements compared to the initial values, while the other Tables represent the 
end result of a parameter change compared to the variables positions at the end of 
the base run. The term N/C denotes no change.
The loan to valuation ratio fell during both periods although this fall was larger in 
period 2 (a fall of 0.211 % compared to 0.007 %). In both periods the demand for 
mortgages was lower than the potential supply owing to the assumption of a 
mortgage demand income elasticity of less than unity (equation 2.16 '). In order to
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Table 4.1, Movement of Key Variables.
Base Run.
Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
Sb increase increase increase increase
Lb increase increase increase increase
E increase increase increase increase
Hm/ increase decrease increase decrease
UPd increase decrease increase decrease
UCfc, increase - increase
UCha decrease increase decrease increase
UCm N/C increase N/C increase
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expose the relative changes in the loan to income ratio over these simulations we 
need to examine the functions controlling the demand for mortgages and the total 
demand for housing. If we look at the fall in the housing user cost we find this is 
much higher in period 2 as opposed to period 1 (-0.03 % compared to -0.006 %) 
which should boast housing demand in period 2 relative to period 1. A similar 
result is obtained when we note that disposable income as a percentage of total 
output actually fell slightly in period 1 while rising in period 2. These factors 
together with the mortgage market analysis above explain the relative falls in the 
loan to valuation ratio witnessed between both periods (particularly in period 2).
An important capital market result can also be observed. Our base model generates 
the result H"“* <  H™ and consequently the simulation which reduces T to 0.99 has 
no effect on the model as the above inequality continues to hold. That is T plays 
no role in the model if equation (2.16') represents the mortgage market. This is 
also the case in period 2. If H"“ <  then a reduction in T would reduce total 
wealth and output while reducing v. The latter effect increases \JCha if r > r ^ b  
and a general reduction in housing demand would occur. All real cash flows rise 
and, apart from disposable income, initial distributions do not change significantly. 
We are now in a position to present a comparative analysis of each period for an 
equivalent percentage change in each parameter.
4.3.2. Reduction in Income Tax.
The main results of this simulation are presented in Table 4.2. Focusing initially on 
period 1 the reduction in income tax compared to the base run simulation increases 
wealth among all asset classes except the stock of mortgages. The user cost of 
manufacturing falls as corporates and individuals face a reduced tax burden on 
distributed income while on the other hand both the general user cost of housing and 
of mortgages rise as the value of MIRAS falls.
Building societies would be willing to supply £18,896m worth of mortgages but the 
marginal increase in cost reduces demand from £18,610m in the base run to 
£ 18,536m in the present simulation. This reduces the loan to valuation ratio to 
below initial and base run levels. The user cost of housing parameters react 
typically, as 0  falls the benefit of MIRAS falls while as v falls a greater proportion 
o f the user cost is borne by paid up stock, rises as 0  falls where as fl2 falls 
principally as v falls. These directions are a function o f the greater proportion the 
fall in 0  plays in Jl7 compared to v and the opposite phenomenon occurring in fi2. 
The net effect is that the aggregate subsidised mortgage rate rises from 4.699 % in 
the base run to 4.718 %.
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Table 4.2. Movement o f Key Variables. 
Reduction in Income Tax.
Period 1 Period 2
Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
Sb increase increase decrease increase
Lb increase increase decrease increase
E increase increase decrease increase
Hm/ decrease decrease decrease decrease
HPd increase increase increase increase
uc^ decrease - increase -
uc„a increase decrease increase decrease
UCm increase decrease increase decrease
The effect of the reduction of 0  on the manufacturing user cost is demonstrated by 
the reduction in the parameters a lc to a3c, consists of depreciation and rates and 
is therefore uneffected by changes in 0 .
Real output rises while tax paid by individuals and corporates falls which increases 
disposable income thus boosting housing demand despite the falling MIRAS 
contribution. Corporate taxes fall only marginally in absolute terms as 
manufacturing output, and consequently profits, rise. That is, the general portfolio 
switch towards manufacturing as a result of lowering 0  in period 1 does not 
significantly reduce the net tax paid by the sector. Indeed, the total government 
balance ,GB, declines by less than 1 %.
The period 2 simulation is rather different, principally as a result o f the unchanged 
marginal cost of investing in manufacturing which results from the imputation 
system. The absence of the double taxation of income is clearly indicated in the 
parameters an  to a3i which remain constant. Thus in period 1, =  -0.17
while in period two the equivalent measure is 0.02, smaller in magnitude but a 
different sign. As a result only paid up housing rises over the simulation, the other 
assets fall marginally apart from the stock of mortgages which falls significantly 
(62,H mi, 0  ~  2.58). As a proportion of the individuals portfolio's all manufacturing 
assets remain fixed while the ratio of mortgages to paid up housing falls from 0.54 
to 0.52.
In conclusion the reduction in 0  results in a portfolio switch away from housing 
towards manufacturing. In both periods this occurs as the user cost of housing 
increases as a result of the consequent reduction in MIRAS. The portfolio switch is 
reinforced in period 1 as the user cost of manufacturing falls owing to the lower tax 
on distributed income. There is no additional reduction in the marginal investment 
hurdle in period 2 because the imputation system has already eliminated this hurdle 
and the relative switch to manufacturing assets raises the user cost marginally. The 
greater cost of mortgages resulted in a reduction in v in both periods. In terms of 
cash flows there was a two way pull in period 1 of lower income tax on dividends 
and earned income but a lower MIRAS contribution while the situation was similar 
in period 2 with the treatment of dividends being the exception. The net result was 
a reduction in household tax and an increase in manufacturing tax as a proportion 
output although the net change in GB was slight in both cases.
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4.3.3. Reduction in Corporation Tax.
Analysing a change in the corporation tax is interesting for many reasons. It is a 
typical policy move (straightforward to carry out), it impacts CGT under the 
classical system and not the imputation system and it results in both the 
manufacturing and housing user costs falling.
The overall effects are broadly similar between period 1 and 2 in terms of 
directional responses as can be observed from Table 4.3. Compared to initial levels 
and the base run simulations all asset values rise (asset elasticities are all positive). 
Portfolio's are biased away from housing assets towards manufacturing in both 
periods. Real output rises while the proportion of tax paid by corporates falls and 
disposable income rises. In period 1 the elasticity ^ ( T X ^ /T X ^ t =  -1-9 while the 
same elasticity in period 2 is -1.4. Both show a switch in the emphasis of tax 
revenue base from corporate to households. The switch is greater under period 1 
because although corporation tax is greater in period 2 (see Section 3.2.2.4), and 
therefore a one percent fall is larger in absolute terms the rate of CGT is also 
effectively cut in the classical system.
In both periods the user cost of manufacturing capital falls as a result o f the 
reduction in the corporation tax, demonstrated by both periods manufacturing user 
cost parameters falling. The user cost of mortgages is unchanged, however the user 
cost of housing in both periods falls because the switch away from paid up housing 
reduces the required risk premium. For example in period 1, compared to the base 
simulation the risk premium on paid up housing falls from 0.0658 % to 0.0656 % 
(^2 ,Ptf>d,T =  0.3). Conversely the risk premium of corporate equity rises from 7.62 
% to 7.63 % (€\,Pe ,t = -°-4)-
In conclusion the reduction in r  produces the anticipated effects of increasing the 
relative size of the stock of manufactured capital while at the same time reducing the 
overall corporate tax bill. The later effect is greater in period 1 (causing an 
absolute fall) as CGT are also reduced.
4.3.4. Reduction in Manufacturing Capital Gains.
By analysing corporate capital gains we will expose the effects of a change in 
expectations on one user cost and by following this Section with a reduction in 
housing capital gains this will enable us to compare these Sections with each other
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Table 4.3. Movement of Key Variables.
Reduction in Corporation Tax.
Period 1
Absolute Relative
Sb increase increase
Lb increase increase
E increase increase
Hm/ increase decrease
HPd increase decrease
U C ^ decrease
UCAa decrease decrease
UCm N/C decrease
Period 2 
Absolute
increase
increase
increase
increase
increase
decrease
decrease
N/C
Relative
increase
increase
increase
decrease
decrease
decrease
decrease
- 121 -
as well as with the initial and base results. The key results are summarised in Table
4.4. The present simulation also enables us to expose some of the factors 
influencing retained earnings.
Like the Section above the reduction in expected corporate capital gains has had 
similar effects on the portfolio split, user costs and real cash flows between both 
periods. Specifically, the reduction raises the user cost of manufacturing capital 
although, naturally, none of the user cost parameters are effected. For both periods 
there is a relative switch away from all manufacturing assets towards all housing 
assets. Asset values fall in absolute terms across the portfolio with the exception of 
paid up housing in period 1 which holds up because the fall in disposable income is 
slight, reflecting a relatively larger saving in the CGT payment in this period. That 
is, because the GCT rate is higher under the period 1 environment the reduction in 
actual gains cuts the tax paid under the period 1 system by more that in period 2 . 
Again the rise in the housing user cost is principally a result o f a switch towards 
housing and the resultant increase in the paid up housing risk premium.
The only real cash flow which moves in opposite directions between each period is 
retained earnings which rises in period 1 as a proportion of output and falls in 
period 2. The elasticity, ^  re ,***  =  -8.67 while in period 2 this falls to 0.2. The 
key factors influencing this result are the relative fall in corporate profits, corporate 
taxation and the real gain made by corporates owing to the reduction in corporate 
debt. The elasticity of corporate profits €i>ajfcY,T** =  0.045 in period 1 compared 
to 0.148 in period 2 which demonstrates the reduced ability of corporates to pay 
dividends in the latter period. We have already indicated that the effect on 
corporate tax is that although the fall in tax paid is slightly greater under the period 
2 system (a fall of 0.178 % compared to 0.175 %) as a proportion of corporate 
profits it is greater under period 1 (unsurprising as CGT is greater in period 1) 
which biases retained earnings towards period 1 .
Finally, the greater proportion of bonds held during period 2 (b is higher, see 
Section 3.2.5.5.) means that the real gains made at the expense of lenders by 
holding debt during a period of inflation is reduced by 4.6 % in period 2 and only 
3.9 % in period 1. These factors combine to favour retained earnings in period 1 if 
capital gains fall.
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Table 4.4. Movement of Key Variables.
Reduction in Manufacturing Capital Gains.
Period 1 Period 2
Absolute Relative Absolute
Sb decrease decrease decrease
Lb decrease decrease decrease
E decrease decrease decrease
H ml decrease increase decrease
HPd increase increase decrease
u c ^ increase - increase
increase increase increase
UCW N/C increase N/C
Relative
decrease
decrease
decrease
increase
increase
increase
increase
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4.3.5. Reduction in Housing Capital Gains.
Compared to our base simulations the reduction in housing capital gains produces 
symmetric directional movements between both periods with the exception of paid up 
housing as can be seen in Table 4.5. Throughout both periods all asset values fall 
in real terms along with real output and the loan to valuation ratio. There is a 
general shift towards manufacturing debt and equity although in period 2  the large 
fall in the stock of mortgages means that this is the only asset class to fall as a 
share of the portfolio. The proportion of household and corporate tax, along with 
retained earnings rise while MIRAS and disposable income fall.
All user costs of capital rise, the explanation for the relative movements of paid up 
housing and the mortgage stock lie in the relative user cost movements and this 
presents us with an opportunity to discuss these in further detail. As we would 
expect the housing related user costs are generally larger under period 2  as a result 
of a higher real interest rate and a higher risk premium (see Section 4.3.1.). Once 
the implications of MIRAS and the different loan to valuation levels observed 
between the periods are introduced matters are distorted some what. In its basic 
form the MIRAS benefit, (1 - Gg) reduces the user cost slightly more under the 
period 2  environment which reduces the impact of the higher real rate of interest. 
The lower proportion of mortgage debt in period 2 negates this benefit as can be 
seen from the generally higher levels of in period 2 simulations. Total housing 
demand is of course influenced directly by UCAa which in period 1 is more sensitive 
to changes in capital gains than in period 2  ( C ^ U C ^ ,^  =  compared to - 1 . 2  
in period 2 ).
The results of this are straight forward but important for asset allocation impacts. In 
period 1 represents 140 % of VC ha and 150 % of UCm, both should react in a 
similar manner to a change in x4*. In period 2 however the figures are 100 % and 
256 % respectively thus when ireh is reduced this has a large impact on UCm in 
period 2 relative to U C ^ which reduces mortgage demand substantially. The share 
of mortgages in period 2 fell by 1.2 % compared to a fall of only 0.5 % in period 
1. This was at a time when the general housing user cost did not rise substantially 
thus promoting outright ownership.
Comparing these results with the equivalent fall in manufacturing price expectations 
we find the effect on housing user costs are greater as they are more sensitive to 
price expectation changes than corporate capital, thus the magnitude of any asset 
allocation changes was greater during these simulations. Generally a reduction in
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Table 4.5. Movement of Key Variables.
Reduction in Housing Capital Gains.
Period 1 Period 2
Absolute Relative Absolute
Sb decrease increase decrease
Lb decrease increase decrease
E decrease increase decrease
H ml decrease decrease decrease
W d decrease decrease decrease
u c ^ increase - increase
increase decrease increase
UC„, increase decrease increase
Relative
increase
increase
increase
decrease
increase
decrease
decrease
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either price expectation shifted asset allocation away from the particular sector or an 
asset within that sector. In absolute terms a fall in either price expectation resulted 
in a deflationary environment where investment hurdles rose.
The area of most significant contrast lies in the path of real cash flows. When 
housing price expectations fell, as a proportion of total output, both household and 
corporate tax payments rose while MIRAS and disposable income fell. The opposite 
cash flow changes occur when manufacturing price expectations fall. This is 
principally because corporate capital gains impact on manufacturing and households, 
and while these are falling, MIRAS is rising as households increase their housing 
weighting. When housing capital gains fall this switches assets towards 
manufacturing which increases the sectors tax payable while MIRAS payments fall.
In conclusion, the reduction in housing capital gains produce relatively consistent 
results in both periods although this significantly affected the demand for mortgages 
in period 2. In both periods all user costs rose and there was a switch towards 
manufacturing assets. Compared to the reduction in manufacturing capital gains the 
magnitude of change induced was greater because of the absence of housing CGT, 
while overall the portfolio and cash flow effects mirrored each other. These effects 
are also reinforced by the results of the simulation where we assume that there is no 
inflation in the economy. In both periods there is a portfolio switch towards 
manufacturing assets and all user costs rise. In period 2 paid up housing increases 
along with retained earnings and disposable income, in period 1 the corporate's tax 
bill falls as the benefit of zero capital gains outweighs the rise in profits subject to 
corporation tax where as the opposite occurs in period 2 .
4.3.6. Reduction in Manufacturing Equity Variance.
Compared to the relevant base simulation the reduction in the manufacturing equity 
variance has reduced manufacturing user cost hurdles and consequently increased the 
size of all assets and cash flows in both periods. In general there has been a 
relative shift towards assets in the manufacturing sector as reported in Table 4.6.
The fall in equity variance is reflected in the parameter a 2 and both the user cost of 
manufacturing and housing capital fall while the user cost of mortgages is 
unaffected. Real output rises in both periods while all proportionate real cash flows 
fall.
The reduction has a slightly greater effect in period 2 where the elasticity, 
e 2 ,UCfal,(72£ =  0.5 compared to 0.4 in period 1. Compared to the base simulation 
the risk premium required from manufacturing equity actually increased (using period
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Table 4.6. Movement of Key Variables.
Reduction o f Manufacturing Equity Variance.
Period 1 Period 2
Absolute Relative Absolute
Sb increase increase increase
Lb increase increase increase
E increase increase increase
Y{ml increase decrease increase
HPd increase decrease increase
u c ^ decrease - decrease
UC*a decrease decrease decrease
UC„, N/C decrease N/C
Relative
increase
increase
increase
decrease
decrease
decrease
decrease
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1 figures for example) rising to 7.645 % from 7.628 % and for long debt to 0.1494 
% against 0.1491 %. This occurred as a result of the combination of a lower 
manufacturing user cost of capital and a higher income elasticity raising the 
proportion of all manufacturing assets in the portfolio. The corollary to this is a 
lower paid up housing risk premium (0.0658 % against 0.0656 %). Effects have 
tended to be greater in period 2  owing to the dominance of the parameter in the user 
cost at that time and the effect would have been even greater if  the debt to equity 
ratio had not risen by almost two fold in this period. Elsewhere in the system the 
change has had little effect.
The purpose of the current Section has been to outline some of the issues 
surrounding the model methodology along with the rationale for the presentation of 
the Results Appendix and to follow this with a discussion of a selection of pertinent 
parameter shocks. Consequently, different areas of the model have been explored 
and alternative methods of analysing an area have been utilised when appropriate.
The comparison of period 1 and 2 environments produces valuable insights in itself 
and by following this route we have obtained an efficient method of introducing the 
workings of the model while presenting analytical techniques which may be used on 
other reported results.
4.4. Basic Model Simulations: Period 3 Data.
The following Section will discuss the impacts of cumulative growth, general 
inflation, relative price inflation and mortgage rationing on the basic model, period 3 
data. Prior to this a short introduction to the layout of results presented in Section 
D is provided. This Section represents the model's closest reflection of investment 
conditions for the relevant sectors in the U.K. economy between 1965 and 1979 and 
enables us to isolate the effect exerted by influences such as general and real price 
inflation and mortgage rationing.
4.4.1. Rationale for Reported Results.
The results reported for the present Section are chiefly in the form of percentages or 
ratios. The changes imposed in each run mean that generally one does not have to 
operate to several decimal places which was the case in Section 4.3. The main 
reason for this form of presentation is to further facilitate the comparative nature of 
the results rather than become fixed on actual values, although the results reported 
will facilitate conversion to actual values when required as we provide actual figures
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in the discussion of the initial values. The user cost of manufacturing parameters 
are presented in Section 4.4.2. and are not reported in the Results Appendix as there 
are no taxation or risk parameter changes in this Section.
4.4.2. Initial Values.
The initial values represent the economy as at 1965 with parameters taken over 
period 3 but with the classical system of taxation in place. The initial balance sheet 
of the two sectors is presented in Figure 4.1. and the individuals portfolio asset split 
is provided in Figure 4.2. From this it can be seen that total wealth owned by 
individuals is £45,000m.
The user cost of manufacturing capital is 44.94 % and its parameters are, a2 =  
1.246, ot2 =  0.661, a 3 =  0.955 and a 4 =  0.094 while the tax parameter x is 
0.2386. The user cost of housing capital is 4.66 % (the parameters are reported in 
the Results Section) while the user cost of mortgages is 2.96 %.
Real output is of course £22,500m, tax paid by the personal sector is £5,889m and 
by the corporate sector £3,584m making an initial government balance of £9,483m. 
Retained earnings are £2,756m and the MIRAS subsidy is £24lm  while disposable 
income is £8482m. Risk premiums are 22.4 % for manufacturing equity, 0.46 % 
for long bonds and 1.3 % for paid up housing. The post tax cost of short debt to 
manufacturing is 3.01 % and for long dated debt this is 3.26 %. The post MIRAS 
cost of mortgage debt in the model is 4.66 %.
4.4.3. Economic Growth.
We are now in a position to look at the effect economic growth has on the model 
with the existing parameters and tax structure. Real growth in manufacturing output 
rose sixteen percent in real terms over the period 1965 to 1979, a poor performance 
which reflects a fall in real output between 1973 and 1979. The more stable period 
1965-73 (and more representative of a long run environment) produced a real growth 
rate of 18.5 %, or 2 % per annum and we therefore increase C*/ such that we 
simulate economic growth of 2 % per annum. This figure remains fixed throughout 
all simulations in Chapter 4 and 5.
The risk free rate of interest and the rate of inflation remain as they were in 1965. 
Manufacturing output grows to £30,348m or by around 35 % and there is a general 
shift towards manufacturing assets, again, the assumed higher manufacturing income
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Figure 4.1. Initial Balance Sheets (£m) of the Period 3 Model.
Individuals
Short bonds 2,842 Wealth 45,000
Long bonds 2,889 Mortgages 12,388
Equity 16,769
Housing 22,500
Mortgages 12,388
Corporates
Capital 22,500 Short bonds 2,842
Long bonds 2,889
Equity 16,769
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Figure 4.2. Initial Portfolio Asset Allocation. 
Period 3 Model.
27.5
Mortgages.
3 7 , 3  Manufacturing 
Equity.
P
6 , 4  Long 
Bonds.
3 Short 
Bonds.
22,5 Paid Up
Housing.
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shift towards manufacturing assets, again, the assumed higher manufacturing income 
elasticity exerts prevalence. The real user cost of manufacturing capital falls to 
40.41 %, an unusual reaction given our analysis contained in Section 4.3. The 
proportionate switch towards the manufacturing sector results, as expected, in a 
continually rising manufacturing user cost owing to rising risk premia. The final 
user cost is lower than the initial figure reported owing to the one off fall when the 
model changes from the relatively heavily taxed classical system to the imputation 
system. Thus the user cost begins at 44.94 % and rises to 45.18 % as a result of 
the increased risk premium, however the change to the imputation system causes an 
instant fall of 4.94 % from which level the path continues its upward momentum, 
ending at 40.41 %. The regime switch results in the tax parameter y becoming 
equal to 0.09, and compared to the user cost parameters prevalent under the classical 
system (reported in Section 4.4.2.) these are now lower with — 1.067, ot2 =  
0.554, a 3 = 0.894 and a 4 remaining unchanged.
Conversely, the real user cost of housing capital rises in absolute terms by 0.04 %, 
despite the housing share in the portfolio diminishing throughout the simulation.
The user cost rises to a high of 4.7 % in order to equilibrate the market when the 
manufacturing tax change takes place, the final result culminates in the ratio reported 
to the user cost of manufacturing capital falling to 8 .6 . This reduction in the ratio 
is principally a result of the sharp decline in the manufacturing user cost which is 
also reflected against the user cost of mortgages. The mortgage market is not 
rationed although Hw/W equals 24.6 % indicating that demand for mortgages can 
not rise much further without hitting this binding constraint. The loan to valuation 
ratio falls from around 55 % to 52 % which can be attributed to the relative fall in 
incomes compared to disposable income which rises as a percentage of output from 
37.7 % to 40.7 %.
Tax paid by both the personal and corporate sector as a proportion of output fall, 
retained earnings remain constant and this results in the switch to disposable income 
reported above (equation (2.62)). The fall in the tax take arises because of the 
introduction of the imputation system with the biggest movement being the reduction 
of the personal tax bill owing to the dividend tax credit (see Section 1.10.8.2.).
The reduction in the corporate tax bill arises from the assumption that under the 
classical system = 0 .5 r which falls to =  np, (an effective fall from 23 % to 
15 %).
In conclusion, economic growth results in a general switch towards manufacturing 
assets, the ratio K/H rises from unity to 1.12 mainly as a result o f manufacturing's 
higher assumed income elasticity and the switch to the imputation system of taxation.
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4.4.4. General Inflation.
The results reported under the heading general inflation are the product of both 
economic growth and an increase in the general rate of prices throughout the 
economy from 4.7 % to 9 %, the average annual rise over the period. In this 
simulation we fix Wr to grow by 42 %, the rate of growth experienced in the 
previous simulation which enables the model to determine the risk free rate of 
interest, rather than Wr.
The model changes which occur are as follows, we rearrange equation (2.13) such 
that,
K =  Wr - H, (4.1)
whilst it remains in the recursive block. An equation to determine the risk free rate 
of interest, i, is introduced which is a weighted average of the increase necessary to 
leave the respective real user costs of capital constant. That is, we force the risk 
free rate of interest to neutralise any effect on the real user cost of capital which 
otherwise would result from a change in inflation. For example, in the case of 
manufacturing we can write,
a2i =  a 3T^k - U C^. (4.2)
Assuming that U C ^ is fixed then we can write the relationship between the risk free 
rate and inflation as,
i =  (a j /a 7)x**. (4.3)
The implicit user cost of capital elasticity for manufacturing is unity and for housing 
is n, thus we can weight the effects between the sectors such that,
1 a3 n tPh
i =  is +  [ ------------ x 5* H------------- ] ,  (4.4)
1 +n olj 1 +n Rj
where x *  and x** represent the change in expected inflation and is represents the 
initial risk free rate (5.6 %).
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We have effectively introduced to the model the possibility that, as a result of 
taxation, the Fisharian conclusion that di/dx is equal to unity may not hold. Real 
interest rates may now vary, although Holland (1984) indicates that taxation is only 
one of many potential factors in the determination of real interest rates. The 
potential role of taxation on real interest rates is discussed further in Feldstein (1976) 
who criticises growth models in general for not allowing taxes to alter the cost of 
capital and for not exposing the effects on interest rates o f inflation and taxation.
Our model should therefore shed light on these issues, in particular how this affects 
capital intensity.
The parameters is and the change in inflation (an increase of 4.3 %) require to be 
introduced to the model and equation (4.4) is incorporated into the initialisation 
procedure between a 4 and UCm.
The results show that an increase in the general level of inflation encourages 
individuals to switch their portfolio allocation away from manufacturing assets 
towards housing which supports the general hypothesis (eg. Feldstein, 1982, pp.
305). The effect of inflation tends to reduce real interest rates through 
manufacturing taxation, d i/dx* =  0.77 during the classical system and 0.84 in the 
imputation system. This contrasts with the work of HH (pp. 804) where they found 
d i/dx* =  1.25, the difference arises from the much higher value for a 3 found in 
their model which results from their assumption of a 4 % CGT rate and our 
different treatment of investment allowances. On the other hand d i/dx*  =  1.18.
The net effect on the real interest rate is that it falls by 0.25 % in the classical 
system and by only 0.1 % under the imputation system. This is marginal and 
conforms, despite theoretical logic, to Poterba's (1984, pp. 735) finding that 
empirical investigation frequently discovers that di/dx <  1 .
General inflation results in 6 3>k,x* =  -0.08 and €3 ,H,x* =  0.07 the difference 
principally arising because all capital gains resulting from increased inflation flow 
straight through to the user cost of housing and mortgages as no CGT has to be paid 
(also see Section 4.3.5.). While the reduction in the real interest rate reduces the 
value of the MIRAS subsidy it also reduces the manufacturers ability to offset 
interest payments against corporation tax thus the ratio \JCka/\JCha rises, 
consequently we find that ^ ( U C ^ /U C ^ x *  >  0  which is consistent with the result 
d ^ r ^ /d x *  <  0 as argued in Ebrill and Possen (1982, pp. 37).
The loan to valuation ratio falls from 52 % to 50 %. The increase in general 
inflation feeds through to a reduction in the user cost of mortgages to a greater 
extent than housing because of the factors outlined in Section 4.3.5. and this is
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reflected in the user cost ratios. The effect of this is to increase 'Bmd above H™ and 
hence mortgage lenders are extending credit to the maximum (effectively mortgage 
demand faces the income binding constraint for the first time) given current income 
leading to a greater reliance on ownership of housing stock.
The effect on real cash flows is negligible although the relative reduction in 
manufacturing capital does cause output to fall slightly to £29,446m. Clearly CGT 
payments by both sectors rise but this is more than offset at the household level by 
the dramatic rise in MIRAS payments from 1 % to 1.7 % of total output caused by 
the interest rate increase. This feature is not incorporated in HH (see Section
2.3.1.5.).
Again these results, in part, differ from the model used by HH. For example, while 
corporate taxes fall in absolute terms owing to reduced profits this is by no means as 
substantial because of CGT. Indeed, the increase in inflation results in the 
corporates share of the tax burden rising proportionally. Retained earnings fall in 
absolute terms as a portion of the real gains made by companies at the expense of 
debtors is paid out and profits are reduced but this is negligible as a proportion to 
output. Unlike HH the absolute (and proportionate) movement o f personal taxes is 
downwards not up because in our model individuals are not taxed on interest from 
bonds, the effects of the imputation system and our inclusion of MIRAS in cash 
flow calculations.
In conclusion, the effect of a rise in general inflation has been to shift capital 
resources towards the formation of housing, the majority o f this has originated in 
paid up housing increasing as mortgage supply binds individuals demand. The net 
effect on real interest rates has been negligible and on the user cost of manufacturing 
capital to cut it slightly to 39.30 % while the user cost of housing fell by a greater 
proportion. In the model presented by Buckley and Ermisch (1982, pp. 281) they 
argued that a rise in the general rate of inflation would (with the stock of housing 
fixed) result in a disproportionately greater rise in house prices, our findings 
complement this by holding real prices constant and letting stock levels change, 
^ 3 ,H ^ ,7t* 1S positive and has a larger effect on portfolio asset allocation than the 
user cost of mortgages despite 63  >  0  because of the binding constraint.
The inflationary environment encouraged households to borrow as much in the way 
of mortgage stock as lenders would supply at the given price. The ratio of K/H 
falls back to unity and clearly the general argument that taxation and inflation bias 
resource allocation towards housing (see Section 1.3.) is supported by our model.
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4.4.5. Relative Price Inflation.
We stressed in Chapter 2 that one of the aims while constructing the model was to 
make it flexible, especially in terms of relative price effects which may play a part 
in a long run model if  the cause is exogenous to the system (this issue is discussed 
in Section 2.2.1.). Moreover, real house price gains have been prevalent in the 
owner occupied sector and it would therefore seem appropriate to present results 
under such an environment. In the present simulation we increase the expected 
house price parameter to 10.75 %. That is, house prices are expected to rise by
1.75 % per annum in real terms. Expected price changes of corporate capital 
remain equal to the general rate of inflation. The actual real house price rise 
experienced over the period was 2.75 % per annum and consequently we increase 
the value of p (the real price of housing) by this figure. The real price of 
manufacturing output rose by 0.25 % per annum over the period and, like p, n is 
increased at this rate. We retain q at unity.
We discussed in Section 3.2.4.2. the actual rise in house prices over the period of 
interest and presented some evidence regarding real house price expectations 
produced by other authors. Increasing x *  by 2.75 % per annum, the rise that 
actually occurred is probably overestimating expectations for two main reasons. The 
first is the hedonic (quality) issue discussed in the Section above and the second is 
the likelihood that the large gains over a few years in the 1970's would not be fully 
built into individuals long term expectations. Taking account of these points we 
have incorporated a figure in the lower range of Hughes (1988b, pp. 6) estimates 
but higher than his 1 % estimate (pp. 54). On the other hand p is increased by the 
full amount as this is what actually occurred and the change in n is incorporated for 
the same reason.
The data for expected manufacturing capital gains discussed in Section 3.2.4.3. was 
calculated over the period 1966 to 1979. Using the input price index as calculated 
in Section 3.2.4.1. we find that the average annual rise in P7 was 12.8 %. Utilising 
Kelly and Owen's (1985) methodology we scale this figure down to place it between 
the actual and Kelly and Owen's (1985) estimate of 5.3 %. We impose x *  =  x*
=  9 %, effectively a scaling factor of 30 % rather than the 50 % used by Kelly 
and Owen's (1985). This assumption, in some ways, side steps the debate of which 
is the relevant scaling factor.
We have stated that q fell substantially over the period (Section 3.2.4.2.) however 
HH (pp. 807) correctly point out that when introducing a fall in q in this type of 
model the reason for that fall is crucial. The main causes may be a result of
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inflation and taxation or because of market valuation errors, which would have a 
similar effect, or, events which reduce the productivity of existing capital such as an 
unanticipated change in factor prices and/or government intervention. Evidence 
regarding productivity changes are numerous (see Section 1.4.8.1.) and the difficulty 
in identifying the cause of the fall in q, or separating it from inflation and taxation 
factors is a weakness of the model. The effect of a reduction in q would be to 
reduce the user cost of manufacturing capital and/or reduce the real value of the 
stock of manufacturing capital. We follow the conclusion reached by HH (pp. 808) 
"Given the uncertainties regarding how the decline in q should be implemented and 
even its directional impact on capital allocation no simulation with this change has 
been run".
HH carry out further model alterations at this point (HH, equations 4" and 19, pp. 
806) in order to introduce relative price effects. Their equations introduce the 
complexity of incorporating a housing supply elasticity (discussed in Section 2.2.1) 
and manufacturing and housing construction productivity parameters (a Table of 
productivity increases between manufacturing, construction and the whole economy 
for the U.K. is presented in Dickens et al. (1985, pp. 88)). Pursuing the changes 
made by HH has been rejected for the present study on the basis that the increased 
model complexity is unjustifiable especially when coupled with uncertainty regarding 
the quality of measurement of the necessary extra parameters.
In summary, expected house price inflation becomes positive in real terms, the real 
price of housing and manufacturing capital also rise while expected manufacturing 
prices remain constant along with q. The model structure remains unchanged from 
the previous simulation.
The results show a further increased swing towards housing assets, the ratio K/H 
becomes equal to 0.87 and £3)(K/H),x * <  0- Again, the housing investment is 
directed towards paid up housing as lenders extend loan books as far as possible.
For the first time >  Hm/ and consequently the loan to valuation ratio drops to
41.5 % and the risk premium attached to paid up housing increases to 1.8 %. The 
real price rises have resulted in the total value of wealth increasing by 70.5 %. 
Ironically if we accept that consumption is to some extent influenced by wealth 
levels (Section 1.4.5.3.) then the present increase in wealth will boost consumption 
at a time when the ability of the economy to produce is diminished. A deterioration 
in the balance of payments is the obvious outcome of this scenario.
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The rise in x *  has resulted in an increase of just under 1 % in the risk free rate of 
interest under the classical system and by slightly less under the imputation system - 
effectively a reduction in the real rate of interest. While there has been a slight rise 
in the manufacturing real user cost of capital to 39.59 % (still marginally lower than 
the base run) this has been a result of the increase in the real price of inputs and the 
higher risk free rate. Countering this to some extent is the reduced risk premia 
attached to long bonds and equities.
While the increase in the risk free rate of interest increases UCm this is more than 
compensated for by the increased price expectations, as a result UCm falls as can be 
seen from the increase in the ratio UCfal/UCm. Similarly, the ratio U C ^/U C ^ falls 
as the rise in the real price of housing input feeds through, (on a bigger number 
than UCm) coupled with an increase in the risk free rate and a shift towards paid up 
housing which results in an increased risk premium, therefore the increased capital 
gains which reduces does not produce a reduced user cost of housing. The user 
cost of housing rises to 5.27 % despite the benefit of the increased inflation. Of 
course the real stock of the housing benefits from the rise in p.
In absolute terms the value of all assets increase, hence the wealth increase 
mentioned above. Total manufacturing output also rises to £30,974m and all real 
cash flows rise in absolute terms. Tax paid by households rises as the rates bill 
increases while taxes paid by corporates fall and MIRAS rises only slightly. The net 
effect is that disposable income falls slightly. Tax paid by corporates falls as the 
equity risk premium is reduced and bond interest offset against corporation tax 
increases.
4.4.6 Mortgage Rationing.
In order to complete the environment of the 1965 to 1979 period in our model it is 
necessary to introduce the effects of mortgage rationing. We have discussed the 
nature of mortgage rationing in Section 1.4.4.1., our incorporation of this within the 
model structure in Section 2.3.1.6. and 2.4.2.1. and parameterisation of T in Section
3.2.5.3. The introduction of mortgage rationing therefore only requires the 
reduction in T from 1 to 0.75.
Mortgage rationing tilts the individuals portfolio towards manufacturing capital, the 
ratio K/H becomes 0.94 while the total value of wealth falls to £76 ,121m and in 
absolute terms the value of all assets fall except paid up housing. The biggest 
portfolio shift has been away from mortgages, a fall of around 5 % and towards 
paid up housing, a rise of around 3 %. Individual and corporate balance sheets are
- 138 -
presented in Figure 4.3 and the portfolio asset split of individuals in Figure 4.4.
This simulation provides an opportunity to explore the mortgage market in greater 
detail. If  we examine the individuals demand for mortgage stock as represented by 
equation (2.16') we find that the user cost of mortgages has fallen to such a low 
level (as a result of house price inflation and MIRAS) that demand is £55,225m, or
72.5 % of total wealth. Interest payments would equate to 26 % of the individuals 
pre tax income (rIfnbHmb I which compares to a figure of just under 4 % at
the end of the base run. Clearly lenders would be uneasy with aggregate debt levels 
so high. In a deregulated mortgage market they would supply (given pre tax 
incomes) £17,394m worth of mortgage stock (by equation (2.16)) or 22.8 % of total 
wealth. Imposing rationing by reducing the loan to income multiple in equation 
(2.16) (effectively a lengthening of the mortgage queue) takes the actual mortgage 
stock to £13,046m or 17.1 % of total wealth. Whilst rationing is significant, 
reducing the mortgage stock that would otherwise have been lent by one quarter, the 
largest discontinuity between mortgage demand and supply occurs as a result of the 
building societies optimal lending limits.
We can now broaden the results of this analysis by examining the effects of 
rationing on the whole model. Without any changes in taxation or inflation, 
economic growth results in the ratio K/H of 1.12, our relative price environment 
takes this ratio to 0.87 while rationing has offset this to a position closer to the 
values of 1965 (on a sector basis). Rationing has reduced a 29 % portfolio shift 
towards housing to one of a 19 % shift, in other words our model suggests that 
rationing offset about one third of the taxation and inflation bias during the period 
1965-1979.
Compared to the previous simulation the user cost of housing rises relative to the 
user cost of manufacturing (which itself rises to 40.89 % principally resulting from 
higher risk premiums). The rise in the housing user cost results from the increased 
reliance of paid up housing whose risk premium is greater than the mortgage mark 
up (hence the large rise in fl7). More generally, the reduction in v as a result of 
rationing may directly increase or decrease the housing user cost depending on 
whether the mortgage mark up is greater or less than the paid up housing risk 
premium. The risk free rate is reduced slightly as 13^ rises in response to the 
reduction in the loan to valuation ratio which falls once again, this time reaching 
33 %.
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Figure 4.3. Final Balance Sheets (£m) of the Period 3 Model.
Individuals
Short bonds 4,674 Wealth 76,122
Long bonds 4,749 Mortgages 13,009
Equity 27,572
Housing 39,127
Mortgages 13,046
Corporates
Capital 36,995 Short bonds 4,674
Long bonds 4,749
Equity 27,572
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Figure 4.4. Final Portfolio Asset Allocation. 
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Manufacturing output rises slightly to £31,502m and all real cash flows rise in 
absolute terms with the exception of MIRAS. The reduction in the quantity of 
mortgage loan stock and the mortgage rate reduces MIRAS significantly. In relative 
terms this falls from 1.9 % to 1.4 % and results in households paying relatively 
more tax than the previous simulation.
Compared to the growth simulation (Section 4.4.3.) the impact of relative price 
movements and mortgage rationing has been to engender a relative portfolio switch 
away from all assets towards paid up housing while at the same time the total value 
of real wealth has increased. The real user cost of housing has risen relatively 
owing to a higher housing risk premium and the lower loan to valuation ratio. On 
the other hand the user cost of mortgages has reduced in absolute and relative terms 
although this has had no effect on the stock of mortgages owing to rationing. All 
real cash flows have risen and as a proportion of output although these variables 
have remained remarkably constant in relation to each other although MIRAS has 
risen significantly.
Finally, we can compare some key variables to actuals over the period utilising data 
discussed in Chapter 3. During period 3 manufacturing capital stock rose by 73 % 
and for housing by just over 75 %. That is the ratio of K/H in reality was 0.97, 
in our model as we indicated above the ratio was 0.95. Over the period the average 
loan to valuation ratio was 24 % with the figure being 22 % in 1979. Our final 
figure of 33 % is close but suggest the model understated slightly the reduction in 
the proportionate stock of mortgages.
4.5. Adjusted Basic Model Simulations.
The present Section seeks to report results generated from a long run model which 
can be more fruitfully utilised in the analysis of policy simulations reported in 
Chapter 5. This is achieved by utilising the period 3 model and data as above but 
incorporating three key alterations. These are, fixing the risk free rate of interest, 
reducing the manufacturing equity variance to a more realistic level, and reducing 
real house price gains. Thus we are progressing from Section 4.4. where the 
objective was to produce results from a long run model parameterised to reflect that 
period. The results from the current Section therefore represent benchmarks for 
comparison with those discussed in Chapter 5 and are reported in Section E of the 
Results Appendix and follow a similar rationale to that described in Section 4.4.1. 
Given the similarity of these results to those reported in Section 4.4. it is 
unnecessary to describe each result to the same degree, but rather to expose the 
main differences and re-emphasise the general trends.
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4.5.1. Model and Parameter Adjustments.
While the effect of maintaining the real user costs of capital constant in the face of 
altered inflation expectations provided an insight into the interest rate pressures 
resulting from taxation and inflation this mechanism has been replaced. Principally, 
this decision stems from the premise that international flows of funds increasingly 
dominate domestic interest rates throughout the world. In order to compare policy 
simulations, which should be forward looking, it will be easier to expose these by 
ensuring the real risk free interest rate is constant.
Over the period 1965 to 1979 the real risk free rate fluctuated greatly and was 
negative overall in real terms. This is not consistent with long run equilibria and 
we therefore impose a real rate of 0.9 %, the figure as at 1965, thus when general 
inflation rises to 9 % the risk free rate is 9.9 %. During our relative price 
simulations it is no longer necessary to weight the expected price series as the real 
user costs are not being kept constant. We therefore take the average of X* and x*  
which is 9.9 % and thus the risk free rate of interest is fixed at 10.8 %. The 
model changes consist of taking i out of the recursive block and to fixing it like any 
other parameter, determining i in the initialisation is also unnecessary.
We noted in Section 3.2.3.2. that the turbulent economic conditions during the 
1970's had resulted in an unusually high manufacturing equity variance measure. 
Utilising this as a representation of the period is justifiable but this becomes difficult 
in a long run model. The long run figure found by Siegel and Kaplan (1989) (who 
utilise the same data source as the present study for o 2e )  was 0.07, closer to our 
period 1 figure. This figure represents a more accurate long run measure and is 
used in the following simulations.
Following the same reasoning, we allowed the real value of the housing stock to rise 
by 2.75 % p.a. in the unadjusted model. Again this could be argued to be 
exceptional and therefore in the relative price simulations we reduce this increase to
1.75 % p .a ., concomitant with house price inflation expectations.
Having introduced these alterations at the appropriate times in the initialisation 
procedure the model specific parameters, otk, ah, am and Cw, were found and are 
reported in the Results Appendix Section E. The model was shocked such that the 
increase in output (Y) was equivalent to that reported in Section 4.4.3. Again, all 
parameters remained constant unless otherwise stated.
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4.5.2. Summary of Results.
For comparison we present the initial balance sheet values in Figure 4.5. and the 
individuals portfolio asset split in Figure 4.6. The user cost of manufacturing 
capital has fallen to 23.62 %, solely as a result of the reduction in o 2e .  This is 
reflected in the fall of a 2 to 0.235 in the classic system and 0.198 in the imputation 
system, the other parameters remain as reported in Section 4.4.2. More specifically, 
the risk premium required from manufacturing equity has fallen from 22.4 % to
10.5 %, a more realistic long run rate. The user cost of housing capital is 3.85 % 
and for mortgages is 2.96 %. Tax paid by the personal sector is £6,932m, while 
the manufacturing sector pays £l,366m . Retained earnings are £l,210m  and MIRAS 
is £334m while disposable income is £11,214m.
The main difference in the model is the reduction in the real user cost of 
manufacturing capital, this also reduces the value of manufacturing's income share 
ak. The indirect effect of this is to increase the loan to valuation ratio as individuals 
incomes rise. Naturally this shifts the proportion of tax paid further towards 
households although MIRAS rises by 39 %. These general shifts are maintained 
throughout the simulations, thus for example, although the loan to valuation ratio 
falls in all simulations its low is 49.6 % compared to 33.2 % in the unadjusted 
rationed run.
The extent of portfolio shifts (apart from the housing split) are similar and we find 
63>K, x  =  -0*12 while 63>h ,x  ^ ses t0 0-12. The effect o f fixing the real rate of 
interest is marginal, the largest divergence occurring in the rationed simulation. 
Similarly, the reduction in the rate of growth of the real value of the stock of 
housing has made little difference to asset allocation, primarily as the real user cost 
of housing capital rises less. We find that the elasticity ^ ( U C ^ /U Q J /d X  remains 
positive. Clearly the greater income share enjoyed by individuals has caused a 
significant increase in the ratio of net taxes paid by individuals compared to 
manufacturing. A similar effect is evident in all other real cash flows although 
directions of change match the unadjusted period. Figure 4.7. and 4.8. show the 
individuals balance sheet and portfolio asset split for the final simulation of the 
adjusted base model.
The key result of the model alterations is the reduction in ak and the subsequent 
increase in all variables which are a function of individual income. The user cost of 
manufacturing is less sensitive to the cost of equity and the user cost ratio's 
generally fall. The ratio K/H becomes 0.97 in the final rationed simulation. As
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Figure 4.5. Initial Balance Sheet (£m) of the Adjusted Period 3 Model.
Individuals
Short bonds 2,843 Wealth 45,000
Long bonds 2,888 Mortgages 11,214
Equity 16,769
Housing 22,500
Mortgages 11,214
Corporates
Capital 22,500 Short bonds 2,843
Long bonds 2,888
Equity 16,769
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Figure 4.6. Initial Portfolio Asset Allocation. 
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Figure 4.7. Final Balance Sheet (£m) of the Adjusted Period 3 Model.
Individuals
Short bonds 4,339 Wealth 69,648
Long bonds 4,409 Mortgages 17,519
Equity 25,598
Housing 35,302
Mortgages 17,519
Corporates
Capital 34,346 Short bonds 4,339
Long bonds 4,409
Equity 25,598
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Figure 4.8. Final Portfolio Asset Allocation. 
Adjusted Period 3 Model.
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with the unadjusted model, we find that the elasticity €3>(K/H),X> ^ 3 ,(K /H ),x /i 
6 3,(K /H ),r  are negative in both models. Greater familiarity with these results 
will occur as comparisons in Chapter 5 unfold.
4.6. Conclusion.
In the present Chapter we have discussed the methodology utilised in order to run 
comparative simulations with the basic model. The rationale for all results reported 
in the Results Appendix was provided and these were then utilised to explain the 
characteristics of the model. A selection of results were discussed which 
comparedsimulations to a base growth simulation as well as the differences arising 
from the period 1 and 2 environments. The selection of these results focussed on 
taxation, inflation, risk and capital markets. While comparing the results various 
methods of analysing the model were discussed when appropriate. The completion 
of this Section left us in a position to explore the simulations of the base model for 
period 3.
During period 3 simulations the model was cumulatively altered to demonstrate the 
effects of economic growth, general inflation, relative price inflation and mortgage 
rationing. The results were a general switch towards manufacturing followed by two 
successive portfolio switches towards housing with rationing correcting around one 
third of the bias. Anecdotal evidence in the form of actual real sector growth 
supports this assertion (Section 4.4.6.). In all simulations there was a reduction in 
the loan to valuation ratio, that is, paid up housing played an increasing part in 
individuals portfolio's, in particular, while the response of individuals to rationing 
was to increase K/H they also invested in housing increasingly by outright purchase 
(or by not reallocating gains made because of inflation). The real user cost of 
housing and manufacturing rose while the user cost of mortgages fell. Real cash 
flows tended to rise and remain relatively stable as a proportion of real output. 
Without rationing the allocative bias towards owner occupied housing would clearly 
have been worse, but even so there is a case for arguing that portfolio asset 
allocation could have contributed to the productivity slowdown (Section 1.4.8.1.). 
Indeed if we look back from the rationed to the unrationed state this is representative 
of the main change between the present model and one representative of the 1980's, 
taking the ratio K/H from 0.94 to 0.87, a trend witnessed in the 1980's.
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The final set of results reported represent the basic period 3 model adjusted in order 
to provide a base which more accurately forms an environment with which to model 
and compare policy simulations in Chapter 5. Having explored the characteristics of 
the adjusted model we are now in a position to discuss and implement policy 
simulations centering around our discussions in Section 1.4.10.
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5. POLICY SIMULATIONS.
5.1. Introduction.
The objective of the present Chapter is to utilise the model framework established in 
Section 4.5. in order to assess the main implications of a selection of alternative 
taxation policy reforms. The selection of such reforms is based on the discussion 
regarding the policy debate in each sector presented in Chapter 1 (Sections, 1.3.8.1. 
and 1.3.9.1.) and are designed to favour investment in the manufacturing sector and 
hopefully obtain a degree of fiscal neutrality across economic environments. In 
order to demonstrate the model's flexibility, while keeping the results reported 
manageable, a selection of four taxation reforms are presented. Prior to describing 
these, a discussion of the results format and model methodology is provided. We 
also describe various policy options which are not tax reform specific but give 
examples of alternative modelling ideas. We then present each of the four options 
modelled in turn, including the necessary model alterations. The policies actually 
modelled represent an eclectic mixture of plausible housing reforms and an example 
of reform of the taxation of manufacturing returns at both the personal and corporate 
level. The results are discussed for each set of simulations together in order to better 
facilitate comparative analysis. Finally, a discussion of the conclusions is presented.
5.2. Methodology.
The purpose of this Section is to outline the results format which relates to this 
Chapter and discuss some of the restrictions typically found when introducing policy 
switches into simulation models.
5.2.1. Results Format.
As described in Section 4.2.1.1. the model specific parameters (eg. ak and ah) 
remain constant throughout all policy simulations. The parameters are those derived 
from the adjusted model and are contained in Section E of the Results Appendix.
The initial values of each policy simulation are presented in the first page of Section 
F of the Results Appendix to aid comparison and these are followed by the results 
of each policy simulation. The results follow a similar methodology to those used in 
Section D and E of the Results Appendix, described in Section 4.4.1. with the only 
addition being the inclusion of the real user cost of manufacturing parameters as 
these change if the manufacturing tax structure changes.
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5.2.2. Limitations of Simulation Results.
We have argued that the model specification outlined in Chapter 2 and extended in 
Chapter 4 is relatively comprehensive and flexible, the results of which can be 
analysed in reasonable detail. As with any economic or econometric model our 
model does have limitations which qualify our results . The limitations of a 
computational simultaneous solution model such as the one presented in this research 
is touched on by Fullerton and Henderson (1987, pp. 426). Principally, the model 
accounts for the effect of policy changes on two sectors and five assets, but not the 
economy as a whole. We therefore omit the possibility of feedback from other areas 
of the economy such the as consumer sector. Like all models, in order to trace the 
origin of results a degree of simplification is required. Thus for example, a change 
in taxation policy which neutralised the corporates incentive to raise finance from 
debt (eg. the ACE system described in Section 5.3.4.) may result in the corporates 
debt to equity ratio (b) adjusting. Given this is not a model variable we cannot 
simulate any possible movement in b although we could impose a 'likely change' 
exogenously, but choose not to do so as institutional factors such as those discussed 
in Section 1.2.4.1.2. may well continue to exert a greater influence than purely tax 
efficiency. All of our policy simulations follow the growth, inflation and rationing 
paths of the base runs presented in Chapter 4. To maintain the comparative nature 
of the model we do not, for example, reduce the real house price gains in the face 
of a housing tax although this could easily be achieved. Finally, the policy changes 
implemented are not necessarily presented on the grounds of "fairness" or 
"simplicity" and may even represent extreme cases where a more pragmatic solution 
would achieve a result between the policy results as presented and the base case.
Other than the tax reforms presented the model runs are treated in the same way as 
the effective base simulations (discussed in Section 4.5.). The policy simulations are 
therefore conducted in a comparative manner with all changes clearly indicated.
5.3. Policy Options.
The object of the following Section is to outline the methodology of those policy 
options incorporated in this Chapter. The model's flexibility allows us to simulate 
most of the aggregate fiscal reforms for each sector discussed in Section's 1.4.10.3. 
and 1.4.10.9. Each policy reform could also be analysed with varying economic 
environments, for example, the low inflation, high real interest rate scenario typical 
of members of the Exchange Rate Mechanism in the late 1980's and early 1990's. 
For comparative reasons however we maintain the economic environment presented 
in Section 4.5. An obvious simulation may have been to look at the effects of the
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Community Charge which not only reduces the user cost of housing, but would 
increase the general rate of inflation as a result of its inclusion in the retail price 
index as a non revenue neutral substitute for domestic rates (see Roseman, 1989). 
The transitory nature of this reform however precludes it from being of major 
interest. For the purposes of the present research four policy reforms have been 
chosen, two specific to the owner occupied sector and two relating to manufacturing. 
The subsequent discussion outlines in more detail the rationale underlying the 
reforms modelled and presents all structural model alterations and, if  necessary, any 
parameter changes. The results are discussed in Section 5.4.
5.3.1. Abolition of MIRAS.
The key points to the debate regarding the abolition of MIRAS are contained in 
Section 1.3.8 .2.1. This reform is of interest because MIRAS has been attributed by 
those expounding the reform of owner occupied taxation as a central problem of the 
fiscal treatment of housing, particularly when mixed with high inflation. It is also a 
practical policy option at the aggregate level (although some help for new entrants to 
the housing market may be justified) and one which is already taking effect as the 
real value of the relief diminishes thus avoiding the dichotomy between economic 
theory and political reality (see Section 1.4.3.). For simplicity and ease of 
comparison we have not assumed any reduction in the rate o f income tax (the value 
o f which would currently allow a reduction in the basic rate o f income tax of 2.75 
pence, Dilnot and Johnson (1992)) or the more preferable option of a direct subsidy
or tax credit (Buckley and Ermisch, 1982, pp. 296).
The implications of applying this reform to our model are straightforward, equation 
(2.50) becomes,
T^mba — T g n b , (5.1)
and therefore equation (2.51) can be written as,
Tgnb =  i +  mp. (5.2)
Substituting equation (5.2) into equation (2.49), after simplification, provides the 
required return from owner occupied housing as,
rh =  i +  vmp +  (l-v JR ^flP ^^ /W . (5.3)
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Consequently the housing user cost parameters which enter directly into equation
(2.53) become,
Ri =  1, 
fl2 =  V,
R3 =  (l-vjRcr2/*^,
P>4 =  5h - +  $ h.
The user cost of mortgage stock also increases as a result of the exclusion of 
MIRAS, equation (2.17") becomes,
UCm =  p [i +  mp +  8* - (5.4)
The real taxation cash flow equations require to be altered to reflect the change in 
the taxation system. This involves the removal of the MIRAS term in the household 
tax equations, (2.56) and (2.57).
Other complementary changes to the model are the removal of the MIRAS equation
(2.54), its initialisation and its presence in the recursive block. The model 
effectively determines one less variable and possesses one less equation.
5.3.2. Abolition of MIRAS and Tax Paid Up Housing.
The introduction of a tax on the value of a property or the associated land value has 
been discussed in Section 1.3.8 .2.2. This option is regarded as more practical than 
the taxation of capital gains although less so them abolishing MIRAS because of the 
lack of actual cash flow. The flexibility of our model allows us to modify this in 
the manner suggested by King and Atkinson (1980, pp. 13), namely, to tax the 
imputed income from the non debt funded proportion of the house. This differs 
from most commentators who generally suggest taxing the imputed income from the 
entire market value of the house regardless of the households funding situation. Our 
simulation differs from King and Atkinson's (1980) proposal however in that we 
continue the abolition of MIRAS because maintaining MIRAS while taxing imputed 
income on the proportion of the house which is not financed by debt would further 
distort the choice of funding towards debt. As it is, our policy is effectively 
providing tax relief on that part of the housing stock which would otherwise be 
subject to income tax. Such a system would break the link between housing
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investment (particularly through debt), inflation and taxation while providing some 
help to those who are highly geared (many of whom will be at early stages of the 
housing ladder).
Maintaining rates which are also a function of a house's market value does not 
represent an inconsistency as tenants in the rental sector were also subject to this tax 
(King and Atkinson, 1980, pp, 13). We assume that imputed income is 4 % of the 
value of the paid up house which is slightly higher than the typical policy figures 
quoted in Section 1.3.8 .2.2. as a consequence of the debt/paid up polarisation which 
effectively reduces the tax base.
The impact of this policy on the model is as follows. Equations (5.1) and (5.2) 
continue to hold as in Section 5.3.1. We introduce a new parameter, IY, which 
represents that proportion of the imputed income which is assumed to arise from 
fully paid up housing stock (IY is assumed to equal 4 % as discussed above). The 
difference between the post (r^>da) and pre tax return from paid up housing can be 
written as,
Tfjpda = ( l-G IY )^ ^ . (5.5)
Thus equation (2.51') becomes,
i,fd  = [i +  Ro W  HWW]/(1-0IY). (5.6)
Incorporating equations (5.6) and (5.2) into the total required return from housing,
(equation (2.52)) and simplifying we obtain the new user cost parameters,
J37 =  v +  ( l-v )/( l-0 IY ),
B2 =  v,
=  [(1-v)Rct2hpj]/(1-0IY ),
il4 = 5h - X* +  4^.
The user cost of mortgage stock remains equal to equation (5.4). Again the real 
cash flow equations to be affected are those defining household taxation. This 
additional tax takes the form (l-v)GIYpH and with MIRAS excluded we can show 
the changes under the classical system, for example, by rewriting equation (2.56) as,
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TX*C = 6(Y - 5*K - T X k - RE)
+  ^ (R E  +  x*qE) +  ($h +  (1-v) 0IY)pH, (5.7)
the same changes are made to TXW. Changes to the model are the same as those
discussed in Section 5.3.1. with the alteration of the relevant equations and
declaration of IY representing the only additional modifications.
5.3.3. Super Personal Equity Plan
We now move to the taxation of manufacturing returns, in this case focusing on the 
taxation of the individual. The Super Personal Equity Plan (PEP) is a method of 
abolishing taxes paid by the personal sector on manufacturing investment returns.
We have already assumed that the return from bonds are tax free (Section 2 .4 .6 .2.) 
and thus we concentrate on equities. The regime is closer to the imputation system 
than the classical system but capital gains are not taxed twice. An other way of 
looking at this policy is that we utilise the user cost of manufacturing capital to the 
corporate, UC*.
This simulation is also of particular interest as it effectively models the investment 
allocation decisions of tax free investment vehicles such as pension or life assurance 
funds. This taxation regime therefore is of interest given the possibility of 
alternative tax bases, pointed out by Ermisch (1988) (see Section 2 .2 .2 .). Finally, it 
would also be simple to incorporate the assumption that only a proportion of 
individuals returns from manufacturing are tax free (the actual position of PEP's at 
the moment) although this is not incorporated in the present study and therefore the 
current and base simulations offer boundary limits to contemporary policy.
The absence of taxation at the personal sector level on manufacturing equity means 
that
rEa =  rE ' ( 5 * 8 )
Although UC* is represented by equation (2.39), this requires to be modified to 
allow for the tax deductability of corporate interest payments and the split between 
short and long dated debt and equity. We therefore continue to utilise equation 
(2.45), given that U C ^ =  UCfc, the required return from the manufacturing capital, 
b(rfi) +  (l-b)r£ becomes,
h  =  i +  [b(l-z)Rcr2i i  +  (l-b)R<r2ir] qK/W. (5.9)
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Substituting (5.9) into (2.45) provides corporate user cost parameters of,
cr, = (l-A)b + (l-A)(l-b)/(l-r),
“ 2 =  [b(l-z)R a2ii> +  (1-b) R£r%] (l-A )/(l-r), 
a ,  =  [(1-A) ( l-Mj ] / ( l - r ) ,
a 4 =  (l-A )/(l-r)5* +
We maintain the classical system assumption that =  (0.5)r  rather than \xp on the
basis that the government is likely to be less generous in the taxation of corporates 
in order to recover some revenue. This rationale could extend to a reduction in A 
although this is not assumed in the present simulations.
Taxation paid by corporates in cash flow terms is equivalent to equation (2.55). 
Again, as the changes are at the personal sector level we require to respecify the 
taxation cash flow paid by households which is reduced by the inclusion of tax free 
dividends and the exclusion of capital gains payments, thus,
T X h = e(Y-5*K - TX* - RE - Dnd)
- MIRAS +  $pH. (5.10)
Apart from the above model changes, the other major difference is that there is no 
change of taxation regime during the simulation.
5.3.4. Allowance for Corporate Equity.
The Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) system is based on a proposal by the 
Capital Taxes Group of the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS). The complete system 
is reported in IFS (1991) and the following regime represents a simplification of one 
of the main taxation outcomes of the study. As the name suggests, the central 
concept is to put corporate equity on a similar footing with debt in that an allowance 
set against corporation tax can be made for the cost of equity finance. The result is 
that the corporate becomes unconcerned as to its source of finance. The IFS argue 
(IFS, 1991, pp. 4) that this removes the need for the imputation of corporation tax 
to the owners of that capital. In reality, the actual user cost of capital may rise or 
fall depending on any changes in the rules regarding investment allowances and 
capital gains tax.
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The present modelling exercise focuses on the taxation of the corporate rather than 
the personal sector. Although this modification could be carried out in a PEP 
environment (see IFS, 1991, pp. 6 ) we shall assume that the classical system 
remains thus adding to the comparative nature of the results. We also assume that 
capital gains allowances against corporation tax are withdrawn and consequently \ik 
=  r. This assumption does not induce us to impose the relationship b =  0.5 
because of the capital market information problems discussed in Section 1.2.4.1.1.
The concept and practicalities of the allowance are such that companies can deduct 
the opportunity cost to the shareholders of the capital invested in the company just 
as if it had been lent to it. In practical terms this means calculating notional interest 
payments made at the real interest rate on the current value of shareholders funds. 
The matter is not therefore as straight forward as to allow the total cost, r£, to be 
offset against corporation tax, not least as the market value of the firm can differ 
substantially from the capital invested in it as represented by shareholders funds and 
accumulated retained earnings.
As a practical solution, the IFS (1991, pp. 27) suggest that the equity allowance be 
measured by a suitable proxy, a medium-term gilt. We define the return obtained 
from such a gilt, rG, as,
rG =  i +  gp, (5.11)
where gp represents the premium over the risk free rate required from a gilt edged 
security. We shall assume that the gilt premium is equal to the corporate long debt 
premium in 1965, thus
gp =  b( 1 -z)R<t2i£(K/W) , (5.12)
which equals 0.5 %. That gp < mp is supported by inspection of the mortgage 
rate and the yield on 20 year gilts (see Economic Trends, 1990, pp. 213).
In the model the required return from equity becomes r£ - rG. The difference 
between r£ and vEa remains that of the classical system and we can therefore re-write 
r£ by utilising equation (2.43) and introducing rG, thus,
xE = [i-<Ke-JuP'T'*+R<r2i;qE /w ]/(l-x) - rG. (5.13)
Substituting (5.13) into equation (2.44) (ignoring the classical subscript as this 
becomes irrelevant) then we find that the user cost parameters become,
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a ,  =  (l-A)b +  [(l-A )(l-b)/(l-x)(l-r)]
- (l-A )(l-b )/(l-r),
a 2 =  (l-A)(l-z)bRo-2Lt +
[(l-A )(l-b)R <rV (l-x)(l-T )],
a, = [(l-A X l-^ + 0(l-A)(l-b)(e-Mp)/
( l-x )] /( l- r) ,
a 4 =  (l-A )(l-r)5 t +  <bk - (l-A )(l-b)gp/(l-r).
On this occasion it is the manufacturing taxation cash flow which requires to be 
altered. Manufacturing tax payments are reduced by offsetting rG against corporation 
tax. The corporate tax payment becomes,
TXt =  r [ a tY-(8t  +  br* +  (l-b )rG
-(1-t)$*+QA)K] + K. (5.14)
As with equation (2.55) Dnd has no representation as this is similar to the classical 
system.
In summary, the required model changes include the equation respecifications 
displayed above, the declaration of gp and its parameterisation. The CGT rate is 
also increased and like the Super PEP simulation, one corporate tax system exists 
throughout the simulation.
5.4. Results Format.
The results o f each simulation in this Chapter can stand alone in comparison with 
the base run (the adjusted model presented in Section 4.5.). However, it is more 
fruitful to analyse these as competing policies. To facilitate this we shall compare 
the results of the four policy regimes using a natural division of the results. The 
first Section is perhaps the main one of the study, namely the portfolio asset 
allocations. Following this, we shall interpret and compare the real user costs, the 
user cost parameters, and finally the real cash flow outcomes of the policies.
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5.4.1. Portfolio Asset Allocation.
At the sectoral level each policy should result in a shift of resources towards 
manufacturing away from owner occupied housing compared to the base run. It is 
possible to obtain the opposite allocative shift, but in the present framework we 
would not expect the relative housing share to increase as each policy is designed to 
favour such a shift. Table 5.1 complements the portfolio asset results by providing 
the sector split K/H for each simulation under the separate policy regimes. As we 
would expect, the condition K/Hbase/K/HpS <  1 holds (where the subscript ps 
represents a policy simulation).
In relative terms the largest sectoral re-allocation occurs when MIRAS is excluded 
and imputed housing income is taxed, although excluding MIRAS alone has an 
almost equally powerful effect. Under these conditions the higher taxation (lack of 
subsidy) of housing, the higher income elasticity of manufacturing and a constant 
real rate of interest reduce the attractiveness o f housing as an investment, even under 
inflationary conditions. Consequently we find 6 3?h w/,-7t<? €3  a
change of sign from the base model. The bias in favour of housing owing to the 
combination of taxation and inflation has been reversed. Factors such as the real 
gain made by manufacturing at the expense of debt holders now have more effect in 
helping manufacturing investment when inflation rises. Rationing under both 
housing taxation policies had no effect on the results as H"ui<H "“ throughout all 
economic environments.
The exclusion of MIRAS has resulted in a voluntary fall in v, that is a switch away 
from the mortgage asset towards all other assets. This naturally increases the risk 
premium attached to other assets. For example p E rises from 8.32 % in the growth 
simulation of the adjusted model to 9.09 % and p^>a similarly rises by 0.12 % to 
0.79 %. By the final run of the respective simulations, p E has risen to 9.28 % 
compared to 7.71 % in the base run while p ^ a  has fallen from 1.46 % to 1.04 % 
reflecting manufacturing's increased dominance as inflation rises. When imputed 
income is taxed the switch is completely towards manufacturing assets and v rises as 
we would expect. Again, a similar pattern of risk premia responses is evident, 
though slightly magnified. At the base level, the growth environment p E becomes 
equal to 9.11 % while p ^ a  is 0.76 % and these figures diverge at the final run, 
becoming 9.4 % and 1 % respectively. Although v is higher under the relative 
inflation simulation compared to the base rationed case, this is because the demand 
for paid up housing is lowered in this policy simulation. Finally, the ratio of 
mortgages to paid up housing is relatively unchanged across the base, Super PEP 
and ACE simulations.
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Table 5.1. K/H Matrix.
Growth
Base run 1.13
Exclude MIRAS 1.38
Tax imputed 
income and exclude 
MIRAS 1.40
Super PEP 1.17
ACE System 1.20
General Relative Rationing
Inflation Inflation
0.91 0.82 0.97
1.65 1.46
1.67 1.49
0.92 0.82 0.97
0.93 0.83 0.99
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The relative effects of the Super PEP and ACE systems also encouraged greater 
investment in manufacturing, particularly the ACE system. The magnitude of this 
swing is reduced as inflation is introduced into the system (we have increased 
manufacturing CGT particularly in the ACE system). We find the elasticity 6 3 j j >7re 
becomes positive again and the boost to manufacturing investment is therefore 
dependent on a low and stable inflation environment. That is, there has not been a 
total offset of the link between inflation and housing investment and therefore these 
policies, while promoting manufacturing investment under low and stable inflationary 
conditions, cannot compete with the favorable taxation of housing as inflation rises. 
There are two further points which should be noted when analysing the allocative 
impact of the manufacturing policies. Generally, the change in allocation would 
have been greater if the classical system of taxation had been prevalent throughout. 
As it is, there is no boost to manufacturing investment during the period which the 
introduction of the imputation system gave in the base runs. More specific to each 
policy, while the Super PEP reduces tax to the personal sector there is no reduction 
in the CGT rate from 23.36 % to 15 % for manufacturing as with the base run. 
Similarly, we utilised the ACE system to equate the taxation of income and capital 
gains at the corporate level, thus CGT paid rose significantly, being levied at 46.27 
% over the entire period. For example, this latter effect would have increased 
manufacturing CGT paid in the final simulation of the base run from £428m to 
£l,321m  (using, ^ t ^ K ) ,  a three fold increase. Had CGT in both systems not been 
made more restrictive, the allocative impact of inflation towards housing would not 
have been so large, and may have been reversed under the ACE system.
Each asset elasticity with respect to the general rate of inflation changes sign 
compared to the same base run simulation in the first two policy switches. For 
example, in the exclusion of MIRAS simulation €3 >e,x* becomes 0.08 compared to - 
0.12 and € 3 H"1* t* t 0  “0-12 compared to 0.04. General inflation also changes 
the sign of 6 3 V 7re from negative in the base run to slightly positive and results 
from the user cost of mortgages falling slightly faster than the general housing user 
cost. When imputed income is also taxed, the signs remain the same as the 
simulation excluding MIRAS. The magnitudes also remain similar with the obvious 
change being the increase of € 3 r^om to -0.14 when imputed income is
taxed. The advantage conferred to manufacturing equities of the latter two policy 
switches is ineffectual under conditions of general inflation and real housing 
inflation. Indeed in the ACE system 6 3 e >7r<? rises to -0.14 from -0.12 principally 
as a result of our CGT assumptions which explains the higher than base K/H at the 
growth simulation which becomes almost equal to the base simulation by the time 
rationing is introduced.
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Under the manufacturing policy regimes rationing, like the base run, constrains the 
equilibrium mortgage stock. The final simulation produces an almost exact match 
between the base portfolio and the Super PEP portfolio. The ACE system is also 
similar although the distribution between UPd and manufacturing assets is skewed 
towards manufacturing.
5.4.2. Real User Costs of Capital.
Throughout all of our policy simulations we find that U C ^ >  UCAfl and UCto >  
UCm. We can therefore assume that if a taxation regime reduces either or both 
ratio's U C ^/U Cha and U C^/U Cm then the tax system is reducing the allocative bias 
towards housing. Whether it is optimal for this ratio to converge as a result of 
U C ^ falling, XJCha or UCW rising, or both, is a separate issue.
As expected the ratios are lower, for equivalent shocks, in all policy regimes 
compared to the base simulation and in general the ratio's move together. Table 5.2 
is presented in order to clearly demonstrate the effect o f alternative policies on the 
user cost of capital, particularly as inflation rises. The main divergence from the 
base simulation occurs during the housing policy simulations when the user cost of 
mortgages does not fall when inflation rises as in the base runs because the MIRAS 
subsidy is excluded and the real rate of interest is constant. The mortgage rate rises 
from 4.7 % in the growth simulation base run to 6.6 % when MIRAS is excluded. 
U C ^ rises by 1.5 % while UCm follows a similar pattern, rising by 1.9 %. Very 
little separates U C ^ and UCm under these conditions, the only important change 
being that p^>d >  mp (ie. i^pH/W  >  ft2mp). This margin widens again as the 
taxation of imputed income is introduced and produces the smallest ratios of 
U C ^/U C ^ despite the rise in p E. The effect of taxing imputed income is to 
increase the required return from paid up housing under the growth simulation from 
6.27 % to 6.46 % (using equations (5.52') and (5.57)).
Introducing general inflation we find, unsurprisingly, that ^ ( U C ^ /U C ^ x *  >  0 
and €3?(U C ^/U C ^),(x^-x*) < 0 over simulations. The same signs are prevalent 
during the base, Super PEP and ACE simulations although €3j(UCJta/UCm),(iri/,- 7r*) 
looks relatively large at over 7 in the base, Super PEP and ACE simulations the 
user cost of mortgages is actually ineffectual in the model, as individuals face a 
binding constraint and consequently using this elasticity would be misleading. This 
latter trend is not reflected in the housing policy simulations although the elasticity 
with respect to x* is positive it is significantly smaller at 0.08 for the excluding 
MIRAS simulation compared to 0.79 for the base simulation. Similarly, the 
elasticity of the ratio UC^/UC^ with respect to real house prices becomes equal to -
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Table 5.2. Real User Cost Paths (% ).
Growth General
Inflation
Base run
UC
UC
UC.
ka
ha
21.66
3.86
2.96
21.35
3.26
1.69
Exclude MIRAS
UC*, 22.64 24.21
\JCha 5.35 5.27
U O . 4.90 N/C
Tax imputed 
income and exclude 
MIRAS
22.67 24.29
5.38 5.32
4.90 N/C
ucAo
UC,„
Super PEP
U C ^ 20.89 20.28
\JCha 3.85 3.25
UCm 2.96 1.69
ACE System
U C ^ 20.82 18.14
\JCha 3.82 3.22
UCm 2.96 1.69
Relative
Inflation
22.54
3.64
0.74
25.45
5.92
5.16
25.57
6.00
5.16
21.39
3.63
0.74
18.48
3.60
0.74
Rationing
23.41
4.18
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
22.20
4.17
N/C
19.51
4.13
N/C
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0.01 during the abolition of MIRAS simulation as opposed to -0.2 in the base 
period. This highlights the importance MIRAS played in determining UCm and 
consequently the significant effects which can be achieved if the MIRAS subsidy is 
eliminated. On the other hand the advantages of the ACE system over the Super 
PEP as inflation rises are clear. The ratio U C ^/U C ^ are greater under the ACE 
system at the initial and growth simulation stage but as inflation increases this trend 
reverses.
5.4.3. Real User Cost of Capital Parameters
The purpose of this Section is to utilise the user cost of capital parameters to further 
elucidate the effect the tax reforms have on the real user costs. Jli to R3 inclusive 
are of course variables in the model where as R4 and a 1 to a 4 are parameters. 
Naturally changes in the taxation of owner occupied housing will not effect a2 to a4 
and changes in manufacturing tax will not effect R4 while any effect on R3 to 
should be slight.
The main determinant in any changes of Jli to R3 derives as a result o f a movement 
in the loan to valuation ratio. As v falls (its typical trend in the present simulations) 
Rj rises along with R3 while R2 falls. As we would expect the elimination of 
MIRAS raises R2 to over all simulations, the latter rising not because of any 
direct tax implications but as a result of the subsequent fall in v. Additionally, 
taxing imputed income results in R3 to R3 rising even further. In this case, although 
v actually rises relative to the MIRAS exclusion simulation (which would tend to 
reduce 153) the tax on imputed income is enough to result in a rise in None of 
the taxation reforms effects depreciation, capital gains or rates and therefore R4 
remains unchanged for tax reasons compared to base over all policy simulations.
Turning to the effects of the reforms of manufacturing taxation. The effects on 13i 
to R4 are minimal for both the Super PEP and the ACE reforms. Under the Super 
PEP case all a 's  except a 4 fall and under the ACE system all fall with the exception 
of ot2‘ Taking the Super PEP case, the exclusion of personal taxation of 
manufacturing returns effects the structure of a3 and a 2 and the CGT term in a3.
We can tell from the fall in a3 that the effective rise in has a greater bearing 
than the elimination of personal CGT (which would increase a 3) for this particular 
parameter. The proportionate reduction in the user cost as a result of the 
elimination of capital gains to the individual is around 11 % of the base figure. On 
the other hand the reductions in oij and a 2 are more than double this number. The 
net effect is a small reduction in the user cost of manufacturing capital in absolute 
terms (just over 1 % in most simulations).
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The effect of the ACE system is slightly greater than the Super PEP albeit in 
different areas. The largest change is the almost two thirds reduction in a2 and the 
slightly less substantial fall of a4. The latter term falls as the gilt premium enters 
this equation. Like the Super PEP, the fall in ot3 as a result of an increase in CGT 
to the corporate acts to increase the user cost. Manufacturing CGT is most severe 
in this reform and as the structure of a3 does not change its fall is solely a result of 
the effective CGT increase. The equality of corporation and CGT makes the firm 
indifferent to making returns in the form of capital gains or income and is 
complementary to an allowance for corporate equity. The split between 
manufacturing and housing would be more in favour of the former if the policy 
towards CGT remained unchanged and a3 would be equivalent to the base run. The 
ACE system, despite this, lowers the user cost below that achieved under the Super 
PEP regime.
5.4.4. Real Cash Flows.
The most noticeable cash flow offset across the policy reforms is the absence of 
MIRAS in the first two sets of policy. This reduces the elasticity of household tax 
with respect to inflation from a base measure of -0.05 to 0.02. When imputed 
income is also taxed the elasticity rises marginally. The elasticity with respect to 
real house prices is positive and almost equal with the base run. As a result of the 
exclusion of MIRAS and the taxation of imputed income individuals disposable 
income falls by between one and two percent in real terms depending on the 
economic conditions.
The effect on manufacturing policy displays the essence of the tax incidence of the 
Super PEP and ACE system. As we would expect the proportion of household 
taxation paid falls with the introduction of the Super PEP but as the size of 
manufacturing capital stock rises, tax paid by this sector also increases. Although 
the government balance falls in absolute terms there is a clear shift o f incidence 
towards corporates, a pattern which is reversed when corporates can offset the cost 
of equity. We should note that the rationing which occurs in both of these 
simulations restrains the incidence shift. MIRAS remains constant throughout as a 
proportion of income for both of these policies. While the Super PEP is more 
favourable with respect to individual disposable income, both regimes result in this 
falling compared to the base run.
An important result is contained in the relative cash flow movements in the face of 
general inflation during the manufacturing tax policies. If we compare the base 
elasticity, ^ (T X ^ /T X * ) ,^  which is -0.15 to the same elasticity under the Super
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PEP this becomes -1.11. Under the ACE system however this falls back to -0.23 
and would be closer to zero but for the high corporate CGT. With the ACE system 
we can identify a policy which, although it does not subsidise corporate cash flow as 
inflation rises, it at least allows some cash flow offset compared to the Super PEP. 
Retained earnings are also much higher under the ACE system. This result is 
significant in a state where MIRAS must exist in some form, if MIRAS were 
abolished then the addition of a policy such as the Super PEP would be more 
complementary and the tax incidence become more favorable to manufacturing.
5.5. Conclusion.
The results reported above represent a fraction of possible tax reforms which could 
be imposed in our model. Within these further alterations could be made, for 
example under the ACE system where the bias to financing through debt or equity is 
eliminated we may have imposed b =  0.5. Similarly, under the Super PEP case 
where the individual becomes indifferent between returns in the form of capital gains 
or income we may have wished to impose <f> =  0.5.
Having parameterised the model for the period covering the late 1960's and 1970's 
this allows us to present comparative static (or "what if  ?") conclusions. Owing to 
the multiple corporation tax systems, and the obvious importance o f this period in 
terms of the sectors relative performance, coupled with the varied economic 
environment, this period is particularly fruitful for assessing taxation systems. The 
results are not strictly time specific as general features of each regime will, under 
various inflation or rationing environments, perform similarly today. Only the rates 
component of housing taxation has changed and while there have been various 
changes to the taxation of corporate returns (eg. the 1984 reforms, see King and 
Wookey (1987) and the introduction of PEP's) the principle o f the imputation system 
remains. Therefore the model is relevant to todays policy debate in its general 
conclusions.
The central conclusion from the results analysis is that the interaction of inflation 
and MIRAS is extremely powerful. If  MIRAS had not existed over the period then 
the need for mortgage rationing would have been eliminated. Compared to MIRAS 
the taxation of imputed income, as parameterised in our simulation which includes 
the exclusion of MIRAS, has a minor effect on portfolio asset allocation. Abolition 
of MIRAS results in corporate equity being the largest asset class over all 
simulations. Moreover, the volatility of portfolio asset allocation, user cost of 
capital ratios and real cash flows is reduced dramatically through each simulation. 
Such stabilisation should engender other benefits such as a reduction across the range
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of risk variances, thus reducing housing and manufacturing user costs. Of course 
the quid pro quo to the abolition of MIRAS is the increase in effective household 
taxation and consequent reduction in disposable income.
The results of the Super PEP and ACE system look, at first glance, unspectacular, 
however our CGT assumptions are to a large extent the source of this. The results 
show that while the manufacturing tax policies favour the allocation of assets 
towards manufacturing the existence of MIRAS negates these benefits in the face of 
inflation and rationing has an influence on the model results. Manufacturing equity 
is not always the largest asset class. Given that the Super PEP makes little difference 
in terms of asset allocation unless inflation is low, the actual PEP policy in existence 
today (which limits the extent of the tax break per person) is unlikely to have much 
effect at all and does little to correct imbalances if inflation were to rise. On the 
other hand the ACE system does have some degree of inflation protection given that 
as inflation rises the required return from equity (with gilt yields) rises and this can 
be offset against corporation tax.
From a theoretical view point the stability afforded to the model as well as the 
allocative implications favour the abolition of MIRAS. Indeed the results suggest 
that to restructure the taxation of the manufacturing sector while holding housing 
policy constant would display a degree of ambivalence on behalf of the policy 
maker. Clearly there are practical problems with this policy (see Section 1.4.3.) in 
that its abolition would lock in gains made by long standing owner occupiers at the 
expense of more recent entrants. To this extent abolishing MIRAS after ten years of 
entering the sector seems attractive and would result in a reduction of q in our 
model. If it is accepted that little can be done to housing taxation for political 
reasons then it would seem important to tax manufacturing returns in such a manner 
that the system would avoid the relative bias towards housing in the face of 
inflation. To this extent it would have been more consistent to impose the ACE 
system (preferably with the CGT rate unchanged or abolished) rather than the PEP 
regime which has been introduced. Separating policy between housing and 
manufacturing, individual and corporate acts to clarify policy implications, but this 
does not mean that policy makers need approach decision making emphasising such 
bifurcation. The structure of the model makes it clear that the interaction between 
each sector could be optimised by a mutually reinforcing policy mix which treats the 
economy as a whole rather than in individual sectors.
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6. FINAL DISCUSSION.
6.1. Introduction.
The purpose o f this research is to provide a framework with which we may expose 
the long run implications on asset allocation between the owner occupied and 
manufacturing sectors. We have argued in Chapter 1 that these sectors have 
particularly important effects on the performance of the U.K. economy. Our interest 
focussed on the long run investment implications of the interaction of inflation, 
taxation, risk and capital markets. The design of our model enabled us to isolate 
the effects of these influences on the investment process.
In Chapter 1 we discussed the theoretical principles of single project investment rules 
and reviewed the theoretical and empirical evidence of aggregate investment theories 
of the firm. This work suggested that the user cost of capital theory represented the 
optimal vehicle for our long run study. In particular this would aid the isolation of 
those parameters influencing the relative price of a capital good, the user cost of 
capital (its purchase price, cost of finance as influenced by the structure of debt to 
equity, taxation, inflation, risk premia and depreciation) whilst still accounting for 
the importance of demand. Although there have been no studies of this kind carried 
out for the U.K. a review of those studies pertaining to the U .S.A . was presented in 
Section 1.3. which concluded that the work of HH represented the most flexible 
framework from which a U.K. model could expand upon.
Chapters 2 and 3 represent the construction and parameterisation of the U.K. model. 
Contrasts with, and extensions of the HH model are discussed along with our 
parameter assumptions which utilise actual data and appropriate magnitudes obtained 
from relevant economic literature and the model solution technique. The purpose of 
Chapter 4 was to provide a framework which would test the stability o f the model 
while enhancing familiarisation with output and parameter influences and compare 
the effects of the period 1 and 2 environments. In this Chapter we also 
systematically emulate the growth, inflation and rationing conditions which prevailed 
between 1965 and 1979. Following this we modified the model in those areas 
which enhanced its long run appeal and utilised the results from this model as a 
basis for comparing the policy simulations reported in Chapter 5.
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Having obtained and discussed the results presented in Chapters 4 and 5 we shall 
summarise these below in terms of our original hypothesis and attempt to draw 
implications in the context of contemporary literature in this field. Following from 
this we outline an agenda for further work which attempts to improve on inherent 
deficiencies of the model and suggest areas for broadening the research base.
6.2. Results and Conclusion of the Present Study.
In Section 1.3.1. we presented various hypotheses and objectives with which we 
aimed to apply our model. The first results analysed in Section 4.3. provided us 
with an insight into how resource allocation between owner occupied housing and 
manufacturing investment was affected by inflation, risk, taxation and capital markets 
under conditions prevalent in the periods of the classical and imputation taxation 
systems. The effects of inflation are captured in Sections 4.3.4. and 4.3.5. along 
with the results in Section B and C of the Results Appendix which show the effects 
of reducing the general rate of inflation to zero. The effects of an increase in the 
general rate of inflation over the whole period are presented in the Results Appendix 
in Section's D and E and are discussed in Section 4.4.
The latter result provides us with the most general starting point. Our model 
supports the hypothesis that inflation biases resource allocation towards investment in 
owner occupied housing. This is consistent with other U.K. studies in this area, for 
example, King and Atkinson (1980), Buckley and Ermisch (1982) and Muellbauer 
(1990c) and the U.S.A. studies quoted in Section 1.3. This arises as housing capital 
gains represent a greater proportion of the real user cost than the manufacturing 
equivalent and because there is no taxation to mitigate any of this benefit coupled 
with the MIRAS subsidy which increased in value as inflation rose. This result is 
also consistent with that reported by HH (pp. 805), our adjusted model's (Section 
4.5) elasticity, ^ k / H ,^  being negative. In the U.S. an increase in the general 
rate of inflation from 1 % to 7 % results in a fall in the ratio, K/H, from 1.05 to 
1.01 which compares to a fall from 1.13 to 0.91 in our adjusted base model. We 
would concur with Feldstein (1982 pp. 309) that an easy money policy designed to 
stimulate investment and growth will actually act to reduce the long run productive 
capital intensity. We would add to this observation that any rise in real wealth as a 
result of inflation (or relative house price rises) is likely to boost consumption 
(especially when the mortgage market is deregulated) at a time when the relative 
ability of the economy to produce is diminished. This evidence is relevant to the 
work of those economists who argue that manufacturing capacity has been a 
constraint on the U .K .'s economic performance, for example O'Shaughnessy (1987; 
1989a,b).
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The effects of an increase in inflation during the period 1 and 2 environments are 
similar in that investment is channelled towards housing. This was particularly the 
case in the period 1 environment. There were several reasons for this, obviously the 
introduction of the imputation system in period 2 helped to relieve some of the 
allocation bias, particularly as the rate of manufacturing CGT fell. Corporate profits 
were proportionally lower in period 2 and therefore an increase in capital gains was 
of greater significance to overall corporate profitability. For similar reasons, given 
that the ratio of corporate debt to equity was higher in period 2, the real gains made 
by corporates at the expense of debtors was consequently greater when inflation 
rose. Risk premiums and the real rate of interest were also larger in period 2 and 
therefore a proportionate increase in inflation reduced the real user cost of housing 
by less than in period 1. Of these factors which made the allocative bias towards 
housing greater in period 1 the government could only directly influence the 
transition of tax regimes whose net effect was mild - we found that the initial U C^ 
was actually higher in period 2 than period 1 despite the beneficial tax change.
Although the result that inflation channels resources towards housing is not 
controversial, this is the first time that an attempt to measure the effect on resource 
allocation over the long run which contrasts with more popular short run studies 
which focus on price effects. The comparative analysis between period 1 and period 
2 is also unique and provides an idea of the labyrinth of sectoral interaction, apart 
from the taxation regime, which may influence investment allocation.
Our second hypothesis stems principally from the work of Meen (1988; 1989; 1990) 
who argues that much, if not all, of the bias towards owner occupied housing during 
the 1960's and 1970's in the U.K. was effectively offset by mortgage rationing.
Our study has disaggregated this process somewhat by differentiating between a 
binding constraint imposed by lenders under any market environment dependent on 
individuals income levels and alteration of this multiple as a rationing tool. The 
effect of the imposition of rationing is a further complication of the mortgage 
market. Our results suggest that switching mortgage market regimes does have a 
significant effect on asset allocation. This is also consistent with King (1980) who 
finds that rationing excluded about 30 % of potential entrants from the owner 
occupied sector. Using our adjusted model, (Results Appendix, Section E) growth, 
coupled with relative housing inflation in an unrationed mortgage market takes K/H 
to 0.82 compared with 1.13 under our growth only simulation. Relative house price 
inflation in an environment of mortgage rationing increases this ratio to 0.97 which 
is also closer to the growth case than general inflation. Our results therefore 
tentatively support M een's thesis that much of the tax and inflation bias was 
eliminated as a result of rationing, though our results suggest there was still a
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significant effect and rejects Meen’s (1990 pp. 6) proposition that rationing breaks 
the theoretical link between inflation, the tax system and real house prices (assuming 
that the long run results would produce similar price effects in the short run). Our 
analysis shows that rationing also tends to reduce the loan to valuation ratio and 
reduce the value of the MIRAS subsidy thus increasing household tax outflows and 
consequently reducing disposable income.
As a result of specifying the user cost of mortgages, and our breakdown of the 
factors which determine the loan to valuation ratio, namely, demand, a binding 
constraint and rationing, we have presented a further level of detail in the 
determination of the mortgage stock. Quite simply, even before we introduce our 
mortgage rationing environment there is a shortfall between individuals desired 
mortgage stock and the actual stock. This occurs because inflation reduces the user 
cost of mortgages to such a low level that mortgage market institutions have to 
impose lending limits (the mortgage premium can not rise to clear the market for the 
reasons explained in Section 2.3.1.7.). Effectively the user cost of mortgages no 
longer has a bearing on the actual mortgage stock. Thus, when measuring the 
influence of an imposed reduction in the lenders loan to income multiple it is 
important to asses what effect on mortgage demand, if  any, their equilibrium 
multiple may be exerting.
Given the conditions prevalent in the 1960's and 1970's our model concurs with 
M een's (1989) assertion that the impact on housing demand of an exogenous shock 
depends on the mortgage market regime. Our model does show, however, that such 
an impact will not always be dependent on this. More specifically, when the user 
cost of mortgages is high enough that actual and desired mortgage stock equate then 
an exogenous shock may have the same effect irrespective of the mortgage finance 
regime. For example, our abolition of MIRAS simulation provides an environment 
where mortgage demand is at a relatively low level such that introducing mortgage 
rationing has no impact on the model. The results of a further exogenous change to 
the model will not, therefore, be influenced by the state of the mortgage market.
The effects of moving from a regime of rationing to one of non rationing can be 
observed by moving from right to left of the base simulation in Table 5.1. Without 
counterbalancing policies this will tend to reduce K/H, this conclusion is also 
reached by Miles (1990). The results reported in Chapter 5 show that under 
alternative policy regimes rationing may or may not have an effect on resource 
allocation depending if  the policy increases the mortgage user cost or not. That is, 
the imposition of rationing may not offset mortgage demand when potential lenders 
supply is greater than demand, such as our policy simulations which exclude
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MIRAS. It is unlikely that a return to mortgage rationing would be politically 
acceptable and there is little support in other circles, for example Bank of England 
(1991) states that such a policy would be undesirable and difficult to implement and 
enforce. The results from our model suggest that, despite the difficulties in doing 
so, re-introducing rationing as a policy control (suggested by Muellbauer (1990a) and 
Potter (1988)) would not solve the problems of a distorted tax structure.
In an international context Table 2 in Nakumura (1981, pp. 68) provides real user 
cost of capital figures for the U .S., Japan and Germany. The highest ratio UC^/UCA 
is that of the U.S.A. who the author finds displays the greatest allocation bias 
towards owner occupied housing. The results imply a pronounced productivity loss 
in the U.S. compared to the other countries. Averaging the user cost of corporate 
structures and equipment, the ratio of manufacturing to housing user costs reported 
for the U .S.A . is 2.79. This is much lower than our model estimates which 
suggests that inefficiency in the U.K. is even higher than the U.S.A. and our other 
main international trade competitors (this conclusion assumes that the respective 
countries have similar long run supply elasticities).
In an attempt to asses the implications and effectiveness of policies which may 
neutralise the taxation bias we simulated the effects of alternative tax regimes under 
similar inflation and rationing conditions. The tax regimes were, exclude MIRAS, 
tax imputed income, a Super PEP and a simplification of the IFS 's ACE system.
The model suggests that the most direct way to rectify the allocative bias is to alter 
the taxation structure of owner occupied housing. Our abolition of MIRAS 
simulation has beneficial allocative results in the event of rising inflation and 
engenders a considerable degree of stability to the model. The result supports this 
as a common policy proposal (for example, see Congdon and Warburton (1987), 
Fitzgerald and Davies (1987) and Atkinson (1989)). Indeed both housing policies 
not only engendered a great deal of stability to the results but actually reverse the 
allocative impact of inflation and erradicated the need for mortgage rationing. It is 
not possible to compare the effectiveness between abolishing MIRAS and taxing 
imputed housing income (the latter being proposed by Muellbauer (1986b, 1987a, 
1987b, 1988b,c) and Hallet (1988)) without simulating each in isolation. On the 
other hand it is clear from our results that the Super PEP does little to protect 
manufacturing investment in periods of high inflation. This supports the conclusions 
presented in King and Wookey (1987) who demonstrate the present corporation tax 
systems weakness in an inflationary environment although they propose a cash flow 
tax base as a solution. Imposing a tax system based on real returns has proved 
difficult and therefore some account of inflation distortions may be achieved by the 
ACE system.
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In conclusion, resource allocation is a function of many factors the interaction of 
which is complex leading to the possibility that direction as well as magnitude can 
change if any one input changes. The main determinants analysed in our model are 
the rate of inflation, the taxation regime and conditions in the housing finance 
market. The allocative result of each of these factors depends crucially on the 
behaviour of the others and it is therefore necessary to formulate policy, not in 
isolation, but in the context of a wider range of influences. Furthermore it is 
clearly important to analyse the effects of policy under various possible 
environments, especially those which governments can find difficult to control such 
as inflationary shocks. The final result o f our adjusted and unadjusted models, a 
high housing content with a low mortgage debt level, provides just the circumstances 
where (in a deregulated mortgage market) a change in taxation policy could 
encourage individuals to raise mortgage debt, as real incomes rise, and invest the 
funds in more profitable sectors which would crowd out future housing investment. 
The liberalisation of the mortgage market in the 1980's which resulted in a flow of 
funds towards housing as a new equilibrium was reached only serves to reinforce 
this possibility.
Given both political and tax-capitalisation effects it could be argued that an 
alternative answer to rectifying this issue is not to alter the taxation of housing as 
suggested by many of the authors in Section 1.4.10. but to make manufacturing a 
more attractive alternative. This would have to be achieved at a time when 
government revenue could finance such a policy. In terms of robustness to inflation 
we have demonstrated that the ACE system would be preferable to PEP's. On the 
other hand the significance of MIRAS suggest that the policy of not increasing the 
threshold over time, and effectively reducing q in our model, is also attractive. 
Restricting MIRAS to the first ten years of entering the owner occupied housing 
market would have the same effect of lowering q and is similar in principle to the 
policy proposal of Malpas (1986) and Muellbauer (1986b). We have indicated that 
the biggest winners in the housing market over the past few decades is that cohort 
which has been in the market the longest, and therefore this policy coupled with 
something similar to the ACE system would result in an attractive policy 
combination in the U.K. as it would cap housing investment and encourage 
productive investment which would increase incomes over time and increase the 
employment prospects of those who have not gained in the housing market. If this 
proves politically difficult then the continued reduction in the real value of MIRAS 
and the ACE system (manufacturing CGT would be less of an issue given our 
results) would provide a more stable and productive policy mix.
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It would seem imprudent to take the view that membership of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism of the European Monetary System will result in the U.K. economy 
permanently being in a situation similar to our low inflation with economic growth 
simulation. That is to ignore, or attach a high probability that there is now no risk 
of inflationary shocks and therefore forget the possibility of relieving past 
experiences and, consequently, fail to tackle the issue of making the taxation 
structure robust to inflationary shocks, more favorable to risk taking and equitable 
across generations hardly seems desirable. Unless the issues discussed in this study 
are constructively addressed then the result o f following the discipline imposed by 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism will seem even more pyrrhic than they presently are. 
Capacity constraints will bind, even at relatively low levels o f growth as we witness 
greater import penetration and, ironically, a greater tendency to cost push inflation.
6.3. An Agenda for Further Work.
The following Section seeks to discuss possible extensions which would improve on 
some of the models drawbacks, or increase the range of the models results. Such 
work could vary in scale but would generally necessitate altering or expanding the 
simultaneous solution model. Utilising the current model, further combinations of 
policy regimes could be incorporated in exactly the method described in Chapter 5. 
For example we could impose the effects of taxing housing capital gains and 
compare this to the other policy simulations, or at a more simplistic level, it would 
be possible to alter parameter values given some economic rationale. For example 
we could alter marginal tax rates on the basis of alternative budget strategies.
Related to the above suggestion, the most straightforward work would be to 
parameterise the model according to the tax regime as it currently stands. While our 
model is not sterile in the application of its conclusions to todays economy its 
historical parameterisation could be regarded as a weakness when assessing the 
effects of policy on current economic conditions. There is little in the way of 
structural change as the imputation system remains in place although there would be 
the introduction of the PEP scheme. This work would result principally in a 
reduction in income tax, the present value of investment allowances (this is a result 
of the less favourable treatment of depreciation, stock and interest relief, see King 
and Wookey (1987, pp. 41-42)), corporation tax and the real value of the MIRAS 
threshold (q). Domestic rates would drop out of UCAa and we may wish to focus 
more on simulations which did not include such dramatic real house price rises if the 
1990's are to be a period of consolidation (at the current time this is the consensus 
view point, for example see Roseman (1990) and for the U .S. see Hokenson 
(1990)). Other parameters may change slightly while those determining risk
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premiums would be held constant. Of course if  we wished to accept the argument 
that the CSO capital stock estimates are too high, as argued by Smith (1986), 
Wadhwani and Wall (1986), Callen and Convey (1988) and Driver (1989) then we 
would have to re-estimate many of the manufacturing parameters presented in 
Chapter 3 using an adjusted capital stock series. This issue is of increasing 
relevance when parameterising for periods post the mid 1970's. The benefit of such 
work is that policy conclusions can be analysed more accurately from todays actual 
base. For example, while the path of the model variables will be similar, the 
influence of MIRAS in the face of inflation should be reduced while the absence of 
domestic rates and the reduction in the value of investment allowances will tend to 
counter balance this in asset allocation terms.
It would also be possible to introduce a simple supply side to the model, the absence 
of which could be regarded as a drawback, and its inclusion a useful extension.
This could be at the asset or sector level with one equation being required for each 
supply and the relevant elasticity. The model could then be switched from short to 
long run, assuming the appropriate elasticities were used. Caution would be 
required in particular if this route were taken given the uncertainty surrounding 
supply elasticity measures and care would be required when assessing price effects, 
although we could utilise the option of assuming instantaneous price adjustment by 
assuming supply to be fixed (introducing the option of collapsing the model into the 
short run).
The model is flexible enough to incorporate many changes, this includes the most 
dramatic change of the 1980's, mortgage rationing, the likely effects of which were 
not instantly forthcoming. Specifically, it could be argued that the ultimate result of 
a deregulated mortgage market is that as equilibrium is achieved returns will become 
more sensitive to general market influences (for example building societies are 
already increasingly dependent on wholesale money market funds). Such an 
environment also suggests that as borrowers can obtain higher loan to valuation 
ratio's than before the probability of defaults rises throughout the economic cycle. 
Lenders may wish to assess individuals credit standing further and competition in 
both the funding and loan markets should ensure that returns to lenders will fluctuate 
more than in the past, this is already occurring. It would be possible to replace our 
assumed fixed mortgage mark up, mp, with a variable mortgage risk premium which 
does conform to the mean-variance approach used for other assets.
This would be relatively straightforward to incorporate (and has been implemented, 
although not reported here) to incorporate, model changes would be to respecify 
equation (2.51) as,
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Tjfnb — [i +  R<72flmi>(pHmi,/W )] (1 -Q ?). (6.1)
This would result in,
= (i-esv),
152 =  v(l-0$)R<7,2rf"* +  (1-v) Ra2^ ,
the term R3 would be equivalent to in the basic model (Section 2 .4 .6 .2 .). The 
difficulty with this alteration is parameterising o2Hmb as we have no stable long run 
history to appeal to.
Further interesting work could be carried out at a more disaggregate level. For 
example, it was not the purpose of the present study to differentiate between wealthy 
households (those individuals who largely owned their house) who provide mortgage 
funds to non-wealthy households (those with large loan to valuation ratio's). Such 
work was carried out by HH who incorporated many features specific to the U.S. 
housing market, such as, the effects of level-payment fixed rate mortgage 
instruments some of which would be non-assumable (that is the interest rate would 
be re-struck if the household moved) although HH do not identify separate real cash 
flows between wealthy and non-wealthy and they split initial wealth arbitrarily in the 
model. While we do not incorporate any real gain as the value of mortgage debt 
declines with accelerating inflation as this cancels out across households at the 
aggregate level this would not be the case if a wealthy, non-wealthy split were 
introduced. The wealthy, non-wealthy split could be made to represent the 
difference between new and existing participants in the housing ladder and therefore 
allow us to simulate our policy suggestion with respect to MIRAS for the first ten 
years in the mortgage market presented in Section 6.2.
Although more ambitious, it would be possible to model other major countries using 
the same methodology utilised in our basic model. Rather than study these in 
isolation the countries could be merged into one simultaneous block in which we 
would assume freedom of international capital flows, thus assets would be allocated 
globally. The rationale for this is that international capital flows are of increasing 
importance regarding the allocation of global resources (even domestic building 
societies are increasingly sourcing funds from overseas capital markets). This is of 
relevance to policy makers as well as academics as there is increasing evidence (see 
Razin and Slemrod, 1990) that domestic taxation regimes play a major role in
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international resource allocation. Jun (1990) utilises relative net rates of return 
between the U.S.A. and the rest of the world to demonstrate that U .S.A . domestic 
tax policy can have a significant effect on direct investment capital flows.
In a similar spirit it would be possible to look within the U.K. at regional asset 
allocation. Utilising the model described in this research we could provide evidence 
regarding the effects of regional parameter variations. In particular, parameters such 
as expected capital gains from either sector, regional grants and investment 
allowances and the risk premium of regional housing markets (through house prices) 
would be of interest. Many factors would remain unchanged as they would be at 
the aggregate level, for example income and corporation tax rates, and the model 
would therefore expose the effects of a select change in parameters across regions. 
Obtaining reasonable estimates of the present value of investment allowances and 
grants at a regional level would represent the most problematic task in such work. 
While our model does not provide results regarding the workings o f the labour 
market, the labour market thesis discussed in Section 1.4.5.1. is essentially a 
problem of regional house price differentiation which restricts labour mobility. This 
problem is complex but our model could shed some light regarding the outcome of a 
regional taxation policy which may help to alleviate this problem. It is worth noting 
however that the stability of the model variables when MIRAS is reduced would cut 
regional housing volatility. If on the other hand Egginton (1988) is correct in 
arguing that regional earnings are the key to house prices which are dependent on 
regional industrial growth then regional allowances to industry would be an obvious 
policy to reduce unemployment which our model could incorporate.
6.4. Conclusion.
Our research demonstrates that manufacturing investment has to some extent been 
crowded out by housing investment in the 1960's and 1970's. It could be argued 
that the wealth currently tied up in housing will be refinanced (an increase in 
mortgage demand) and utilised to crowd in a new more attractive investment vehicle 
if taxation policy permitted. If the taxation of housing continues to remain 
politically sensitive our research demonstrates that the taxation of productive 
alternative investments should be in some ways comparable to housing taxation. In 
particular, the powerful investment incentive arising from housing taxation and 
inflation has to be addressed for any policy to be robust over various economic 
environments.
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RESULTS APPENDIX
Section A.
Period 1
ak =  0.220517 
ah =  1.2472 
am — 0.62041 
Cju =  2468.621
Period 2
ak =  0.647999 
ah = 4.4111 
am = 0.71786 
Cw =  49.179
Period 3
ak = 0.449393 
ah = 1.8940 
otm = 0.56016 
C „  =  249.083
N/C denotes no change from the previous column result.
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Section B: Period 1.
Initial Base 0  =  0.402138 ■? I
I ©
Values Run
Sb 1,375 1,476 1,479 1,478
Lb 2,779 2,984 2,989 2,987
E 18,346 19,700 19,734 19,722
Hm/ 17,538 18,610 18,536 18,614
H/** 4,962 5,267 5,374 5,272
u c * . 0.220517 0.221167 0.220878 0.220980
UC*. 0.033640 0.033638 0.033835 0.033639
UCm 0.030992 N/C 0.031182 0.030992
B.1 0.775512 0.775535 0.778970 0.775578
&2 0.554995 0.554939 0.554199 0.554832
*3 0.001323 0.001324 0.001349 0.001324
b4 -0.016000 N/C N/C N/C
<*lc 1.260931 N/C 1.258154 1.259624
<*2c 0.215397 N/C 0.214880 0.215153
a 3c 0.953597 N/C 0.951237 0.954207
® 4c 0.087026 N/C N/C N/C
V 0.779483 0.779426 0.775250 0.779275
Y 22,500 24,234 24,242 24,239
TX* 7,766 8,365 8,293 8,364
TX* 1,058 1,143 1,142 N/C
MIRAS 333 354 349 354
RE 1,151 1,241 1,142 1,241
D 10,748 11,576 11,655 11,582
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4> = 0.4356 n =  0.693 e =  0.792 r  =  0.408375
Sb 1,477 1,468 1,449 1,487
Lb 2,986 2,966 2,929 3,005
E 19,716 19,585 19,337 19,843
Hmi 18,613 18,144 17,145 18,634
R p d 5,257 5,148 4,928 5,276
UC*, 0.221032 0.222185 0.224395 0.219923
uc„„ 0.033633 0.033636 0.033650 0.033637
ucm N/C N/C N/C N/C
B; 0.775441 0.775657 0.776310 0.775550
b2 0.555170 0.554638 0.553022 0.554888
*3 0.001322 0.001326 0.001340 0.001324
*4 N/C N/C N/C N/C
a lc 1.259178 1.260931 N/C 1.252925
“ 2c 0.215070 0.215397 N/C 0.213907
“ 2c 0.952170 0.953597 N/C 0.949075
®4c N/C N/C N/C 0.086454
V 0.779751 0.779003 0.776734 0.779355
Y 24,238 24,202 24,135 24,272
TX„ N/C 8,357 8,339 8,382
TX* N/C 1,146 1,153 1,124
MIRAS N/C 345 326 354
RE 1,251 1,242 1,243 1,249
D 11,570 11,560 11,525 11,595
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mp = 0.0099 T^ ek =  0.04653 v *  =  0.04653 * k =  0.00495
Sb
Lb
E
Hm/ 
HPd
U C ^
UCfe,
UCm
fi;
r3
« i c
« 2 c
<*3c
®4c
Y
TX*
TX*
MIRAS
RE
D
1,477
2,985
19,706
18,641
5,266
1,473
2,978
19,661
18,604
5,269
N/C
2,976
19,652
18,407
5,226
1,477
2,984
19,705
18,611
5,267
0.221115
0.033579
0.030921
0.221515
0.033640
0.030992
0.221588
0.034112
0.031462
0.221035
0.033638
0.030992
0.775443 0.775577 0.775693 0.775536
0.555166 0.554836 0.554547 0.554936
0.001322 0.001324 0.001327 0.001324
N/C N/C -0.015530 -0.016000
1.260931 N/C N/C N/C
0.215397 N/C N/C N/C
0.953597 N/C N/C N/C
0.087026 N/C N/C 0.086976
0.779744 0.779281 0.778876 0.779422
24,235
8,366
1,142
N/C
1,241
11,576
24,223
8,360
1,141
N/C
1,242
11,574
24,221
8,362
1,144
350
1,241
11,569
24,235
8,366
1,142
354
1,242
11,576
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* h =  0.01089 b =  0.182754 z =  0.32769 g 2e  =  0.06138
Sb N/C 1,459 1,461 1,484
Lb 2,986 2,950 2,998 2,999
E 19,712 19,717 19,700 19,798
H mZ 18,659 18,606 18,610 18,627
HW 5,280 5,265 5,267 5,270
u c ^ 0.221061 0.221408 0.221170 0.220312
UC*a 0.033528 0.033638 0.033638 0.033636
UCm 0.030882 0.030992 N/C N/C
Bi 0.775531 N/C 0.775536 0.775526
*2 0.554949 N/C 0.554936 0.554961
Bj 0.001323 N/C 0.001324 0.001323
B, -0.022050 -0.016000 N/C N/C
N/C 1.262405 1.260931 N/C
<*2c N/C 0.215862 0.215405 0.213261
“ ic N/C 0.953890 0.953597 N/C
&4c 0.087026 N/C N/C N/C
V 0.779441 0.779440 0.779422 0.779456
Y 24,237 24,226 24,234 24,260
TX* 8,363 8,362 8,365 8,374
TXjt N/C 1,145 1,143 1,140
MIRAS 355 354 N/C N/C
RE 1,241 N/C N/C 1,240
D 11,580 11,572 11,576 11,587
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(j2jjpd. — 0.00198 a2ub = 0.00792 R = 2.97 A = 0.3861
Sb
Lb
E
Hm/ 
H’p*
u c ^
UC,a
UCm
Bi
B2
Bj
B<
“ Jc
« 2 c
Y
TX*
TX*
MIRAS
RE
D
1,476
2,984
19,701
18,610
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
5,266
1,484
2,999
19,800
18,627
5,273
1,467
2,965
19,576
18,589
5,261
0.221162
0.033632
N/C
0.221160
0.033638
N/C
0.220301
0.033630
N/C
0.222265
0.033639
N/C
0.775560
0.554877
0.001311
N/C
N/C
0.215397
N/C
N/C
0.779338
0.775533
0.554944
0.001324
N/C
N/C
0.215378
N/C
N/C
0.779434
0.775549
0.554904
0.001311
N/C
N/C
0.213243
N/C
N/C
0.779377
0.775536
0.554937
0.001324
N/C
1.268993
0.216774
0.959694
0.087550
0.779423
24,234 N/C 24,260 24,200
8,365 N/C 8,374 8,352
1,142 1,143 1,140 1,151
N/C N/C N/C 353
1,241 N/C N/C 1,239
11,576 N/C 11,587 11,560
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Q = 0.04851 q = 0.70191 8h =  0.0198 6k =  0.07821
Sb 1,476 1,475 1,147 1,482
Lb 2,984 2,981 2,987 2,995
E 19,700 19,683 19,721 19,776
Hml 18,609 18,528 18,699 18,623
HP* 5,265 5,262 5,284 5,272
u c * . 0.221169 0.221316 0.220986 0.220511
u c ^ , 0.033637 0.033792 0.033436 0.033637
u c m N/C 0.031182 0.030792 0.030992
fi; 0.775525 0.777958 0.775466 0.775554
^ 2 0.554964 0.556737 0.555108 0.554893
0.001323 0.001327 0.001322 0.001324
b< N/C N/C -0.016200 -0.016000
<*ic 1.260931 N/C N/C N/C
« 2 c 0.215397 N/C N/C N/C
" J o 0.953597 N/C N/C N/C
0.087026 N/C N/C 0.086205
V 0.779462 0.778801 0.779664 0.779361
Y 24,234 24,229 24,239 24,254
TX„ 8,364 8,366 8,367 8,375
T X k 1,147 1,143 1,142 1,148
MIRAS 354 349 355 354
RE N/C 1,241 N/C 1,247
D 11,575 11,570 11,579 11,587
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i =  0.05544 r  =  0.99 ak = 0.2183118 a h =  1.234728
Sb 1,484 1,476 1,423 1,473
Lb 3,000 2,984 2,876 2,978
E 19,808 19,700 18,989 19,660
Hm/ 18,798 18,610 18,206 18,604
HPd 5,313 5,267 5,145 5,069
uc^ 0.220228 0.221167 0.220385 0.221518
uc,a 0.033202 0.033638 0.033639 0.033558
ucm 0.030594 0.030992 N/C N/C
Bi 0.775475 0.775535 0.775464 0.773683
S2 0.555087 0.554939 0.555130 0.559518
Bi 0.001322 0.001324 0.001322 0.001285
B, N/C N/C N/C N/C
<*lc N/C N/C N/C N/C
<*2c N/C N/C N/C N/C
N/C N/C N/C N/C
0.087026 N/C N/C N/C
V 0.775475 0.779426 0.779670 0.785857
Y 24,263 24,234 23,511 24,223
xx, 8,376 8,365 8,128 8,359
xx, 1,140 1,143 1,094 1,144
MIRAS N/C 354 346 354
RE 1,241 N/C 1,190 1,241
D 11,585 11,576 11,258 11,573
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T ^ h  =  T ^ e k  —  0
a m =  0.614259 Cw =  2443.935 i =  0.009
Sb 1,476 1,458 1,505
Lb 2,982 2,947 3,043
E 19,692 19,460 20,090
Hm/ 18,423 18,421 14,491
HPd 5,409 5,213 5,309
u c ^ 0.221243 0.221056 0.217814
U C,a 0.033714 0.033638 0.044031
UCm N/C N/C 0.044528
A; 0.777381 0.775533 0.789234
^ 2 0.550375 0.554943 0.521071
0.001362 0.001324 0.001609
b. N/C N/C 0.031000
& lc N/C N/C N/C
<*2c N/C N/C N/C
N/C N/C N/C
<*4c N/C N/C N/C
V 0.773015 0.779432 0.731852
Y 24,231 23,927 24,339
TX* 8,367 8,259 8,498
TXjt 1,143 1,128 979
MIRAS 350 N/C 79
RE N/C 1,225 1,321
D 11,572 11,429 11,594
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R = 2.5 R = 3.5
Sb 1,614 1,364
Lb 3,261 2,757
E 21,533 18,204
Hm/ 18,905 18,353
Y[pd 5,371 5,166
UCfa 0.206454 0.235211
UCte 0.033516 0.033760
UCm 0.030992 N/C
Bi 0.775733 0.775272
0.554448 0.555589
Bj 0.001106 0.001538
B* -0.016000 N/C
a u  N/C N/C
“ 2c N/C N/C
“ jc N/C N/C
N/C N/C
v 0.778737 0.780339
Y 24,714 23,815
TX* 8,527 8,224
TX* 1,090 1,183
MIRAS 359 349
RE 1,229 1,249
D 11,781 11,395
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Section C: Period 2.
Initial Base 0  =  0.328383 II 0
Values Run
Sb 14,660 16,926 16,922 16,980
Lb 6,773 7,819 7,818 7,845
E 42,566 49,143 49,134 49,302
H m/ 22,528 25,431 24,791 25,473
H#* 41,473 46,968 47,582 47,117
u c ^ 0.647999 0.653082 0.653125 0.652342
0.091371 0.091073 0.091442 0.091091
UCm 0.035539 N/C 0.035946 0.035539
Bi 0.896244 0.896652 0.898470 0.896752
^ 2 0.248436 0.247915 0.247039 0.247676
B, 0.071928 0.072010 0.072309 0.072047
B< -0.062000 N/C N/C N/C
a li 1.104937 N/C N/C 1.103941
<*2 i 0.987614 N/C N/C 0.986538
a 3i 0.998517 N/C N/C 1.000874
a 4i 0.103404 N/C N/C N/C
V 0.352001 0.351260 0.348566 0.350922
Y 64,000 74,476 74,467 74,631
TX* 10,170 11,840 11,765 11,837
TX* 17,405 20,288 20,286 20,315
MIRAS 916 1,034 1,015 1,036
Dnd 6,051 7,047 7,046 7,064
RE 11,746 13,680 13,678 13,713
D 19,622 22,829 22,899 22,908
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<f> =  0.3366 n =  0.963 e=  0.792 H
oII
Sb 16,885 16,724 16,056 17,277
Lb 7,801 7,726 7,418 7,982
E 49,026 48,557 46,619 50,164
Hm/ 25,399 24,689 22,816 25,703
46,756 46,050 42,543 47,623
u c ^ 0.653632 0.655846 0.665316 0.648375
UCAa 0.090990 0.091062 0.090362 0.090994
UCm N/C N/C N/C N/C
Bi 0.896431 0.897310 0.897286 0.896866
2^ 0.248445 0.246337 0.246394 0.247402
Bj 0.071926 0.072258 0.072249 0.072091
B, N/C N/C N/C N/C
<*H 1.105451 1.104937 N/C 1.095213
a 2i 0.988169 0.987614 N/C 0.977111
a 3i 0.998954 0.998517 N/C 0.987816
ot4i N/C N/C N/C 0.102363
V 0.352012 0.349024 0.349106 0.350534
Y 74,360 73,899 71,974 75,474
TX„ 11,829 11,756 11,453 12,030
TX* 20,261 20,150 19,686 20,322
MIRAS 1,033 1,004 928 1,045
Dnd 6,966 6,995 6,823 7,204
RE 13,730 13,580 13,245 13,984
D 22,715 22,644 22,050 23,177
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r *  =  0.09009 ^eh — 0.09009 * k = 0.006237
Sb 16,887 16,823 16,929
Lb 7,802 7,772 7,821
E 49,031 48,845 49,153
Hm/ 25,400 24,905 25,433
HPd 46,947 46,648 46,975
u c to 0.653607 0.654483 0.653037
UC,a 0.091114 0.092152 0.091072
UCm N/C 0.036449 0.035539
Bi 0.896700 0.897588 0.896655
B2 0.247801 0.245670 0.247909
Bs 0.072028 0.072363 0.072011
*4 N/C -0.061090 -0.062000
<*n 1.104937 N/C N/C
a 2i 0.987614 N/C N/C
a 3i 0.998517 N/C N/C
<*4i 0.103404 N/C 0.103341
V 0.351099 0.348080 0.351253
Y 74,366 74,182 74,485
T X h 11,818 11,803 11,842
T X k 20,252 20,218 20,288
MIRAS 1,033 1,013 1,034
Dnd 7,033 7,021 7,049
RE 13,653 13,629 13,683
D 22,817 22,729 22,833
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$ h =  0.00891 b =  0.331551 mp =  0.0099
Sb 16,938 16,615 16,931
Lb 7,825 7,676 7,822
E 49,179 48,974 49,157
Hm/ 25,485 25,319 25,469
47,016 46,717 46,969
u c to 0.652915 0.655032 0.653018
U C,a 0.090972 0.091116 0.091022
UCm 0.035449 0.035539 0.035469
»i 0.896575 0.896588 0.896549
fi2 0.248100 0.248069 0.248162
83 0.071981 0.071986 0.071971
8 , -0.062090 -0.062000 N/C
<*n N/C 1.107530 1.104937
<*2i N/C 0.992471 0.987614
<*3i N/C 0.998284 0.998517
OL4i 0.103404 N/C N/C
V 0.351522 0.351479 0.351610
Y 74,511 74,068 74,489
TX* 11,838 11,765 11,842
TX* 20,297 2 0 ,2 1 1 20,292
MIRAS 1,036 1,029 1,035
Dnd 7,050 7,009 7,048
RE 13,686 13,606 13,682
D 22,847 22,696 22,833
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z =  0.67716 o 2e  = 0.3564 o*a* =  0.03663
Sb 16,754 17,176 16,950
Lb 7,988 7,935 1,035
E 49,136 49,871 49,213
H” ' 25,429 25,625 25,449
HW 46,975 47,373 47,150
u c ^ 0.653115 0.649711 0.652753
UC*. 0.091080 0.090975 0.090801
ucm 0.035539 N/C N/C
B| 0.896667 0.896717 0.896862
^2 0.247880 0.247761 0.274130
B, 0.072150 0.072034 0.071368
B< N/C N/C N/C
«7i N/C N/C N/C
“ a 0.987780 0.977814 N/C
N/C N/C N/C
a 4i N/C N/C N/C
V 0.351211 0.351042 0.350549
Y 74,469 75,188 7,454
TX, 11,842 11,961 11,853
TX, 20,281 20,456 20,305
MIRAS 1,034 1,042 1,034
Dnd 7,045 7,109 7,053
RE 13,675 13,802 13,692
D 22,832 23,044 22,848
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o*u> =  0.04059 R =  2.97 A =  0.4059
Sb 16,927 17,202 16,702
Lb 7,820 7,947 7,716
E 49,146 49,946 48,494
Hm/ 25,432 25,645 25,256
Hf* 46,965 47,553 46,601
u c ^ 0.653067 0.649369 0.656143
UC,a 0.091069 0.090700 0.091158
UCm N/C N/C N/C
Bi 0.896646 0.896919 0.896587
fi2 0.247931 0.247276 0.248070
0.072007 0.071389 0.071985
B< N/C N/C N/C
<*n N/C N/C 1.112615
ot2i N/C N/C 0.994477
a 3t N/C N/C 1.005456
&4i N/C N/C 0.104079
V 0.351283 0.350355 0.351481
Y 74,479 75,261 73,837
TX* 11,839 11,973 11,730
TXjt 20,292 20,476 20,148
MIRAS 1,034 1,043 1,027
Dnd 7,048 7,117 6,987
RE 13,681 13,816 13,563
D 22,827 23,061 22,634
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Q 0.03937 9 = 0.87813 8h =  0.0198
Sb 16,923 16,894 16,949
Lb 7,819 7,805 7,830
E 49,141 49,052 49,210
U m i 25,430 25,204 25,549
U p* 46,962 46,934 47,040
u c ^ 0.653093 0.653511 0.652770
0.091070 0.091343 0.090834
UCW N/C 0.035946 0.035339
Bi 0.896645 0.898229 0.896442
il2 0.247932 0.247626 0.248420
Bj 0.072007 0.072217 0.071930
B< N/C N/C -0.062200
<*u 1.104937 N/C N/C
<*2i 0.987614 N/C N/C
<*3i 0.998517 N/C N/C
0141 0.103404 N/C N/C
V 0.351284 0.349394 0.351976
Y 74,473 74,386 74,541
TX* 11,838 11,842 11,848
T X k 20,299 20,267 20,304
MIRAS 1,034 1,014 1,039
Dnd 7,043 7,039 7,053
RE 13,672 13,664 13,691
D 22,826 22,785 22,851
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8k =  0.07821 i = 0.126918 r = 0.99
Sb 16,976 17,111 16,926
Lb 7,843 7,905 7,819
E 49,291 49,681 49,143
Hm/ 25,470 26,040 25,431
HP* 47,063 47,472 46,968
0.652394 0.650586 0.653082
0.091061 0.089748 0.091073
UCm 0.035539 0.034634 0.035539
Bi 0.896683 0.895776 0.896652
b2 0.247841 0.250016 0.247915
Bj 0.072021 0.071679 0.072010
B< -0.062000 N/C N/C
a n N/C N/C N/C
<*2i N/C N/C N/C
<*3i N/C N/C N/C
&4i 0.102433 0.103404 N/C
V 0.351156 0.354238 0.351260
Y 74,620 75,002 74,476
TX* 11,867 11,917 11,840
TX, 20,353 20,430 20,288
MIRAS 1,036 1,049 1,034
Dnd 7,069 7,099 7,047
RE 13,723 13,781 13,680
D 22,879 22,972 22,829
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otk = 0.641519 ah = 4.366989 £«  =  48.68721 a m =  0.7106814
Sb
Lb
E
Hm/ 
Hpd
u c te
UC,a
UCm
*1
*2
<*2/
O L 4 1
Y
TX*
TX,
MIRAS
Dnd
RE
D
14,011
6,473
40,681
21,991
40,340
0.643394
0.091646
N/C
0.896199
0.249003
0.071839
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
0.352807
61,350
9,851
16,491
894
5,738
11,139
19,036
16,837
7,779
48,886
25,362
46,307
0.654289
0.090761
N/C
0.895884
0.249759
0.071720
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
0.353873
74,223
11,793
20,228
1,031
7,024
13,636
22,758
16,512
7,628
47,940
24,905
45,971
0.652214
0.091125
N/C
0.896614
0.248007
0.071995
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
0.351390
72,556
11,534
19,760
1,012
6,864
13,325
22,241
16,902
7,808
49,074
25,158
47,046
0.653403
0.091291
N/C
0.897484
0.245921
0.072324
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
0.348435
74,408
11,838
20,272
1,023
7,041
13,668
22,780
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T^ eh — ^ek = Q
i =  0.0372 R =  2.5 R =  3.5
Sb 16,356 22,634 13,166
Lb 7,556 10,457 6,082
E 47,490 65,717 38,227
Hm/ 16,863 29,566 22,275
HPd 48,284 58,424 38,674
u c ^ 0.660997 0.589577 0.713464
UC„a 0.104447 0.084832 0.097291
UCm 0.062313 0.035539 N/C
A; 0.923840 0.901138 0.892472
^ 2 0.182696 0.237153 0.257943
B* 0.082267 0.061419 0.082172
&4 0.029000 -0.062000 N/C
<*li N/C N/C N/C
a 2i N/C 0.823011 1.152216
<*3i N/C N/C N/C
(%4i N/C N/C N/C
V 0.258855 0.336013 0.365474
Y 72,842 89,908 63,288
TX, 11,306 14,482 9,953
TX, 20,048 23,911 17,562
MIRAS 234 1,202 906
Dnd 6,846 8,413 6,041
RE 13,289 16,331 11,726
D 22,556 27,377 19,504
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Section D: Culmulative Base Model Simulations 1965-79.
Initial Growth General
Values Inflation
Balance sheet asset split (%)
Sb 6.3 6.7 6.3
Lb 6.4 6.8 6.4
E 37.3 39.3 36.9
Hm/ 27.5 24.6 25.4
HPd 22.5 22.6 25.0
Ratio of real user costs
U C JU C * . 9.64 8.60 9.49
u < v u q . 15.19 13.66 24.20
Housing user cost parameters
Rj 0.837996 0.846673 0.851906
R2 0.388602 0.367788 0.355238
R3 0.025615 0.027296 0.028310
R4 -0.017000 N/C -0.060000
Loan to valuation ratio and risk free rate (%)
v 55.1 52.1 50.3
i 5.6 N/C 9.8
Real cash flows as a percentage of output (Y)
T X h 26.2 23.4 23.3
TX* 15.9 14.9 15.3
MIRAS 1.1 1.0 1.7
Dnd 8.7 8.2 N/C
RE 12.2 N/C N/C
D 37.7 40.7 40.6
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Relative Price
Inflation
Mortgage
Rationing
Sb 5.8 6.1
Lb 5.9 6.2
E 34.5 36.1
Hm/ 22.3 17.1
Ytpd 31.5 34.5
U C ^/U C * 7.51 7.14
U Q JU C*, 66.69 79.10
Rj 0.878150 0.902248
fl2 0.292283 0.234478
R3 0.033394 0.038062
R4 -0.077500 N/C
v 41.4 33.1
i 10.6 10.5
T X h 23.6 24.0
TX* 14.9 14.8
MIRAS 1.9 1.4
Dnd 8.1 8.0
RE 12.0 N/C
D 40.4 40.0
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Section E: Culmulative Adjusted Base Model Simulations 1965-79.
Model derived parameters
a* =  0.236242 
oth =  1.325900 
a m =  0.598050 
Cw =  2108.706
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Initial
Values
Growth General
Inflation
Balance sheet asset split (% )
Sb 6.3 6.7 6.0
Lb 6.4 6.8 6.1
E 37.3 39.6 35.6
38.2 35.1 36.4
HPd 11.8 11.8 15.9
Ratio of real user costs
UCJXJCha 6.13 5.61 6.55
U C JU C m 7.99 7.32 12.61
Housing user cost parameters
Rj 0.775281 0.779535 0.794498
B2 0.539039 0.528834 0.492941
&3 0.013466 0.014290 0.017189
R4 -0.017000 N/C -0.060000
Loan to valuation ratio and risk free rate (%)
v 76.4 74.9 69.7
i 5.6 N/C 9.9
Real cash flows as a percentage of output (Y)
TX* 30.8 29.6 29.1
TX* 6.1 5.2 5.8
MIRAS 1.5 1.4 2.4
Dnd 3.6 N/C 3.7
RE 5.4 N/C 5.5
D 49.8 51.1 51.6
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Relative Price
Inflation
Sb 5.7
Lb 5.8
E 33.6
H™' 32.6
HP* 22.3
U C JU C * . 6.19
u c v u c m 30.59
fi; 0.825489
B2 0.418603
B, 0.023192
K -0.077500
V 59.3
i 10.8
•c
XH
29.2
H X 5.4
MIRAS 2.6
Dnd 3.6
RE 5.3
D N/C
Mortgage
Rationing
6.2
6.3
36.7 
25.2
25.6
5.6
31.76
0.853993
0.350229
0.028714
N/C
49.6 
N/C
29.8
5.1
2.0
3.4
5.1 
51.0
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Section F: Initial Values of Policy Simulations.
Exclude Tax Imputed Super PEP ACE System
MIRAS Income
Balance sheet asset split (%)
Sb 7.0 7.0 6.7 6.8
Lb 7.1 7.1 6.8 6.9
E 41.0 41.1 39.6 39.9
Hml 31.1 31.1 35.2 35.3
HW 13.8 13.7 11.7 11.1
Ratio of real user costs
u cv u c* . 4.61 4.59 5.36 5.38
V C J V C m 5.06 5.07 6.99 6.96
Housing and manufacturing user cost parameters
Bj 1 1.004567 0.779115 0.776785
ft2 0.691170 0.697260 0.529842 0.535430
*3 0.017603 0.017516 0.014209 0.013750
-0.017000 N/C N/C N/C
<*1 1.245902 N/C 0.985092 0.413629
a 2 0.235093 N/C 0.185098 0.235093
<*3 0.955194 N/C 0.858347 0.696847
ol4 0.093829 N/C N/C 0.089658
Loan to valuation ratio and risk free rate (%)
v 69.1 69.7 75.1 75.9
i 5.6 N/C N/C N/C
Real cash flows as a percentage of output (Y)
XH
32.1 32.4 29.6 31.1
TX* 6.3 6.3 5.4 4.2
MIRAS - - 1.5 1.5
Dnd 6.3 6.4 3.3 3.9
RE 5.5 5.5 5.0 5.7
D 48.6 48.2 
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51.0 49.9
Exclusion of MIRAS.
General Relative
Growth Inflation Inflation
Balance sheet asset split (%)
Sb 7.3 7.9 7.5
Lb 7.4 8.0 7.6
E 43.3 46.4 44.2
JJm/ 28.2 25.4 22.5
jjpd 13.8 12.3 18.2
Ratio of real user costs
U Q JU C *. 4.32 4.59 4.30
UCfc/UQ. 4.62 4.94 4.93
Housing and manufacturing user cost parameters
15; 1 N/C N/C
152 0.673092 0.674729 0.553555
Bj 0.018634 0.018540 0.025447
*4 -0.017000 -0.060000 -0.077500
a l 1.245902 N/C N/C
a 2 0.235093 N/C N/C
a 3 0.955194 N/C N/C
oc4 0.093829 N/C N/C
Loan to valuation ratio and risk free rate (%)
v 67.3 37.5 55.4
i 5.6 9.9 10.8
Real cash flows as a percentage of output (Y)
TX* 30.8 31.5 31.7
TX* 5.5 4.6 4.3
MIRAS - - -
Dnd 3.7 3.3 3.2
RE 5.5 5.0 4.8
D 50.0 49.2 N/C
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Rationing
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
N/C
Taxation of imputed paid up housing income.
General Relative
Growth Inflation Inflation Rationing
Balance sheet asset split (%)
Sb 7.4 7.9 7.6 N/C
Lb 7.5 8.0 7.7 N/C
E 43.4 46.7 44.6 N/C
Hm/ 28.3 25.5 22.6 N/C
HPd 13.4 11.9 17.5 N/C
Ratio of real user costs
U C ^/U C ^ 4.21 4.57 4.27 N/C
uCh/uq. 4.63 4.96 4.95 N/C
Housing and manufacturing user cost parameters
Bi 1.015084 N/C N/C N/C
0.679212 0.682388 0.563504 N/C
Bj 0.018561 0.018377 0.032604 N/C
B, -0.017000 -0.060000 -0.077500 N/C
<*i 1.245902 N/C N/C N/C
«2 0.235093 N/C N/C N/C
0.955194 N/C N/C N/C
0.093829 N/C N/C N/C
Loan to valuation ratio and risk free rate (%)
v 67.9 68.2 56.4 N/C
i 5.6 9.9 10.9 N/C
Real cash flows as a percentage of output (Y)
TX* 31.1 31.8 32.3 N/C
TX* 5.4 4.5 4.2 N/C
MIRAS - - - -
Dnd 3.7 3.3 3.2 N/C
RE 5.5 5.0 4.8 N/C
D 49.7 48.9 48.6 N/C
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Super PEP.
General Relative
Growth Inflation Inflation Rationing
Balance sheet asset split (%)
Sb 6.8 6.0 5.7 6.2
Lb 6.9 6.2 5.8 6.3
E 40.3 35.7 33.6 36.8
Hm/ 34.4 36.4 32.6 25.2
HPd 11.6 15.7 22.3 25.5
Ratio of real user costs
V C J \J C ha 5.43 6.24 5.89 5.32
u c v u c m 7.06 11.98 29.02 30.12
Housing and manufacturing user cost parameters
Bi 0.779501 0.794408 0.825166 0.853668
0.528917 0.493160 0.419379 0.351011
0.014283 0.017171 0.023130 0.028651
* 4 -0.017000 -0.060000 -0.077500 N/C
0.985092 N/C N/C N/C
«2 0.185098 N/C N/C N/C
“ 3 0.858347 N/C N/C N/C
o l4 0.093829 N/C N/C N/C
Loan to valuation ratio and risk free rate (%)
V 74.9 69.9 59.4 49.7
i 5.6 9.9 10.8 N/C
Real cash flows as a percentage of output (Y)
TX„ 29.6 29.0 28.1 29.7
TX* 5.4 6.5 6.0 5.9
MIRAS 1.4 2.4 2.6 2.0
Dnd 3.4 N/C 3.1 N/C
RE 5.1 4.9 4.7 N/C
D 51.0 51.4 49.6 50.8
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ACE System.
General Relative
Growth Inflation Inflation Rationing
Balance sheet asset split (%)
Sb 6.98 6.1 5.7 6.3
Lb 7.0 6.2 5.8 6.4
E 40.6 36.0 33.8 37.0
I\ml 34.5 36.4 21.6 25.2
JIpd  11.0 15.3 33.1 25.1
Ratio of real user costs
U C JU C * . 5.46 5.64 5.14 4.72
UCfcl/UCm 7.04 10.71 25.07 26.47
Housing and manufacturing user cost parameters
Bi 0.777130 0.792691 0.823941 0.852572
^2 0.534603 0.497278 0.422316 0.353640
0.013824 0.016838 0.022893 0.028439
-0.017000 -0.060000 -0.077500 N/C
<*i 0.413629 N/C N/C N/C
«2 0.235093 N/C N/C N/C
0.696847 N/C N/C N/C
0.089658 N/C N/C N/C
Loan to valuation ratio and risk free rate (%)
v 75.7 70.4 59.8 50.1
i 5.6 9.9 10.8 N/C
Real cash flows as a percentage of output (Y)
TX* 31.1 30.6 30.8 31.4
TX* 4.2 5.0 4.6 3.8
MIRAS 1.4 2.4 2.6 2.0
Dnd 3.8 2.3 2.4 2.1
RE 5.8 6.0 N/C 5.9
D 49.9 50.4 50.5 50.0
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